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A
D E F E N S E
O F
HUMAN LIBERTY,

In ANSWER to the
PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS
which have been alledged against it;

And particularly to
CATO's LETTERS on That Subject.

In which DEFENSE
The Opinion of the Antients, concerning FATE,
is also distinctly and largely considered.

By JOHN JACKSON,
Rector of *Rossington* in the County of *York*, and Pre-
bendary of *Wherwell* in the County of *Southampton*.

Non est igitur natura deorum præpotens neque excellens, siquidem ea subiecta est ei vel necessitati vel natura, qua cælum, maria, terræque regantur. Nihil autem est præstantius Deo, ab eo igitur necesse est mundum regi: Cic. de Nat. Deorum, lib. 2.

Fato quædam agi verum est; & quod quædam in nostra potestate sunt, hoc quoque verum esse monstratum est. Quare qui omnia Fato fieri dicunt merito reprehenduntur ab iis qui probant esse aliquid in nostra potestate. Denique qui omnia in nostra potestate constituunt, nec quicquam Fato relinquunt, falli deteguntur. Quis enim ignoret esse aliquid in Fato & extra nostrum jus? Sola igitur vera illa ratio est, fixæque & stabilis sententia, quæ docet quædam Fato fieri, alia porro ex hominum Arbitrio & Voluntate proficisci. Chalcid. Com. in Plat. Tim. c. 7, Sect. 188.

L O N D O N :

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THE DEATH OF
HUMANITY

18

CHAS. S. DILLON'S

The Origin of the ...

1900

1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 1, 1861. It is a copy of the original letter, and is signed by Abraham Lincoln.



1891-1892

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THE PREFACE.



S Liberty of thinking and judging for ourselves is the Privilege and Right of all Mankind, as being rational Creatures; and a free impartial Enquiry after Truth is, in Matters of Philosophy, the great Principle of natural Knowledge, and in Matters of Religion and Morality, the Ground and Foundation of true Virtue and sincere Piety; so this Liberty ought to be labour'd after by ourselves, and encouraged as much as possible in all others.

A 2

On

THE PREFACE.

*On which Account I do not blame the late Author of * Cato's Letters for applying his Reason and Understanding to the Search of the most nice and difficult Truths; or for any Designs or Endeavours (after a full and fair Examination of things) to inform the Minds of others in that Knowledge which appeared to him to be founded in Truth and Reason.*

But as it is certain (and his own good Sense could not but convince him) that a Thing or Matter, tho' true in itself, is not worth the studying, and much less the publishing abroad, if it is of no Use or Benefit either to ourselves or others: So, much more, if our Enquiries lead us into Notions which are not only of no Use but of great Hurt and Mischief unto all; such as not only do

* The Letters contained in the following Treatise, when first published, were subscribed *Diogenes*, and were written by the late Mr. Trenchard, as we are inform'd by the Editor of *Cato's Letters*.

THE PARADOX

not tend to promote the Service of God, and the Interests of Religion, the Good of Society or any useful Knowledge whatsoever; but on the contrary do manifestly and directly subvert the Foundation of all Morality and Religion, destroy the essential Difference of Virtue and Vice, Good and Evil; and take away the Ground, and Reason, and Obligation of all both divine and human Laws, and contradict all our Knowledge and Experience concerning the Works of Nature and Providence; we should at least suspect such Notions to be erroneous and false, and that their appearing to us to be true, may be the effect of some Prejudice or corrupt Judgment in us; and therefore should be very cautious of giving our Assent to them, and wish at least that after further Examination these Notions may be found to have no Truth in them, which,
if

THE PREFACE.

if they should prove true, every Thing almost besides must be false.

And supposing it, after all, possible for an unprejudic'd Mind to think such Nations to be true, or not to perceive the Falshood of them; yet 'tis evident that (as being pernicious to every rational Nature) they can have no right to be defended; and therefore no wise or well dispos'd Man would, I think, publish to the World, what tends only to corrupt and mischief it, and to take away those natural, moral, and civil Obligations, on which the good Order, the Peace and Welfare of it are entirely built and supported.

Of this Nature, and attended with these Consequences, I take the following Speculations of the foremention'd Author on the Necessity of the Actions, both of God and Men, and his Defenses of it to be; which Notion I
think,

The P R E F A C E.

think, and shall endeavour in the following Sheets largely to prove, very weak and groundless in itself, and opposite to the Supposition of God's being a real and moral Agent, Creator and Governor of the World, and of Man being a rational, moral and accountable Creature; and which by true and immediate Consequence destroys the very Essence of Virtue and Vice, Religion and Piety, and overthrows the Ground and Obligation of all the Laws of God and of human Society.

And as such a pernicious Scheme cannot be too much opposed and confuted; so the Defense of human Liberty of Action, which presupposes the Free-agency of the divine Nature, and on which the Nature and Distinction of Good and Evil, all Piety and Worship towards God, Justice, Righteousness,

THE P R E F A C E


ness, and all social Virtue towards Men, is wholly and entirely founded, cannot but be acceptable to all sincere Lovers of Truth and Virtue, and Professors of true Religion and Godliness.



LETTER



LETTER I



THE Author of *Cato's Letters* on the Subject of *Liberty**, introduces his Thoughts with an Enquiry into the *Origin of Good and Evil*; and he conceives *moral Good*, or *Virtue*, to be nothing but the *Relation of Mens Actions to one another*, either dictated by *Reason*, by the *Precepts of Heaven*, or the *Commands of the Sovereign* acting according to his *Duty*.

In these Words our Author does not set out with an Accuracy suitable to his great Genius; for *Virtue* and *Vice*, *Good* and *Evil*, in the *moral* Sense of them, are not founded in the *Relation of Mens Actions to one another*; but *antecedently* to any such Relation, they are founded in the *essential Difference* of Things, and their *necessary A-*

* *Cato's Letters*, Vol. IV. p. 168, &c.

agreements and Disagreements, consider'd with the several *Circumstances* of them, and as being natural Objects of every *rational Agent*.

Supposing indeed *Society*, Mens Actions must in many Cases have a *Relation* to one another; but this Relation is not the *Origin* of the *Virtue* or *Morality* of Actions, any more than the Relation of a *Cone* to a *Globe*, or of a *Square* to a *Circle*, is the Origin of their different Natures. Mens Actions may be either *good* or *evil*, although they have *no Relation* to other Men: It will always be *virtuous* and *good* in Men to employ and improve those *rational* Faculties which God has given them. To study the Works of Nature, and contemplate the Being and Perfections of God, with a suitable Sense of his wise and good Providence, and of the manifold Blessings of Life which we derive from thence, always was, and always will be, *morally good*. *Temperance*, *Sobriety*, and *Contentment* in his Condition, will always be a Duty and Virtue in every Man, tho' he were *alone*, and there was no other Man in the World: And *Cato* is aware that the Morality of Mens Actions is to be extended farther than the *Relation* which they bear to each other, by adding, towards the Conclusion of this Letter, that it consists also in the Relation of their Actions *to the Supreme Being*. (p. 174.)

Therefore, though a great part of Mens Actions relates to one another, consider'd as having a Property, and certain natural Rights, and are
more

more or less *virtuous* or *vicious*, as they affect this natural Property, and bring greater or less Good or Evil to Men; and so, many Virtues and Vices are of a *social* Nature, and have an immediate Respect to the mutual Relation of Men to each other, insomuch that without such a Relation, those Virtues and Vices cou'd not be exercis'd: Yet nevertheless, the proper Origin of *Virtue* and *Vice*, *Good* and *Evil*, abstractedly consider'd as such, is founded, not in the *external* Relation of Mens Actions, either to each other, or even unto God; but in the *essential* Difference of Things and their *Circumstances*, as they relate to, or are Objects of a *rational* Nature. As *Reason* consists in the Perception of the natural and unalterable Congruity and Incongruity of Things, and of their *Circumstances* and *Relations* to each other; so Actions are *good* or *evil* as they are agreeable to *Reason* or not; or as they are *reasonable* or *unreasonable*: And therefore those Actions call'd *Justice* and *Charity*, *Obedience*, &c. and their Contraries, have, as being moral *Virtues* and *Vices*, (tho' relative to others,) the same Foundation with other Virtues and Vices that are *not* *relative*; namely, the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness of them to natural Reason, in those particular Circumstances in which they are exercis'd; which *Reason* is the Rule of their Morality antecedent to the Consideration of *Society*: And though Society, or the Relation of Men to each other, gives Occasion to the *Existence* and *Exer-*

use of such and such *Actions*, so that they cou'd not be perform'd without such a Relation; yet it plainly does not give Existence to the *Morality* of them; and the formal Ground of these relative *Actions* being *virtuous* or *vicious* is not this Relation, (tho' that is the Ground of their being *relative Actions*) but is the same with the Origin of other Virtues and Vices; namely, the internal Relation which they bear to the Mind endued with *Reason*; or their being essentially and unalterably agreeable or disagreeable to the eternal and immutable Principles of *Truth* and *Reason*. In short, *Justice*, &c. is a *relative* and *social* Virtue, and therefore supposes Society and Relation to others as necessary to its *actual* Existence; but the Reason why the Action call'd *Justice* is a *Virtue*, is not because it bears a particular Relation to other Men; but the Reason is (as is just now observ'd) because it is an Action proceeding from rational Principles, such as Reason dictates in the present Circumstances and Relations of Things to each other: And as the Nature and Properties of a *Triangle* are the same, whether a Triangle actually exists or not; so the Nature and Properties of *Justice*, &c. are the same, whether any Men, or Society of Men, exist or not: The *Morality* of these Virtues consists not in the Relation which they bear (*a posteriori*) to Society, but in the Relation which they bear (*a priori*) to the essential and unalterable Truth and Reason of Things.

To

To make this Matter still plainer by an Example: To deprive another of his *Life*, or any Part of his *Estate*, or on the contrary, to be the Cause of any great Good or Benefit to another, (if Virtue and Vice proceeded merely from the Relation of Mens Actions to one another) wou'd be always the one morally *evil*, the other *good*: Yet this is not so; and Men can neither be truly said to be *vicious* in the one respect, or *virtuous* in the other, if the Actions do not proceed from *Design* or *Choice*, or acting *voluntarily* upon Principles of Reason; if Men either *ignorantly*, *undesignedly*, or *unavoidably*, do either the one or the other; or if in the former Case they act *with Reason*, or in the latter Case *without Reason*. The Observation of the Heathen Philosopher on this Head deserves Consideration: “ * The *involuntary* “ killing of a Man, as not proceeding from *Choice* “ and Will, and a Power of acting or not acting, is *pardon'd*: But the taking away the Life “ of another *deservedly* and *justly*, is ever *praiseworthy*.

Wherefore, if *Cato* in saying that *Virtue* is a Relation of Mens Actions to one another, either dictated by Reason, &c. means only, that *social Virtue* is an acting according to Reason in a State of

* Φόνος ὁ μὴ ἀκούσιος, ὡς μὴ κατὰ αἵρεσιν, μηδὲ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐξουσίαν γινόμενος, συγγνώσκεται, ὁ δὲ κατὰ αἵρεσιν καὶ δίκην φονεύων καὶ ἱππύσσεται. Simpl. in Epict. c. 1. p. 14.

Society, or social Relation of Men to each other; there wou'd be no other Fault than calling that by a *general* Name which is *particular*. But if he means either that *all* *Virtue* and *Vice* is founded merely in the Relation of Mens Actions to one another, as dictated by Reason, &c. or as contrary to it, and that there is no other *Virtue* or *Vice* besides, this (as I have shewn) is plainly an Error: Or if he means that *Virtue* and *Vice* are in the Nature of Things nothing but the consequent *Benefit* or *Hurt*, *Pleasure* or *Pain*, which arise from Mens mutual relative Actions; which *Pleasure* or *Pain* will generally (tho' not always) follow, the former from that which is agreeable, the latter from that which is disagreeable to Reason; if he supposeth *Virtue* and *Vice* to consist in this only, without regard to the Actions being the Result of the *free Determination* of the rational Mind; then his Notion is still more erroneous; and, as I shall prove hereafter, is of very fatal Consequence to Society, and inconsistent with the Supposition of the *Dictates* of any Reason, of any *Precepts* of Heaven, of any *Duty* either in *Sovereign* or *Subject*, or of any **Virtue* or *Vice* whatsoever.

* 'Ουκ αὖ πράξεις ἐν ἑαυταῖς ἔχουσιν τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς αἰρέσεως ἢ προαιρέσεως τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὄντων ἐκδοποιῶνται. Simpl. in Epict. c. 1. p. 14. Actions in themselves are neither good or evil, but are either the one or the other from Choice, and a Power of acting freely.

2. *Cato* proceeds to observe, that “ the common Light of Reason has told all Mankind, that there cannot be an Effect without a Cause, and that every Cause must be an Effect of some superior Cause, till they come to the last of all, which can be no otherwise than self-existent; that is, must have existed from all Eternity.” (p. 169.)

All this is very right, excepting only that *Self-existence* and *Eternal-existence* are not the same, as they are here suppos'd to be: For *Self-existence* relates to *Causality*, and *eternal* Existence relates to *Duration* of Existence. To be *self-existent*, is evidently the same as to exist *necessarily*, by *Necessity* of Nature absolutely, without any Cause or Original; it is to have no Cause of Existence; and the Consequence of *necessary* or *Self-existence*, is *Eternity* of Existence; but mere *Eternity* of Existence does not, I think, infer *necessary* or *Self-existence*. Supposing that God, as having eternal Power and Will, cou'd or did *eternally* act, or produce Beings, these Beings, tho' *eternal*, wou'd not be *self-existent*. But,

3. *Cato* goes on to consider the Actions or Effects of the first self-existent Cause, or God, and says, “ Some think that he must act from the *Necessity* of his own Nature: For since his Being is *necessary*, they think that his *Will* and *Attributes* (which are *Parts* of his Being, essential to it, and inseparable from it) and consequently his *Actions*, which are the *Results* of
“ that

" that *Will*, and of those *Attributes*, must be
 " necessary too." (p. 170.)

If this and what follows (which I shall also consider) did not appear to be the real Sentiments of this Writer, I should dismiss it (with the absurd System of the *Materialists*, which he mentions and gives up) without taking any notice of it: For certainly nothing can be more unreasonable and absurd, than what is here proposed, and afterwards at large defended, by this Author.

That a necessarily-existent Being must act necessarily is no Consequence; and there is no Connection at all between the *Necessity* of God's *Existence*, which is *no Act*, and the *Necessity* of his *Actions*: And the true Consequence of such a Supposition is, that he does not act at all; and so the Supposition is a Contradiction in Terms. *Necessity* is contradictory to *Agency*, which latter always supposeth *Will* and *Choice* in the Agent, otherwise he is *no Agent*, but is merely *passive*; and the Consequence of this is, that what Cato calls the *Actions* of God, wou'd be *no Actions*, and God *no Cause*, but all wou'd be *Effect*, without any *original Cause* at all, directly contrary to his own Maxim; that there cannot be an *Effect* without a *Cause*.

Secondly, it wou'd hence also follow, that whereas Cato says, and very truly, that every Cause must be an Effect of some superior Cause, till we come to one which is self-existent; it wou'd, I say, follow, in direct Contradiction to his own just

reasoning, that, if God acted *necessarily*, or from the Necessity of his Nature; *i. e.* if his *Actions* were as necessary as his *Nature*, all the Effects or Beings produc'd or resulting from this *Necessity*, would be *necessarily-existent*; and so every thing would be equally *necessarily-existent*; and consequently there would not be any one *superior* or *self-existent* Cause; which *Cato* himself sees and owns is contrary to the common Light of Reason. He is so sensible that God cannot be an Agent or proper Cause of any Thing, cannot be said to act without *Will*, that he is forc'd expressly to allow that God has *Will* with other Attributes, and that his *Actions* are the Results of his *Will* and of those Attributes: But then he argues, that because his Being is necessary, his *Will*, &c. (which are Parts of his Being, &c.) and consequently his *Actions* which are Results of that *Will*, &c. must be necessary too; than which there never was a greater or a weaker Fallacy offered by a Man of Sense. The Fallacy lies in the Word *Necessary*. The Being of God (*Cato* argues) is necessary, *i. e.* he means *necessarily* or *self-existent*. Very well, what then? therefore his *Will* and other Attributes, which are essential to his Being, are necessary, *i. e.* again *necessarily* or *self-existent*; true, and what then? therefore the *Actions*, which are Results of that *Will*, must be necessary too, *i. e.* according to this Argument, *necessary* or *self-existent*: This, if any thing, is the Consequence; and, as I have already observ'd, is the true Result of his

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Notion,

Notion, which makes all things equally *necessary* or *self-existent*, which he himself owns is the greatest Absurdity; and therefore, had he been aware of the Fallacy, which he here offers, he must have been ashamed of it. For not to take notice of the gross and improper way of his calling the *Attributes* of God (which are every one *Attributes*, not of a *Part*, but of the *whole* divine Being) *Parts of his Being*, how cou'd so acute a man as our *Author* think it to follow, that because the *Will* of God is *necessarily-existent*, the *Actions* resulting from it are *necessary*? than which there cannot be a more self-evident Contradiction. It is the same as to say, that because God is *necessarily* endued with *Will*, therefore he has *no Will* at all.

The very Supposition of God acting by his *Will* makes his *Actions* *voluntary*, not *necessary*; and *Cato's* Argument makes *Necessity* and *Will*, which are opposite and contrary in their Natures, to be one and the same, than which nothing can be more absurd. Surely it is one thing to say that God's *Will* is *necessary*, i. e. *necessarily* or *self-existent*, and another thing very different to say, that his *Actions* resulting from his *Will* are *necessary*, i. e. do *not* result from his *Will*, but from the *Necessity* of his Nature, which is an evident Self-contradiction. If *Cato* had understood the Word *necessary* in one uniform Sense, and had meant by the *Actions* being *necessary*, the same as the *divine Nature* being *necessary*, then he cou'd not have avoided seeing the Consequence to
be

be, that all things are *self-existent* alike : But to mean by *necessary*, as apply'd to God's *Being* and *Attributes* one Thing, (*i. e.* not Necessity of *Action* or *Effect*, but of *Existence* only without Cause) and as apply'd to the *Actions* of God a quite different Thing, (*i. e.* Necessity of *Action* or *Effect* proceeding from a Cause) and then to argue consequentially from the one to the other, is a Fallacy not becoming a serious Man in a serious Argument, and therefore I shall conclude was not designedly, but unknowingly offered.

To proceed ; *our Author* adds, as another Argument for the *Necessity* of God's *Actions*, “ that he
 “ cannot conceive how a Being, who has the Principles and Causes of all Things within itself,
 “ could exist without having seen every Thing intuitively from all Eternity, which must have excluded *Choice* and *Preference* in his Actions, which
 “ implies *Doubt* and *Deliberation*.” (p. 170.) He subjoins to this Purpose in the last Paragraph of this Letter ; “ He (*viz.* God) sees all Things at
 “ one View, and nothing can happen without
 “ his *Leave* and *Permission*, and without his giving Power enough to have it effected. (p. 174.)

That God, as having the Principles and Causes of all Things within himself, must see every Thing intuitively from all Eternity, is, I grant, very true ; but as Intuition does not imply *Action*, and is not the efficient Cause of *Action*, so how it excludes *Choice* and *Preference* in God's Actions I cannot see. Had *Intuition*, which is *necessary*,

imply'd *Action*, the Consequence would be that all *possible* Things which God had in View, must have existed at once, and from all *Eternity*; which no one is so weak as to affirm to be fact. Contrary therefore to *Cato's Reasoning* I think the Truth to be, that God, seeing all things from Eternity, saw, amongst the infinite Possibilities of Things, infinite Variety of Things and Circumstances of Things, perfectly equal in themselves; and having within himself infinite *Power*, and *Will* to exert that Power into Action, *as he will'd*, and *when he will'd*; he freely *chose* one System rather than another, and at one Time rather than another. That God should create just such a particular Quantity of *Matter*, and no more; and such a Number of *Planets*, *Comets* and *fix'd Stars*, and no more; and at one particular *Time*, and in one particular *Place*, rather than another; and that their *Orbits*, *Distance* and *gravitating Powers* should be just what they are, and no other: Nay, that God should place *equal* Quantities of Matter in *equal* Forms *here* rather than *there*; that he should cause the Propagation of Mankind to come from *two* only, rather than *more*, and in a different way from many other living Creatures: that he should create so great a Variety of Species of Things, as suppose of *Birds*, *Fishes*, *Horses*, *Dogs*, *Fruit*, &c. with a thousand Things of like Nature, and which are *indifferent* as to *Time*, *Number*, *Manner* and *Place*, can be rationally deduced from no other Principle but

Choice

*Choice and Will**. That all these Things should be *necessary*, and could not *possibly* have been otherwise, is very absurd to affirm: for *Necessity* has plainly no Relation to *Time*, *Number*, or *Place*; whatever is *necessary* at all, is equally *necessary* in all *Time*, in all *Numbers*, in all *Place*.

If *Necessity* therefore was the principle of God's Actions, it must have produced all possible Things in all possible *Time*; and then, since God's Knowledge and Power are *eternal* and *infinite*, the Effects *necessarily* proceeding from them must be *eternal* and *infinite*. To suppose *Matter* to exist *necessarily*, is to suppose it to be *necessarily* *eternal* and *infinite*, which is absurd. For nothing is more evident than that there cou'd be no *Necessity* for *Matter* to exist at one *Time* and not at another, in one *Place* and not in another; and therefore if its Existence was at all *necessary*, it must be *necessary* in all *Time*, and in all *Place*, i. e. must be *necessarily* *eternal* and *infinite*: But it is evident that its Existence was not *necessary* in all *Time* (for we can conceive it to exist at a *particular* *Time*, and even not to exist at all, without a Contradiction, which we could not

* It is every whit as absurd to suppose the Works of God's Creation to be the Effects of *Necessity*, as it would be to suppose the Effects of humane Art to be *necessary*; as absurd as to say, that a *House*, or *Bed* is *made*, or an *Harp* is *tun'd* by *Fate* or *Necessity*, as *Alex. Aphrodisius* puts the Cases. Πῶς οὐκ ἀτοπον, τὰς οὐκίας, καὶ τὸ κλῖναι καὶ εἰμαρμένῳ λέγειν γιγνέσθαι ἢ τὸ λῦσαι ἡρμόσθαι καὶ εἰμαρμένῳ. De Fato p. 23.

do, if its Existence was *necessary*) nor in *all* Place (for we can not only conceive it not to be in *all* Place, but in Fact know certainly that it is not) and therefore it was plainly not *necessary* at *any* Time, and in *any* Place, *i.e.* it was not at all *necessary*.

Again, another Argument that *Matter* must be *necessarily infinite*, if it is *at all* necessary, may be deduced from the Nature of *Power*: *Operating Power*, if not hinder'd or limited by a *superior Power* or by *Will*, will exert all its Force; but God's Power being *omnipotent*, no superior Power can hinder or limit the Force of it; and therefore either the Force and Operations of it are not *limited* at all, *i. e.* are *infinite* as the Power is, or they are *limited* by his *Will*.

Again; as *Limitation* of Power in Actions is a Consequence of *Will* and *free Agency*, *To Variety* is a Consequence of this *Limitation*; if the Existence of *Matter* was *necessary*, as it would be (as I have proved) *necessarily infinite*; so in Consequence of this *Infinity* it would be *uniform* and *invariable*, without any *Difformity* or *Variety* whatsoever, even in so much as a Mode or Circumstance of Existence: No one Part of Matter could have *different* Qualities from another, nor could there be any *Distinction* in the Nature of Things; and therefore it is unquestionably true and certain that it is God's *Choice* and *Will* that limits the Exertion of his Power, and distinguisheth Things into their several Kinds by
distinct

distinct Qualities and Modes of Existence, and determines the particular *Time*, and *Place*, and *Number* of them: And the great *Variety* of Things, and of their Properties, and the apparent *arbitrary* Disposition of them, is such a Demonstration of their being the Effects of a wise and powerful *Free-agent*; that to suppose every Thing to be the Effect of *Necessity*, is to suppose the Operations of *Necessity* to be the same as the Operations of *Will*; and Things to be produced and ordered in the same *various* and *arbitrary* Manner by *Necessity* as by *Will*; and so is to confound the Distinction of Things the most opposite that can be in Nature, and to make *Necessity* and *Will* one and the same. *Cato* must therefore have said that there could not be any thing more or less existing, than actually does exist; that nothing could possibly be *otherwise* than it is; that there is and can be no *Variety* in Things or Properties of Things; that there is not nor can possibly be any *determinate* Quantity of *Matter*, or *determinate* *Place* or *Duration* of the Existence of it; that it is impossible for God to create two Pieces of Matter of equal Quantity and Form, as suppose two *Cubes*, or two *Globes* of an Inch Diameter (it being evident that being of the same Form and Quantity, there can be no *Necessity* why one should exist *here* or *there* or *any where*, rather than the other) and a thousand other Absurdities contrary to all the *Sense* and *Reason* of Mankind *Cato* must have affirm'd

affirm'd and held; or else acknowledged that God created all Things by the *free Determination* of his *Will* by the free Exertion of his Nature into Action.

But now if, upon the Hypothesis of *Will* and *free Agency* in God, the Reason be ask'd why God *chose* one Scheme of Creation rather than another (supposing, as hath been proved, another could possibly exist) it is easily answered; that the Reason was either because it was the *best*, or as *good* as any other amongst the infinite Variety of possible Systems which he had in his View: And God, as *Cato* observes, *having all Things in his View at once*, need not doubt (which always supposes Imperfection of Knowledge) which of (suppose) equally good Systems to *choose*; and if one was the *best* System, he could not doubt or deliberate in the *Choice* or *Preference* of it: and its being the *best*, tho' it is a Reason why God would infallibly *choose* it, is none at all why he could not *choose* it, or why it is *necessary*; the being *best*, no way excluding *Will* and *Choice* *. Supposing a *Will* in God (as *Cato* does allow) what Reason can there be why, by that *Will*, God, the best Being, should not *choose* what is

* *Seneca*, speaking of God and the fix'd Laws of his Providence, says, *Liceat illi hodieque decernere & ex ea lege Factorum aliquid derogare; an majestatis diminutio sit, & confessio erroris mutanda fecisse: necesse est enim ei eadem placere, cui nisi optima placere non possunt, nec ob hoc minus liber & potens est, ipse enim est necessitas sua. Quæst. Nat. Præfat.*

best? on the contrary, supposing God to be endued with *Will*, he will infallibly always apply it to the *Choice* and *Preference* of what is best. So weak and wholly destitute of Truth is every Part of *Cato's* Argument.

But *Cato* argues against *Choice* in God, as implying *Doubt* and *Deliberation*: In which he is also mistaken; for the Reason why God cannot *doubt* or *deliberate* is, not that he hath no *Will* or *Choice*, but because his Knowledge and Wisdom is absolutely perfect and unerring: And tho' *Choice* does not imply *Doubt* and *Deliberation*, yet on the other hand it is true that *Doubt* and **Deliberation* do imply *Choice*, and so this is an Argument that Men are endued with *Choice* and *voluntary* Agency, which quite destroys the Scheme of *Necessity*.

* As all *Deliberation* and *Consultation* about our Actions would be absurd and ridiculous, if they were not in our own Power; so is it, if possible, more absurd to suppose that we are by Nature necessarily endued with a Power of *Deliberation* and *Consultation*, and necessarily deliberate and consult about Things in which we have no *Choice* or can act *voluntarily*, "Wherefore (as *Alex. Aphrodisius* observes) "we never deliberate about Things in *Eternity*, nor about Things confessedly necessary; nor "about Things, which, tho' not necessary, are yet in the "Power of others only; nor yet about Things done by our "selves, which are past: but we deliberate about those Things "only, which are and will be in our own Power to do.

Διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτε περὶ τῶν αἰδίων βουλευόμεθα, ὅτε περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένως γινομένων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης — ἀλλ' ὅτε περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὴ μὴ γινομένων, ἢ ἄλλοις ἢ τισὶν ὄντων βουλευόμεθα — ἀλλ' ὅτε περὶ μὲν ἡμῶν μὲν πρακτῶν παρεληλυθότων δι, βουλευόμεθα — βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ μέσων τῶν ὑφ' ἡμῶν τε πραττομένων, καὶ μελλόντων. De fat. p. 55, 56.

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I must farther take notice that our Author, whilst he is arguing against the *voluntary* Agency of God, directly maintains it in saying, *that nothing can happen without God's Leave and Permission*, which is very absurd upon the Supposition of all Things being from *Necessity*: If they are *necessary* they are *independent* of any *Leave* or *Permission* of God, and God can no more hinder their Existence and Effects, than his own Existence; and therefore the supposing Things and their Effects to exist by God's *Leave* and *Permission*, is saying they exist by his *Choice* and *Will*, as plain as can be express'd in Words, and so *Cato* herein contradicts himself.

Another Argument which is us'd for the *Necessity* of God's Actions is, *that all his Actions must be instantaneous Emanations of himself*; (p. 174.) which, I grant, is true, if they are *necessary*, but not otherwise; and whether they are *necessary* or not is the Question: but however our Author might easily perceive the Consequence of his Argument to be, that all Things are *eternal*: And another unhappy Consequence is, that *Necessity* being one and the same in every Thing, all humane Actions must also (if necessary) be *instantaneous*; and *Necessity* must as much exclude *Doubt*, and *Deliberation*, and *Suspension* in *Men*, as in *God*: And therefore if *Men* can *doubt*, *deliberate*, and *suspend* (as *Cato* would not, I suppose, deny) it must proceed from *Will*, not *Necessity*. If *Necessity* could cause *Deliberation* in *Men*, it would in

God also; and it is not sufficient to say, that Men's *imperfect* Knowledge is the necessary Cause of their *Deliberation* and *Suspension* of Action; for tho' the Sense of their imperfect Knowledge makes them *deliberate* and *suspend* many Actions, yet they can equally *suspend* where they have the clearest and most perfect Knowledge. But wherever *Necessity* operates, there is no *Suspension*; there is no *Suspension* of *Rays* issuing from the *Sun*, or in a *Balance*, whether it should move when a *Weight* is in one of the Scales; or in the *Pulse* and *Heart* whether they should beat; or of any of the Effects of natural and necessary Causes: And *Life* and *Intelligence* can alter nothing in the Case, for unless there is *Will* in this Life and Intelligence, *Necessity* must operate equally in Things with or without *Life* and *Intelligence*.

“ 4. *Cato* could not apprehend how *Reason* and *Wisdom* can be analogous in God to what are call'd by the same Names in Men: For Judgment in them, as far as it regards their own *voluntary* Operations, is only the Balance of the Conveniences or Inconveniences which will result from their own or others Thoughts and Actions, as they have Relation to Beings or Events out of their Power, and which depend upon other Causes: But if a Being can have no Causes without itself, but produces every Thing by its own Energy and Power, sees all Things at once and cannot err, as Men

“ may, nor consequently deliberate and debate
 “ with itself; he thinks it must act singly, and in
 “ one way only; and where there is no *Choice*,
 “ or which is the same Thing, but *one* Choice,
 “ he conceives there is always *Necessity*.” (p.
 170, 171.

Ans. *Reason* and *Judgment* in *God* and in *Men* are not different in *Kind* or in *Nature*; if they were, then what is most contradictory to our Ideas, might be *true* or agreeable to the divine Reason; then *two* and *two* may not be equal to *four* in *God's* Judgment; and that which to humane Reason is the plainest and greatest Absurdity, Impossibility, or Enormity, may, to the Reason of *God*, be *true*, *possible*, and *right*; which Supposition destroys the Foundation of all *Reason*, *Truth* and *Right* amongst *Men*: They do not therefore differ in *Nature* or *Kind*, but only in *Degrees of Perfection*. The *Reason* and *Wisdom* of *God* is founded on clear, infallible and perfect Knowledge; but that of *Men* upon confus'd, fallible and imperfect Apprehensions of Things. *Wisdom* and *Judgment*, whether in *God* or *Men*, so far as they regard *Actions*, is the Knowledge and Application of Means proper and effectual to obtain the Ends intended by them: *God*, knowing the *Natures* and *Powers* of all Things, cannot err in his Judgment, and in effecting his Ends; but *Mens* Knowledge being erroneous and very imperfect, makes them often err in their Use and Application of Means, and in effecting the Ends they
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aim at. But as, no Doubt, in the Nature of Things, several Means are equally effectual to produce the same End; God, who sees all Things, *chooseth* out of this Variety which he pleases: And Men also, who in many Cases see that several Means are equally and certainly effectual to certain Ends, *choose* to make use of which they please. The Consciousness of their imperfect Knowledge makes them, it may be, *deliberate* before they *choose* (which is otherwise in God whose Knowledge is perfect) but the *Choice* and Action following is nevertheless *free*, whether it be with or without *Deliberation*.

Secondly, God's acting uniformly, doing always what is *good* or *best*, is exactly all one whether we suppose him to act *necessarily* or *freely*, and so can be no Argument for *Necessity*.

A Mind endued with perfect *Freedom*, which consists in having a perfect Knowledge of the eternal and immutable *Relations* and *Difference* of Things, and an unbiaſſed or unrestrain'd Power of Action upon ſuch a Knowledge, will always as invariably *act one Way*, i. e. always do what is right and good, and beſt in the whole, as if it was impell'd by *Necessity*. The Agreeableneſs of ſome Things to *Reason* will always as infallibly induce God to *prefer* and *choose* them, and the Diſagreeableneſs of other Things, to reject and reſuſe theſe, as if *Necessity* was the Cauſe of all his Actions. As *Seneca* (noted above p. 13.) well obſerves, God's being always pleas'd with, and
doing

doing what is *best*, is no Argument that he is therefore *less a Free-agent*. If Men had the same Perfection of Knowledge and Power that God has, their Actions, proceeding from their Will, would be as invariable and uniform as God's are; and as much in one Way of moral Goodness, as if Necessity impell'd them to act. The Reason is; because a *rational* Mind cannot be equally or *indifferently* inclin'd to all *different* Things; *Vertue* and *Vice*, *Good* and *Evil*, which are opposite in their Natures, and the one essentially agreeable to Reason, the other essentially disagreeable to it, cannot appear equally *eligible* to a Mind endued with *Reason*; and therefore the Mind, if not impos'd upon, will certainly always *choose* the one, and *reject* the other: And 'tis certain that in this *Respect*, the more uniformly Men act, with the more *Freedom* they do act; and the less uniformly, with the less *Freedom*; because they act with the less clear and steady Perception of the essential Difference of Good and Evil. Every Vice darkens the Mind, and proportionably takes away its *Freedom* and Power of exerting into good Actions, as it deprives it of the Sense of the Difference of *Good* and *Evil*. Where the Mind is balanced with an equally clear Perception of the Nature of Good and Evil, of the Agreeableness of the one to a rational Mind, and of the Disagreeableness of the other, having withal a Power of Action, and being inclin'd by nothing to either side but by
the

the Nature of the Things themselves; here is a State of perfect *Freedom*, and in this State the Mind will always uniformly *choose* by its *Will* (as uniformly as if impell'd by *Necessity*) that which is *right* and *good*, and agreeable to *Truth* and *Reason*. But if the Perception of the Nature and Agreeableness of Virtue, and of the Nature and Disagreeableness of Vice is diminished in any Proportion, in the same Proportion the Mind is biased, and acts less freely in *choosing* the one and *refusing* the other. It is a great Mistake to think that *Freedom* of Action consists in the Mind's being of itself *indifferently* inclin'd to Virtue and Vice, Good and Evil: Since these are *different* in their Natures, and the one essentially agreeable, the other essentially disagreeable to Reason; it is impossible that a *rational* Mind, under a clear Perception of this Difference, should be equally affected towards both of them, and be *indifferently* disposed to choose the one or the other. *Moral Freedom* therefore does not consist in a Power of doing contrary Actions with the same *Indifference*, but in the Nature of Things it consists in being endued with *Reason* and the Perception of the Difference of *Good* and *Evil*, and in Consequence of that *Reason* having a Power of *choosing* and *doing* either the one or the other; which Power is greater or less in Proportion to the clear, regular, and uninterrupted, or to the weak, decay'd and disordered Sense with which the Mind is possessed concerning them; so that we may either conceive the Mind

(thro'

(thro' Love and good Endeavours) so well dispos'd, and to have such a clear and strong Sense of the moral Difference of Things; as regularly and with great Constancy to *choose* and perform Works of Vertue and Goodness: Or on the other Hand, we may conceive the Mind (thro' excessive Carelessness, natural Ignorance, vicious Habits, or disordered Imaginations) to be by Degrees so corrupted and depraved in its Sense of Good and Evil, as to act with little or no Freedom, either in doing the one or the other, being almost necessarily impelled by such Motives as excite the *Appetites* and *Passions*. In Actions resulting from Minds thus disposed we may see something like *Necessity*. But in this Case the Mind is not in a *natural* State, is enslav'd thro' Accident or its own Fault, and may be recovered to a State of Nature and Freedom again, by being restored to its Understanding, and the right Use of its *Reason*. The Words of the renowned *Platonist Plotinus* are very observable on this Head.

“ * The Soul obtains a *greater Power* (over its
 “ Actions) as it becomes more *good*, and a *less*
 “ as

* Πλείων δὲ κρατεῖν (τὴν ψυχὴν) ἢ ἀμείνων· ἐλάττω δὲ ἢ χείρων· ἢ γὰρ κρᾶσι σώματος τι ἐνδιδούσα ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ὀργίζουσα, ἢ ἀνέγκαστος (lege ἠνάγκαται) ἢ πνίαις ταπεινῇ, ἢ πλείτοις χαῖν, ἢ διωκόμεσι τύραν. ἢ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τύτοις ἀντίσταν ἢ ἀγαθὴ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ ἡλλίωσεν αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἢ ἡλλιώθη. — ὅταν μὲν ᾖ ἀλλοιωθεῖσα παρὰ τῶν ἔξω ψυχῇ πράττει τι καὶ ὀρμῶν, οἷον τυφλῇ τῇ φρενὶ χρομένη, οὐχὶ ἐκύσειον τὴν κρᾶσιν, οὐδὲ τὴν διάβασιν, λεκτίον, καὶ ὅταν αὐτὴ

" as it grows more *evil*. For either yielding to
 " the *Constitution* of the *Body*, it is *compelled*
 " unto *Lust* or *Anger*; or it acts *meanly* in a
 " *State* of *Poverty*, or *insolently*, if *rich*, or *ty-*
 " *rannically*, if in *Power*. But the *Soul* that is of a
 " *good Nature*, if in the very same *Circumstances*,
 " *resists* and *overcomes* (the *Temptations* of)
 " them, and *changeth* them rather than is *chang-*
 " *ed* by them. — When therefore the *Soul*,
 " *suffering* a *Change* from external *Means*, exerts
 " itself, and does any thing, being led as it were
 " by a *blind Impulse*, we cannot say that either
 " the *Action* or *Disposition* of it is *free*: And so
 " in like manner, when of *itself* becoming
 " *worse*, it no longer makes use of the *right* and
 " *governing* Principles of *Action*. But when its
 " *own Reason* is the pure and active governing
 " Principle that moves it to act, this *Exertion*
 " alone is that which we can say is *in our own*
 " *Power* and *voluntary*; and this is *our own Ac-*
 " *tion*, which proceeds not from external Im-

αὐτὴ καὶ αὐτῇ χρεὶν ἔσται περὶ τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς πανταχῶς αὐτῇ ἡγε-
 μωνεύσασαι τῶν ὁρμῶν ἢ (lege ᾧ) χραιμένη. Λέγουσι δὲ ὅτι αἱ ἡγεμονίαι
 καθαροὶ καὶ ἀπαθεῖ τὸν οἰκτιρὸν ἔχοντα ὁρμῶν, πάντῃσι μόνον τὰ ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ
 φασὶν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ καὶ ἐκείνῳ, καὶ τούτο εἶναι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἔργον, ὃ
 μὴ ἀλλοθεῖν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἰδόντι ἀπὸ καθαρότητος τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς
 πρώτης ἡγεμονίας καὶ κοῦρας. ἀλλ' οὐ πάντως ἐξ ἀγαθῶν παθήσας. ἢ
 ἄλλαν ἐκ βίας ἐπιθυμῶν, αἱ προσελθοῦσαι ἀγνοεῖ καὶ ἔλκεται καὶ οὐκ
 ἔστι ἔργον (lege ἔργον) ἰδόντι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ παθήματα καὶ ἡμῶν.
 Ennead. 3. lib. 1. p. 234.

“ pulse, but from the *internal* Motion of the un-
 “ *corrupted* Soul itself, from the primary, pre-
 “ siding and governing Principle of it: And not
 “ from the Soul led *passively* into Error thro’
 “ Ignorance, or overcome by the *Violence* of its
 “ Lusts, which *drag* and *draw* it, and make
 “ every thing we do to become not properly
 “ *Action* but *Passion*.” And to the same Pur-
 “ pose *Simplicius* says; * “ When the *rational* Soul
 “ gives itself up to the *Body*, and to unreason-
 “ able and corporeal *Passions*, it is moved (as it
 “ were) by mechanical Impulse, and its Moti-
 “ ons are not *free* and *in its own Power*: But
 “ when it *acts* according to its own Nature,
 “ then it is moved by an *inward self-moving*
 “ Principle, *freely* and of its own Accord, and
 “ is indisputably endued with free Will.” Again;

* Ἡ λογικὴ ὁ ψυχὴ ὅταν μὴ ἑαυτὴν ἰδῶ τοῖς σωμασιν, καὶ τοῖς αἰσ-
 γαῖς καὶ τοῖς σωματικαῖς κινήμασι, καὶ αὐτὰ περισπαρῇται, καὶ
 ἀδύνηται, καὶ οὐκ ἔτι ἔνδοξα ἐφ’ ἑαυτῇ ἔχει τὰ κινήματα ὅταν ὅ κατὰ
 τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν ἐκφυγῇ, τότε ἐλευθέρως καὶ αὐτεξούσιως ἰσθάνει ἀφ’
 ἑαυτῆς κινῆται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης, τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ὁράται ἀναμφιλύ-
 τως. ——— εἰ μὴν τοι ἐπὶ τῷτο χρὴ κρῖναι ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ αὐτεξούσιον,
 καὶ τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν τῷ δυνάμει, καὶ τὰ ἐκαστὴν παῖν αἰ ὅ τῷ ἀγαθῷ
 αἰ ἐκινῆται ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρῆται, καὶ αὐτεξούσιως
 ἔχει τὸν ἀρετὴν· εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴς ἡ ἀναγκασμένη· καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ
 αἰ ἔχουσι αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ποτε πρὸς τὸ ἐκαστὴν ἀναγκασμένη· αἰ ὅ ἡμέ-
 τεραι ψυχῇ ἀγαθῇ μὴ εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐρέγονται, καὶ παλαι γυ-
 ραται, τῶν παλαιῶν μεταβάλλει ὅ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς παλαιῆς ἐκ ἀρετῆς,
 διαμελίσσεται, καὶ ἀπὸ ἀρετῆς ἐκ παλαιῆς ἀμελίσσεται, καὶ ἐκαστὴν,
 κατὰ ἀρετὴν οἰκίαν, οὐ κατὰ ἀνάγκην, ποιῶσιν. in Epict. p. 8,
 9, 22.

“ We

“ We ought not in all Cases to judge of our *Li-*
 “ *berty* and *Freedom* of Action, by our having a
 “ Power of doing (indifferently) contrary
 “ Things: for those Minds which are always in-
 “ clin’d to and *choose* that which is *good*, do ne-
 “ vertheless *freely choose* it; this Choice is not
 “ *forc’d*: and they persevere always in that which
 “ is *good*, without being drawn aside unto *Evil*.
 “ And thus our Minds, if they have good Dis-
 “ positions, *desire* that which is good, if evil
 “ ones, that which is evil. By taking care also
 “ they return from Wickedness unto Vertue,
 “ and by Neglect they fall from Vertue into
 “ Vice; and do both by their own *free Choice*,
 “ not by *Necessity*.

Towards the Conclusion of this Letter (p.
 173.) *Cato* very justly and ingeniously taxes the
Cheats and *Impositions* which have been introduced
 into Religion, and with a reasonable Indignation
 censures the *Rogueries* and *Persecutions* proceeding
 from them: but then all this is said with a very
 ill Grace by one who is arguing for all Actions
 being the Results of *Necessity*; according to which
 Argument, all these *Cheats*, and *Forgeries*, and the
Mischiefs and *Persecutions* ingrafted on, and
 supported by them, are not culpable, because
necessary; and are in reality no more *Rogueries*,
 or can justly be complain’d on, than the Mischief
 and Devastations caus’d by *Storms* and *Tempests*,
Inundations, *Earthquakes*, *Fire* or *Plague*, or any of
 those *material* Instruments by which humane

Miseries are effected, can be call'd *Rogueries*; they being, as these are, according to *Cato's Scheme*, the *natural* and *necessary* Effects of *natural* and *necessary* Causes: And all the *Malignity* of Men must at last be supposed by this Hypothesis to be not a *moral*, but a *natural* Evil only, and must centre at last in the *Malignity* of the *divine Nature* necessarily producing it.

To this Purpose *Hierocles* observes * ;
 “ We will not say that our *Purposes* of Justice, and our *Judgments* and *Desires* proceed from an over-ruling *Necessity*, for if
 “ so, we should not impute *Virtue* and *Vice*
 “ to *ourselves*, but to that *Necessity*.” And *Plotinus* says, that the Consequence of the Notion of *Necessity* is †, to attribute to God the Commission of all Evil. And *Origen* in *Eusebius* says, that the ** *Maintainers* of this *Doctrine* of *Necessity* do absolve Men from all Manner of Crimes

* Ότι ὅς — τὰς δίκης προαιρέσεις, καὶ χεῖρας, καὶ ὁμῶς ἀπὸ κρείττονος ἀνάγκης ἐγγίνεσθαι φέρομεν· ἔτω ὅς ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας οὐχ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῳ αἰτιασάμεθα. De Fat. p. 26.

† Τῷ παντὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν ποίησιν ἀνατιθεῖται. Ennead. 3. lib. 1. c. 4.

** Καὶ τι δεῖ λέγειν ἡμᾶς περὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ἀμαρτανειμένων ὑπ’ αὐτῶν μυρίων ὅσων τυγχάνοντων, ἕς τινος οἱ τῶν γενεῶν προΐστέμενοι τούτων λόγον, ἀπολύοντες παντὸς ἐγκλήματος, ἢ ὡς Θεῷ προσγράψοι πάντων τῶν κακῶν καὶ ψευκῶς (lege ψευκῶς) πραττομένων τὴν αἰτίαν. Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. c. 11. p. 282.

committed

committed by them, and make God the Author of all the Evil and Wickedness of the World.

And Eusebius * himself insists upon this Argument at large; viz. that the Assertors of the Necessity of humane Actions are guilty of Impiety; because this Doctrine, supposing Men to do nothing of their own free Choice, absolves them from the Guilt of all their Wickedness, and chargeth Providence with it, making it, under the Name of Necessity and Fate, to be the Cause of all the Filthiness and Enormities, the Cruelty and Murders which are committed by Men. And concludes that this Notion makes God and no one else the Author of all Evil, and that Man cannot justly be charged with Sin, but only God that made him.

To conclude; according to Cato's Scheme of Necessity; that Malignity, that moral Malignity, which he calls Roguery, and which he is apprehensive prevails strongly in humane Nature, could not possibly exist. For if God (as he constantly affirms) is good, and his Goodness re-

* 'Στοδ' οὕτω (ὁ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ ἄστρον φορέας ἀναρτῶν τὰ πάντα) τοῦ δυσσεβοῦς ἐκπέφυγε τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀμαρτανωμάτων, τοὺς μὲν πλημμυροῦντας ἀπολύει, ὡς μηδὲν τῶν ἀτόπων ἐξ οὐκείας γνώμης διαπεπραγμένους, ἀνάγκη δὲ τὴν αὐτίαν τῶν κακῶν ἐπὶ καθόλου προνοεῖν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ ἐμμετρομένη ἀποκαλεῖν, καὶ πάσης τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀιχαρουργίας καὶ ἀρρητοποιίας, ἀμόνητός τε καὶ μισοφορίας αἰτίαν εἶναι λέγων. — αὐτὸς (scilicet ὁ Θεός) αἰεὶ ἔν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῃ ὁ πάντων κακῶν ποιητικὸς, καὶ οὐκ ἔτ' αἰεὶ ὅλην ἡμετέραν λέγοιτ' αἰεὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ' ὁ ταῦτα ποιητὴς Θεός. *Præp. Evang.* lib. 6. c. 6. p. 251.

sults,

sults, not from his *Will* and *Choice*, but from the *Necessity* of his *Nature*; then it will follow, that as *Necessity* (if that alone is the Cause of all Things) cannot produce any Effect that is not in the Cause whence it proceeds, so consequently God being *necessarily* good, without *Will* or *Choice*, all Things proceeding from him by the same *Necessity* by which he exists, will be *necessarily* in like Manner good also: And as there is no *Evil*, whether *moral* or *natural*, in God, so there can be none in the Beings *necessarily* derived from him; and no Account of the Difference and Existence of *Good* and *Evil* (whether natural or moral) can ever be given upon the Hypothesis of *Necessity* *.

But on the other Hand, supposing *Goodness* to be the Result of the perfect *Rectitude* of God's *Will*, then there is plainly a physical Possibility of the Existence of *Evil*; and supposing Things to be produc'd not from the *Necessity* of the divine Nature, but from the *Will* and *Free-agency* of God; then it will also follow that since God

* * To those who made humane Actions subject to *Fate* or *Necessity*, *Chalcidius*, by way of Objection, puts the *Question*; viz. *constituant quid esse, Fatum velint. Virtutemne divinam? sed non esset causa malorum. An vero animam malignam? sed demum a malitia nihil boni fieri potest; & Fato dicuntur etiam bona provenire, dicent fortasse mixtam quandam esse substantiam; at qui fieri potest, ut unum & idem quid malitia simul & bonitate sit præditum, intemperantiamque & castitatem creet, cæteramque virtutum vitiorumque importet contrarietatem.* In *Plat. Tim. c. 7. p. 264.*

cannot produce by his *Will* Beings equally perfect with himself, there must be in the *Will* of every Being produc'd by him, a less Rectitude than in his *Will*; and consequently a greater Possibility of *Evil*: And since farther upon the Supposition of God's acting by his *Will*, he can produce all possible Variety of Beings, and endue them with all possible Variety and Degrees of Perfection, the least perfect Beings will have the least Perfection of *Will* and greatest Possibility of doing *Evil*; and from the Use of this *Will* and Actions resulting from it, consider'd with the Circumstances of this present State, all the *moral* Good and Evil that is in human Nature may be reasonably accounted for.





LETTER II.



IN this Letter we are told, that *Good and Evil are Objects of God's Will, which alone can constitute Right or Wrong* *.

In this Observation *Cato* shew'd that he had either a strange Head, or a strange Inclination to run counter to the common Reason of Things. The *Actions* of God proceeding upon the Ideas of *Right* and *Wrong*, he will have to be *necessary* tho' they are truly, as I have shewn at large, the Results of his *Choice* and *Will*: But here he will have the *Ideas* and Nature of *Right* and *Wrong*, which are truly *necessary*, to be Objects of his *Will*; meaning, as he explains himself,

* *Cato's Letters*, Vol. IV. p. 175. &c.

that God's *Will* alone constitutes the Nature of Right and Wrong; the Consequence of which is (and which Consequence he insinuates) that they are not of a fix'd and immutable, but of an uncertain and changeable Nature; that there is no essential Difference between them, and what we esteem *Right* or *Wrong*, may be otherwise with God: And so, that God's Actions may be *right* and *just*, tho' contrary to our clearest Notions of *Justice* and *Equity*: Which Opinion is not only very absurd in itself, but of dangerous and fatal Consequence, as making the Nature and Difference of Vertue and Vice, Good and Evil, precarious, uncertain and mutable. But besides, all this while *Cato* did not consider, that tho' the Notion of God's *Will* being the only Ground of *Right* and *Wrong* does (as he intends it) confound the Distinction of Vertue and Vice, Good and Evil; yet *his* Notion of God's *Will* entirely confutes and overthrows the Consequences he would draw from the Supposition of its constituting *Right* or *Wrong*. For when he says God's *Will* alone constitutes *Right* or *Wrong*, he really means in Contradiction to his own Words, that their Natures result not from God's *Will*, as that signifies *Choice*, but from his *Will*, as it signifies really in Opposition to *Will*, *Necessity*. And thence he might see, that whatever results from God by *Necessity*, cannot be different in God from what it is in Beings produc'd necessarily by him; where the Effect is *necessary*, it must be

first in the Cause; and so contrary to his Reasoning, the Ideas of *Right* and *Wrong* must be the same in God, as they are in us.

The Truth is; *Right* and *Wrong* are indeed Objects of God's *Will*, as *Truth* and *Falshood* are of his *Understanding*; but his *Will* no more constitutes the Nature of the one than of the other: They are necessary and immutable in their Natures, as necessary as the Nature of God is, and are constituted not by his *Will*, but by his *Existence*. Supposing a perfect Being, as God is, to exist; the essential Difference of *Truth* and *Falshood*, *Right* and *Wrong*, the one as the Object of God's *Understanding*, the other as the Object of his *Will*, immediately and necessary follows; and they are as immutable in their Natures, as the Nature of God is: God can no more by his *Will* alter the Nature of *Right* or *Wrong*, or the Objects of any of his moral Attributes, of his *Justice*, *Holiness* or *Veracity*, than he can make a *Globe* to be a *Cube*, or give one the Properties of the other; or make *two* and *one* to be equal to *four*, or not equal to *three*; or than he can alter his own *Essence*, or cease to be what he is.

Cato, in order to support the Absurdity of *Right* and *Wrong* being constituted by the *Will* of God, and to shew that his Dealings with Men do not (as he expresses it) quadrate with the Notions which we form of *Justice* amongst one another; alledges several Instances of God's providential Dispensations out of the History of the old Testament. As,

I. God's

1. *God's punishing all Mankind for the Sin of their first Parents, which they could not help.* (p. 175, 176.)
2. *His punishing all Israel with a Pestilence for the private Sin of David, which without Doubt many of them condemn'd.* (p. 176.)
3. *His bringing Plagues upon the Ægyptians, because he had hardned Pharoah's Heart.*
ibid.
4. *His destroying all Mankind at the Deluge for Crimes which he could have prevented.* ibid.

In answer to the preceding Observations, I desire,

First, To know to what Purpose these Instances are brought; if the Facts are true, can they be solved upon the Scheme of *Necessity* better than upon the Notion of *Free-agency*? just the contrary is evident to Sense and Reason; for,

I. In the Nature of Things there could be no absolute *Necessity* for God to make the *Immortality of Men* to depend upon the Obedience of the *first Man*; tho' he might have Reason to *choose* by his *Will* that it should be so. The first Supposition is plainly absurd, the latter, tho' not clearly known to us, yet is no way contradictory to *Reason*, as I shall shew presently.

II. Tho' there may be wise and good Reasons for God by his *Will* to cause temporal Calamities to fall upon a People for the Crimes of their Rulers; yet 'tis highly absurd to suppose it *necessary* to be so. And

III. Tho' God may justly inflict a *voluntary* Punishment upon Men for their *voluntary* Wickedness; yet it is no more *right* or * *just* to destroy them for *necessary* Actions, or doing what they could not help, than it is to destroy them for being *fat* or *lean*, *sick* or *weak*, *blind* or *lame*, or for any *bodily* Infirmary, which it was not in their Power to prevent.

* Lucian represents Socrates speaking thus to Minos; εὐκοῦν ἄρας πῶς ἄδικοι ποίεις κολάζων ἡμᾶς ὑπηρέτας γενομένους ὅτι ἡ κλωθεὶ προσέταται, καὶ τούτους τίμωμι τοὺς διακονησασμένους ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκείνο εἰπεῖν ἔχει τις αὖ ὡς ἀντιλέγειν δυνάσθαι ἢ τοῖς μητὰ πάσης ἀνάγκης προσεταγμένοις. "Do not you see how
" *unjustly* you act in punishing us who are only the Servants of
" the Decrees of Fate; and in rewarding those who are only
" mere *Instruments* in doing that Good which ought to be af-
" crib'd to others? for no one can say it is possible to with-
" stand those things which are wholly ordained by *Necessity*.
Dial. Mort. p. 155. Edit. Par.

Again he argues in the Person of Cyniscus the Fatalist: " He (Minos) " ought neither to punish or reward any one —
" because we Men do nothing by our own *free Mind*, but
" every thing by the Compulsion of an unavoidable *Necessity*.
Οὐδέναι οὐτε τιμᾶν οὐτε κολάζειν αὐτῶ προσήκει — ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐκού-
τες οἱ ἄνθρωποι ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τινι ἀνάγκῃ ἀφ᾽ οὗ κειλευσμένοι.
ibid. p. 678.

Secondly, the preceding Examples of the divine Dispensations are not inconsistent with our Notions of *Justice*; for, according to the plainest Notions of *Justice*, God might (without doing *Wrong*) leave mortal Man in a State of *Mortality*, by withdrawing an extraordinary and supernatural Favour, which he made to depend on one Man's Behaviour, without telling us the Reason of his Conduct: In the mean time, where is the *Iniquity* (according to our Notions of Right and Wrong) of God's dispensing mere Favours on what Conditions he pleases; or where is the *Punishment* or the *Injury* done to Man in being subject to Death?

His second and third Instances only shew that in God's providential Government of the World, we cannot always see the *Reasons* of his Dispensations, tho' we may see that they are not *contrary* to *Reason*. To suppose God by an immediate Act of his Power to inflict Pain or Death upon any of his Creatures without any Reason, or in such Cases where it is evident there can be no Reason, is, no doubt, contrary to the Notions which he hath given us of *Right* and *Wrong* (and to which Notions he appeals in his Word for the Equity of his own Proceedings) and is derogatory to his *Goodness*. But when we consider that we derive our Nature and the Duration of its Existence merely from God's *Will*; and in Consequence see that God may (without any *Wrong*) give us any determinate Continuance

ance of Life; it is impossible to say there is or can be no *Reason* for God to make the Continuance or temporal Happiness of any Number of his Creatures to depend upon things which are not in their Power: And God may as well have *Reasons* for making the Lives and Happiness of Men in many Cases to depend upon the Actions of other Men, as upon *natural* Causes; upon the Disposition of the *Air*, upon *Storms* and *Inundations*, and many other *natural* Causes: We are sure that the one is the *Act of God*, as much as the other; and we can no more say he does *Wrong* in the one than in the other; because we cannot on the one Hand see the *Reasons* of his *Providence*, and the Grounds of the Dependence, which he has made one Part of the Creation to have upon the other Parts, and of the Connection of Things *present* with things *past*, and in *Futurity*: But we can on the other Hand very clearly see that the Author of our Beings may *determine* the Continuance of our Lives, and consequently make them depend upon what immediate Causes he pleases, and take them away by what other Instruments he thinks fit, as well as by the ordinary Course of Nature, without doing us any *Wrong*. Therefore, as God may (consistently with our Notions of *Right*) make any particular Men's *Lives* or *temporal Good* to depend upon *Earthquakes*, *Fire*, *Water*, &c. so I see no Reason why he may not make them depend upon the Actions and Behaviour of other Men, who

who in his Providence are made Instruments of bringing great *Good* or *Evil* to a *Nation* as such. And as God does no *Wrong* to Men, but is on the contrary *good* and *beneficent*, in being the Author of *Society*; so, from the Nature of Society, there is such a *Dependance* between the Actions of *Governors*, and the *Good* or *Evil* of their *Subjects*, that it cannot be, but as they receive much *Good* from their *Virtues*, so they must be subject to *Evil* from their *Vices*: And God's *causing* a People to suffer for the *Wickedness* of a Prince against himself, seems to be no more than his *permitting* them to suffer by the Armies of other Princes for the Crimes of their King committed against other States; and there seems to be no more in these divine Proceedings, than in making any of the *natural* Elements to be Causes either of great *Good* or *Evil* to Mankind, which yet for Reasons before-mentioned, cannot be shewn to be inconsistent with our Notions of *Right* and *Wrong*; or to be any Arguments that *Right* or *Wrong* is alone constituted by the *Will* of God.

One thing more I must observe with Respect to the third Instance; that *Cato*, in order to make God's punishing the *Ægyptians* seem the more inconsistent with our Notions of *Justice*, says, that God *brought the Plagues upon them* because *he had hardned Pharoah's Heart*: Which is a very ill-natur'd Expression, as thereby insinuating that God first by an Act of his irresistible

Power

Power *hardned Pharoah's Heart*, and then made that *Hardning* the Cause of *bringing Plagues* upon him and his People: which, if it was indeed the Case, it could not, I think, be reconciled to our Notions of *Justice*. But the Matter is either very *ignorantly* or very *unfairly* propos'd by *Cato*. If he had attended to the *Stile of Scripture*, he could not but know that any extraordinary Event or Action of Men is frequently in Scripture ascrib'd to *God*; and *God* is said to do what he either permits to be done in extraordinary Cases, or what happens in Consequence of any extraordinary Act of his Providence: And it is in the Example before us said expressly several Times that *Pharoah hardned his own Heart*, in Opposition to the *divine Command* to let the *Jews* go; which *Command* would have been *unreasonable*, and impossible to have come from *God* upon the Supposition of his having by an immediate Act of his Power *hardned Pharoah's Heart*, and thereby hinder'd him from obeying it.

But the Cause (as plainly appears from the Text) of *Pharoah's hardning his own Heart*, was the Event's of *God's merciful Providence* to him, in removing the Plagues from him presently after they were inflicted. *But when Pharoah saw that there was Respite, he hardned his Heart, and bearkned not unto them, as the Lord had said.* Exod. viii. 15.

Again, upon the removing of the Plague of *Flies* it is said; *And Pharoah hardned his Heart*

at

at this Time also, neither would he let the People go. *ſ. 32.* Once more; And when Pharaoh ſaw that the Rain, and the Hail, and the Thunders were ceaſed, he ſinned yet more, and hardened his Heart, he and his Servants. Chap. ix. *ſ. 34.* Pharaoh, hoping every Plague was the laſt, as ſoon as it was removed, returned to his obſtinate Reſolution of reſuſing to let the People go; and thus God is ſaid to *harden his Heart*, by doing that which in the Event was a Motive for Pharaoh to continue in the Hardneſs of his Heart, which he had brought upon himſelf by his *Sins*; until God by repeated Plagues overcame the Hardneſs and Oppoſition of his *Will*, and brought it to yield to his Commands. Therefore Cato had either not at all conſidered the *Stile of Scripture*, and the Expreſſions of the Text in this particular Relation; or if he had, he was very *unfair* to put the Inſtance as he does; and to take Advantage of a mere * *Figure of Speech* and known way

* *Origen* obſerves in this very Inſtance; *Tropum* vero vel *figuram* Sermonis ejus qui ſcriptus eſt *De Induratione*, etiam ex communi conſuetudine exponere puto, quod non videatur abſurdum: frequenter enim benigniores quique domini ad eos ſervos, qui per multam patientiam & manſuetudinem dominorum inſolentiores improbioreſque fiunt, dicere ſolent: Ego te talem feci; ego te perdi; mea patientia te peſſimum fecit; ego tibi cauſa hujus tam duræ & peſſimæ inſolentiae exiſto, qui te non ſtatim per ſingulas culpas punio pro merito delictorum. Neceſſe eſt enim nos *tropum* vel *figuram* Sermonis advertere, & ita demum virtutem Dei intelligere, nec inferre calumnias verbo, cujus interiorem ſenſum diligentius exploremus.

way of Expression, especially in the Scriptures, and Eastern Forms, and to set it against not only the *Reason* of the thing, but the plain *literal* Sense and Expression of several other Places explaining the *figurative* one.

But the *fourth* Example which is alledged is most unreasonable of all; *viz.* *God's destroying* (as he says) *all Mankind at the Deluge for Crimes which he could have prevented.* Which is very absurd to affirm, either upon Supposition of *Necessity* or of *Will*, being the Ground of the *divine*, or of *humane* Actions. Supposing this Event of the Deluge to result from the *Necessity* of the divine Nature, God could no more *prevent* the Event, than the Operations of the *Necessity* which produced it; and if the *Crimes* of Men which caused it, were *necessary* Effects of *necessary* Causes, neither could he *prevent* them, for the same Reason. But it is natural for this Author to talk as if God's Actions were *voluntary*, at the same Time that he is arguing for the *Necessity* of them; and tho' he had laid aside his natural Notions of God and

De princip. lib. 3. p. 716. Græca Orig. apud Philocalia extant his verbis: Οὐκ ἄτερον ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ συνήθειας τὰ ταῦτα παραμυθήσασθ· πολλάκις τῶν χρηστῶν διαποτῶν φασκόντων τοῖς ἀλφ' τὴν χρηστικότητα καὶ τὴν μακροθυμίαν ἐκτριβομένοις οἰκταῖς τὸ, ἐγὼ σε ποτὸν ἐποίησα, καὶ ἐγὼ σοι αἰτιᾷ γεγονα τῶν τελικέων ἁμαρτημάτων· οἷον ὅτι τὸ ἦθος ἀκούσαι, καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ λεγομένου, καὶ μὴ συνκρίναντ'· μὴ κατακρίνοντας τοῦ βολήματος τοῦ λόγου. Philoc. C. 21.

Religion, yet he could not lay aside the Language whereby they are expressed; and Truth issueth from his Thoughts and Pen at the same time that he is using both against it. It is nothing but Cant and Jargon to talk of Mens committing *Crimes*, and of God *preventing* any thing, if all Things are the Result of *Necessity*, and nothing proceeds from the *Will* or *Choice*, either of God or Men. But the Supposition of God's *preventing* Men's *Crimes* is equally absurd, if their *Crimes* were not *necessary* but *voluntary*: For if God, as a *moral* Governor of the World, has endued Men with *Will* and *Free-agency*, and made the Determination of their own Minds acting by this *Will* to be the Principle of their Actions; then it is evident, that as they are *moral Agents*, and their *Crimes* and *Vertues* depend only on the *Free-agency* of their own Minds, God cannot absolutely *prevent* the *Crimes* of Men: He cannot *prevent* them so long as they have *Will* and free Power to *choose* either *Good* or *Evil*; he might indeed have prevented the particular *Crimes* for which they are punished by altering their Natures, or placing them in other Circumstances; but a Power or Possibility of committing *Crimes* cannot be prevented, so long as Men have *Will* and Power of Action; and if he takes away their *Will* (which is the only Way whereby he can prevent them) he at the same time takes away the Foundation of their *Crimes*, and makes it impossible for them to do either *Good* or *Evil*: And his destroying

Men for their Crimes in this Case, is the same and no more than breaking a Stone to Pieces for falling upon or hurting any one, which is as much a Crime in the Stone, as any Action of Men can be.

In the remaining Part of this Paragraph, *Cato* descants very ingeniously upon the various and wonderful Works of Providence, from whence, if some great Prejudice had not lain in the Way, he could not but see and confess that they are the Effects, not only of an *intelligent*, but of a *rational, wise and free-agent*; which is abundantly demonstrated from the *various Forms, Orders, Number and Motions* of Things, in all which there appears the greatest *Arbitrariness* of the Author of them; and in none of which there appears to be any *Necessity* that they should be just what they are, and impossible to be in any Respect otherwise. But to proceed;

Our Author, in order to ridicule and expose the Notion of humane *Liberty* (which he calls a *new Scheme, which Men have form'd at the Expence of denying all that they see or can know.* p. 177.) says, that these Formers of the *new Scheme* have made *Man the Primum Mobile, and his Mind the first Principle or Spring of all his Actions, independent of the Author of his Being, and of all the second Causes, which evidently influence and concur to determine his Resolutions and his Actions.* (p. 177, 178.)

Here is much more of *Art* than of *Reason* or *Argument* in what *Cato* offers.

1. This *Scheme of Liberty*, which he calls *new*, is far *older* than *Cato*, and is so *old*, that it began (as far as appears) with humane Nature, and has been the constant Opinion of both the learned and unlearned part of Mankind in all ages (a few only excepted.) It hath been the concurrent Sentiment (as I shall fully shew hereafter) of the greatest as well as most reasonable and learned Part of Men, that the *Mind* is (what *Cato* here ridicules, under the Term of *Primum Mobile*) *αὐτονόμητος*, a *self-moving* Agent, Principle and Spring of Action. But

2. It is very unfair to say, that the Maintainers of *Liberty* make the *Mind independent of the Author of its Being*; as if they thought that God in his *moral* and providential Government did no way, by his *invisible Presence* to the Mind (as well as by his *revealed Word*) excite, move or influence it in its Operations, not by *forcible*, but by *rational* Motives: That his Spirit did not concur to form good Resolutions in the Soul, and to hinder bad ones; and was not a Means, a *persuasive* and *rational*, not *necessary*, Means of the Mind's exerting itself into virtuous Actions. Who ever deny'd the Influence, as well of the *Spirit of God*, as of *external* and *second Causes*? as being *Motives*, not indeed to *compel*, but to *incline* the Mind, and to be *Reasons* why it should proceed to act by its *Will*, but not be driven by *Force* or *Necessity*.

The Heathens by the Light of natural Religion, were sensible of this; and therefore **Homer* introduceth the Deities working upon the Minds of Men by their visible Influences; *exciting Inclinations*, and *diverting the Intentions* of them; which Passages *Plutarch* explains thus, *viz.* "† *Homer* does not by these Expressions " make God to take away the *Liberty* of Acti- " on, but only to influence it; nor to be the " *efficient Cause* of the Exertions and Operati- " ons of the Mind, but only of the *Objects* which " excite them. ——— moving the *efficient* and " *voluntary Power* of the Soul to act by the " Impression of sensitive and intellectual Ideas " upon it; or on the other Hand dissuading and " diverting it from *Action*.

The Words of the great *Philosopher Hierocles* are very apposite to the present Purpose? *viz.* " ** All Things conducing to the Acqui-

* Τῷ δ' ἄρ' ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θῆκε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη

Ἀλλὰ τις ἀθανάτων τρέψῃ φρένας ———

† Ὅκ' ἀναιροῦντα ποιεῖ (Ὅμηρος) τὸν Θεὸν, ἀλλὰ κινεῖν τὴν προαίρεσιν· οὐδ' ὁρμᾶς ἐργαζόμενον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ὁρμῶν ἀγωγός. ——— τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πρακτικὸν καὶ προαιρετικὸν ἀρχαῖς τισι καὶ φαντασίαις καὶ ἐπινοαῖς ἐγείροντες, ἢ τῶναντίον ἀποτρέφοντες καὶ ἱσχύοντες.

** Πάντα τὰ πρὸς τὴν κτῆσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν συνετελούντα διὰ βραχείων υπέγραψεν ὁ λόγος, τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοκίνητον, καὶ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ συνεργίαν. Ἐπὶ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν αἴρεσις τῶν καλῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν θέσθαι ἔχοντες, τῆς παρ' ἐκείνου συνεργείας ——— πάντως πρὸς, χερίζομεν. In *Pythag. Carm.* p. 233.

fiction

" fition of that which is good, are briefly; the
 " *self-moving* Power of the Soul, and the *Assis-*
 " *tance* of God. For tho' it is in our Power to
 " *choose* that which is good, yet since we derive
 " this Power from God, we altogether stand in
 " need of his Assistance." But how does it ap-
 pear (as *Cato* argues) to the *Senses* and *Under-*
standing, either that *God* himself, or any *second*
Causes, compel and force the Mind into Action?
 On the contrary, I think, that *Cato* in denying
 humane *Liberty of Action*, does, much more than
 his Adversaries, *deny all that he sees or can know*:
 as great a Philosopher as himself is of this Opini-
 on, who says, " * They who deny *Free-will* are
 " ignorant of the *voluntary Agency* of the Soul,
 " and take away the very formal *Essence* of it;
 " for they take away that *self-moving* Faculty in
 " which the Nature of the Soul primarily con-
 " sists. For if it is a *self-moving* Being, its Appe-
 " tites and Desires are excited inwardly *from it*

* 'Οι τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἀναφοῦντες, καὶ τὸ αὐτεξέσσιον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγνοοῦσι, τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπ' τοῦτο φθείροντες τὸ ᾧ αὐτοκίνητον αὐτῆς ἀναφοῦσι, καθ' ὃ μέγιστα ὑσιῶται. ἢ τι ᾧ αὐτοκίνητός ἐστιν, ἢ ὁδοῦν ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐγείρεται πρὸς τὰς ἐρέξεις καὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς, καὶ ἐκ ἑξωθεν ποθεῖν ἐλκομένη ἢ ὠθευμένη, ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα. ἢ τι ἑξωθεν κινεῖται, οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτοκίνητος. ἢ πῶς τὴν ζωτικὴν ἐκτέναιαν τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἀπάρτησιν οὐ προσλογίζονται οἱ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἀναφοῦντες. Τὸς δ' οὐκ ἔχει συνάμειχσιν τοῦ βίβειν, καὶ μὴ βίβειν, καὶ τοῦ αἰεῖν, καὶ ἐκκλίνειν, καὶ τοῦ συνήθειον καὶ ἀπαρνητικόν; ἢ περ πάντα ἡνδρῶν ἐστὶ ἐξ κινήσεως ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐκ ἑξωθεν ὠθισμοὶ ἢ ὀλκαὶ τινες, ὥς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων. Simp. Com. in Epiet. p. 26.

self,

“ *self*, and it is not under any *external Compulsion*,
 “ like Bodies: But if it is moved by external
 “ Force, then it has no *Self-motion*. Further;
 “ they who deny *Free-will*, do not at all confi-
 “ der the vital Efficacy of the Mind, and its
 “ Power of *Assent* and *Dissent*. For who is
 “ not conscious to himself of his having a Pow-
 “ er to *will* or *not to will*, to *choose* and to *re-*
 “ *fuse*, to *consent* and to *deny*? all which are in-
 “ *ternal Self-motions* of the Soul, and not *exter-*
 “ *nal Force* and *Impulse*, such as moves inani-
 “ *mate Beings*.” And nothing is more agreeable
 both to *Sense* and *Reason*, than what *Cato* sup-
 poseth to be contrary to both, namely, *That Al-*
mighty God hath given to Man a Rule to act
by, and annexed Rewards and Menaces to the Ob-
servance or Non-observance of this Rule; has given
a free, uncontroul'd and impartial Liberty to him
to determine, without being coerc'd or restrain'd by
any other Power to do or not to do an Action, or to
choose Good or Evil to himself. (p. 178.)

All this is a very fair and just Representation
 of the Notion of *humane Liberty*; and is well
 and elegantly expressed; and is so agreeable to
 the natural Notion of *God*, as being a *wise, just*
 and *moral Governor* of the World, and of *Men*,
 as being *rational Agents*, and capable of *Vertue*
 and *Religion*; that I cannot but wonder any seri-
 ous Man of *Sense*, that ever at all considered ei-
 ther *God's Nature and Perfections*, or his own,
 should doubt of the *Truth and Certainty* of this
 Notion.

In

In the next Particular, *Cato* is mistaken in laying it to the Defenders of *Free-will*, that they say that *God's Justice* obliges him to this Conduct. (p. 178.) We do not ascribe the Existence of our Natures, and the Faculties of it to any Obligations in God, in which his *Justice* bound him; but to his *Will* and *Choice* directed by his *Wisdom* and *Goodness*. We deny not but God might have exerted his *Power* and *Knowledge* (consistently with *Justice*) in making the whole Creation either altogether *unintelligent* or *intelligent* without giving any part of it a *Will* and *Power of Action*. But then we say, that as to have made all things *unintelligent*, would not have been so great an Exertion of *Power* and *Knowledge*, as to make some Things *intelligent*; so also that the giving *Intelligence* without *Will* and *Free-agency* is not so great an Exertion of them, as the giving with *Intelligence*, *Reason*, and the *Faculty of Will*, and *Power of Action*: This is a greater Perfection than any other; and God could not be a *moral Governor* (*i. e.* indeed a Governor properly at all) if he had not endued his Creatures with *Will* and a *Power of Action*: And there is as much Difference of *Power*, *Knowledge* and *Authority*, and consequently of *Glory* and *Honour* following it, in God's governing the *rational* Part of the Creation endued with *Liberty*, and the other Part which is *unintelligent* or *irrational*; as in a *King's* governing a Nation of *learned* and *civiliz'd* Men, and an *Herd* of *Cattle*, or direct-

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ing

ing the Position and Order of a Set of Chestmen.

The next Argument which Cato alledges against the Notion of *humane Liberty* is, *that it takes away* (he says) *and robs God of most of his Attributes.* He argues (p. 178.)

1. That God's *Prescience* or *Knowledge* (from all *Eternity*) of every *Event* which does or can happen in the *Universe* is deny'd at once: His Reason is, for whatever is contingent in its own Nature, and may or may not happen, cannot be foreseen. No, the true Conclusion is, that contingent Things cannot be necessary, cannot come necessarily to pass; but since contingent Things as certainly come to pass as if they were necessary, they may with Certainty be foreseen by him who sees the Causes preceding, and by means of which the Agent voluntarily effects them; where is the Difficulty or Unreasonableness of this? he adds, *when any Being sees that a Thing will be, it must be.* But this is mere Fallacy built on the Confusion of the different Terms *Will* and *Must*, as if they were Consequences, the latter of the former, or there were no Difference betwixt *Certainty* of Event, and *Necessity* of Event: It is true indeed that what *must* be *will* be, but not *vice versa*; it only follows from what *will* be that there is a *Certainty*, but not that there is a * *Necessity* of Event. This therefore

* Celsus argued as our Author here does; Θεός ὃν πρότερον, καὶ πάντως ἔχρην γίνεσθαι τὸ προσημασμένον. " That whatever was foretold

therefore is nothing but an old Quibble, which so far imposed upon *Epicurus*, tho' a Man of fine Parts, as to make him deny that Axiom*, of every Proposition being either true or false; for (as *Cicero* represents the Case) “ † He was afraid, if he granted this, that he must in Consequence grant that every Event proceeded from Fate (or Necessity.)” For (arguing like *Cato*) he thought, “ That if either Part of a Proposition was true from Eternity, that then it was certain: And if certain, then necessary also; and so he thought this Argument made for Fate or Necessity.” The same Quibble the Stoic Dio-

foretold by God, must without all peradventure come to pass.” To which *Origen* replies; Ἐπεὶ ὅτι τὸ πάντως, ἀκέραιον ἐστὶ τοῦ καταναγκασμένου, οὐ δόσσομεν αὐτῷ. δυνατὸν ὅτι ἦν καὶ μὴ γίνασθαι· ἢ ὅτι τὸ πάντως, λέγει ἀντὶ τοῦ, ἔσθαι, ὅπερ οὐ κωλύεται εἶναι ἀληθές, καὶ αὖ δυνατὸν ἢ τὸ μὴ γίνασθαι· οὐδὲν λυπεῖ τὸν λόγον. “ If by the Word, without all peradventure, *Celsus* means necessarily, I do not allow it; for it is possible that it may not come to pass: but if he means by the Word, the same as that it will come to pass; nothing hinders it from being true, tho' there is a Possibility of its not coming to pass; and so his Argument is nothing to the Purpose. *Cont. Cels. lib. 2. p. 74.*

* One of the *Argumenta palmaria*, top Arguments of the ancient Fatalists was, as *Plutarch* tells us, Τὸ πολυβέβητον τοῦτο, ὅτι πᾶν ἀξίωμα ἢ ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἢ ψευδές.

† *Epicurus* veretur ne si hoc concesserit (scilicet omnem enunciationem, aut veram esse aut falsam) concedendum sit Fato fieri quæcunque fiant: si enim alterutrum ex æternitate verum sit, esse id etiam certum, & si certum, etiam necessarium: ita & Necessitatem & Fatum confirmari putat. *Lib. de Fato.*

dorus made use of; arguing “ * That that only
 “ *could* come to pass, which either actually *was*,
 “ or *would* come to pass: And whatsoever *will*
 “ *be*, that he says must *necessarily* be: and what-
 “ soever *will not be*, he denies that *that can be*.”
 To which *Chrysippus* the Stoic replies; “ That
 “ what *will not be*, *may be*; as that this Gem
 “ *may be* broken, altho’ it never *will be* broken:
 “ And that it was not *necessary* for *Cypselas* to
 “ reign at *Corinth*, altho’ it was foretold a
 “ thousand Years before by the Oracle of *Apol-*
 “ *lo*.” And *Cicero* himself argues on this
 Head, “ † That had *Epicurus* granted that every
 “ Proposition was either *true* or *false*; he need-
 “ ed not have been afraid that it thence would
 “ follow, that all Things come to pass by *Fate*

* Ille (sc. Diodorus) id solum fieri posse dicit, quod aut sit verum, aut futurum sit verum: & quicquid futurum sit, id dicit fieri *necesse* esse: & quicquid not sit futurum, id negat fieri *posse*. Tu (scilicet Chrysippus) & quæ non sint futura, posse fieri dicis: ut frangi hanc gemmam, etiam si id nunquam futurum sit: neque necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, quanquam id millesimo ante anno Apollinis oraculo editum esset. *Lib. de Fato*.

† Licet Epicuro concedenti omne enunciatum aut verum aut falsum esse, non vereri, ne omnia *Fato* fieri sit necesse: non enim æternis causis naturæ necessitate manantibus verum est id quod ita enunciat. Descendit in Academiam Carneades: nec tamen sine causis: sed interest inter causas fortuito antegressas, & inter causas cohibentes (forte, continentes) in se efficientiam naturalem. Ita & semper verum fuit, morietur Epicurus, cum duo & septuaginta annos vixerit, Archonte Pitarato: neque tamen erant causæ fatales, cur ita accideret: sed quod ita cecidisset, certe casurum, sicut cecidit, fuit. *Ibid.*

“ (or Necessity:) For that which is *true* does
 “ not come to pass by a *necessary* Chain of *eternal*
 “ Causes. For Example, *Carneades* went down
 “ into the Academy; and not without a Cause:
 “ But then there is a Difference betwixt an ante-
 “ cedent *contingent* Cause, and a *natural* efficient
 “ Cause. So also this Proposition was *always*
 “ true, *viz.* *Epicurus* will die when he is seventy
 “ two Years of Age, in the Magistracy of *Pita-*
 “ *ratus*; but notwithstanding there was no *Fa-*
 “ *tality* (or Necessity) that this should so happen:
 “ but because it did so happen, it was *certain* to
 “ happen as it did.

And *Origen* observes to this Purpose; “ * But
 “ if any one will understand that which is said
 “ will be, that it *will* be, *so*, as that it *may not*
 “ *be*; this (says he) I readily acknowledge to be
 “ true. For God cannot lie; but of those things
 “ which *may be* or *may not be*, he can know
 “ which *will* be, and which *will not* be.

Cato proceeds (p. 178.) it is impossible to know
 that any Event will come to pass, that may not
 come to pass. But if it will certainly come to pass
 (tho' there be a Possibility of its not coming to

* Ἐι δὲ τις δηγῆσται, τὸ πάντως ἔσαι, λέγων ὅτι ἔσαι μὲν ταῦτα
 τινὰ, ἐνδέχεται ὅ καὶ ἑτέρως γένηται, τοῦτο ὡς ἀληθὲς συγχωροῦμαι·
 τὸν μὲν δὲ Θεὸν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ψεύσασθαι, ἐνδέχεται ὅ περὶ τῶν ἐνδέχο-
 μένων γένηται καὶ μὴ γένηται, φρονῆσαι τὸ γένηται αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ γένηται.
Orig. apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 288. & Com. in
Gen. p. 9.

pass) why may not this *Certainty* be foreseen? Here is yet no Appearance of an Argument. *Cato* concludes; (ibid.) 'tis equally impossible to foresee an Effect, without knowing the Causes which produce it.

This indeed is, and the only Thing that is true and to the Purpose: And the Answer is easy, as in every Effect, whether contingent or necessary, there are Causes which produce it; so God the Author of Nature, as well sees those Causes which are Causes only of the *Certainty* of Events, or of contingent Events; as those Causes which necessarily produce Effects, or which are Causes of necessary Events.

Origen argues; “ * That God when he laid “ the Foundation of the World, (nothing being “ produc'd without a Cause) did contemplate in “ his Mind every future Event; and saw that if “ this was done that would follow; and from “ that another, and so on to the End of the “ World, whereby he knows whatever will be, “ without being at all the Cause of any Event, “ which he knew would come to pass.

* Ἐπιβάλλων ὁ Θεὸς τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆς κοσμοποιίας, οὐδενὸς ἀναιτίου ἡνωμένου, ἐπιπορεύεται τῷ νῦν ἕκαστον τῶν ἐσομένων, ὁρῶν ὅτι ἐπεὶ τόδε γέγονε, τόδε ἔσται· ἢ γίνηται τόδε τὸ ἐπόμενον, τόδε ἀκολουθεῖ· ἢ ὑποσάντω, τόδε ἔσται· καὶ ἕτα μίχεται τέλος τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιπαρεμβείς, οἶδεν ἂν ἔσται, οὐ πάντας ἕκαστα τῶν ἡνωσσομένων αἰτιᾶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ συμβῆναι τυγχάνον. Apud. Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 287. & Com. in Gen. p. 8.

This

This is the reasoning of the most learned Men of former Ages; and the whole Confusion of *Cato's* Thoughts in this his grand (tho' trite) Argument against *Liberty* is owing to his not distinguishing betwixt Things *certain* and Things *necessary*, and not considering the distinct Nature of God's Knowledge of these different Objects; tho' there is not a clearer Distinction betwixt any two Ideas whatsoever.

Will any one in his Senses say that because it was certain yesterday, that I should write these Words to Day; it was therefore *necessary*? and that this Truth is of the same Nature with *necessary* Truths; with the Truth of three Angles, of a Triangle being equal to two right Angles, and all other either *self-evident* or *demonstrative* Truths? Or is the same with the Truth of the *Ascent* of light, or the *Descent* of heavy Bodies, or any other *necessary* Effects of *natural* Causes?

If then the Distinction of *certain* and *necessary* Truths is plain and undeniable, it unavoidably follows that God can foresee Things whose Events are *certain* only and not *necessary*: That he can as well foresee Things that *certainly will* be (tho' they are *contingent* and *may not* be) by foreseeing the Causes which will *certainly* produce them; as he can foresee Things that *necessarily must* be, by foreseeing the Causes that *must* produce them. God's Foresight neither makes *necessary* Events *necessary*; nor *certain* Events *certain*: And as some Things are *necessary*, not because

cause God foresees them, but because they are necessary in their *Nature*, prior in order of Ideas to this Foresight; so other Things are *certain*, not *necessary*; not because God foresees the *Certainty* of them, but because antecedently to this Foreknowledge, they are *certain* in their Causes, and which would be exactly the same, the one *certain*, the other *necessary*, whether God foreknew them or not, or supposing he did not foreknow them.

'Tis Origen's Argument, " * As (saith he) if
 " any one seeing another, who thro' Ignorance
 " is rash, and precipitately and irrationally walks
 " in a *slippery* Path, foresees, that he will slip
 " and fall, is not the *Cause* of his Fall, so we
 " are to understand that God foresees what every
 " one *will* be, and perfectly knows the
 " Causes of what he *will* be, of both his *Vices*
 " and his *Vertues* : But nevertheless (he adds)
 " his Foreknowledge is not the *Cause* of
 " them.

* Όσοτις γάρ τις ὁρῶν τινα ἀπὸ τὴν ἀμαθίαν προπιτῆ, ἀπὸ τὴν προπίπτειν ἀλογίζων ἐπιβαίοντα οὐδὲ ὀλιγοῦρας, καὶ καταλάβει πιστῶς ὀλιγοῦσαντα, οὐκ αἰτία τοῦ ὀλίγου γίνεται. ὅτι νοητῶν, τὸν Θεὸν προσημασμένα ὁποῦν ἔσαι ἕκαστον, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τοῦ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν ἔσεσθαι καθορᾶν, καὶ ὅτι ἀμνηστέσται τὰδε, ἢ καταθέσει τὰδε καὶ εἰ χρὴ λέγειν, οὐ τὴν πρόγνωσιν αἰτίαν τῶν γνωμένων. Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 287, & Com. in Gen. p. 8.

The great Philosopher, as well as Orator, *Cicero*, thus reasons on this Head of Argument, “ * It does not at all (says he) follow from every Proposition’s being either *true* or *false*, that there are *eternal* and *immutable Causes*, which render it impossible for any thing to happen otherwise than it *will* happen : There are *contingent* efficient Causes of *certain* Truths, as *that* Cato *will come into the Senate House*, which are not interwoven with the Nature of Things (or *mundane material Causes*) and yet the *Truth* of that which *will* come to pass, is as *immutable* as that which is already come to pass : Nor does *Fate* or *Necessity* at all follow.

Again; as my *Knowledge* of any Event which happened to day, no way influenceth the *Existence*, or *Certainty*, or *Necessity* of it; but it is what it is, independent of my *Knowledge*: So in like Manner God’s *Foreknowledge*, which is to him, to whose Thoughts all Things are present, the same as *Knowledge*, no way influenceth the *Existence* of any Event, which whether *present* or *future*, is or *will* be the same, whether he

* *Tully’s* Words are; Nec si omne enunciatum aut verum aut falsum est, sequitur illico esse causas immutabiles, easque æternas, quæ prohibeant quicquam secus cedere atque casurum sit. Fortuitæ sunt causæ quæ efficiant, ut vere dicantur, quæ ita dicentur, *veniet Cato in Senatum*, non inclusæ in rerum natura atque mundo; &c tamen tam est immutabile venturum, cum est verum, quam venisse: nec ob eam causam *Fatum* aut *Necessitas* extimescenda est. *Lib. de Fat. p. 354.*

foreknows it or not. Supposing God did not foreknow any Event, it was equally true and certain from all Eternity, that the Event which now is come to pass would come to pass: Whence it is evident, that the Truth and Certainty of it does not depend on any Foreknowledge, supposing it to have been foreknown. Therefore, as it is evident to Sense and Reason, that some Truths, as all self-evident Propositions, and mathematical Demonstrations, are in their Natures (*a priori*) necessary and independent of God's Power or Will, and his Knowledge does not make them to be more or less necessary: And other Effects are also necessary (but a *posteriori* only) so long as the immediate Cause of them continues, such as the Rising of the Sun, the Return of the Seasons, and a thousand such like Events, which are necessary in their immediate Causes so long as they are permitted to operate, which depends wholly on the Power and Will of God: and his Foreknowledge of these Events does not make them necessary, nor are they necessary because he foreknows them, but they are necessary from the Nature of the Cause which immediately produces them, which Cause God being the Author of, must foresee the Effects of it: so also it is equally evident that there are other Truths or Events proceeding from rational Agents, or humane Actions, which are not necessary in either of the former Senses, but are contingent only, i. e. such as might possibly not have been, or might have been otherwise, even whilst the

the immediate Cause which produced them did exist, such are all the Effects of *Will* and *Choice*; and these also having Causes, which as *certainly* produce them, as the others are *necessarily* produc'd from their Causes, and God being the Author of these Causes of *voluntary* Effects also, must know their Effects as well as the other which are *necessary*; and this *Foreknowledge* can no more make *contingent* Events which *certainly* will be, to become *necessary*, than *necessary* Events to become *contingent*: In Truth, God's *Knowledge* or *Foreknowledge* is founded upon their *Certainty* of Existence (whether necessary or not alters not the Case) and not their Existence upon his *Knowledge*.

The Nature of no Truth is alter'd by being *known* or *foreknown*; for it is only known to be *what it is*. If I see an Object (supposing that I really see it) in a certain Place, it is certain that the Object is there; but then 'tis evident, that my seeing it is not the *Cause* of its being there, (for it would be where it is, whether I saw it or not) but the Object's being there causeth my Sensation, I see it there, *because it is there*: So God *foresees*, or rather *sees* the Actions of *Free-agents*, because they *will* be, are *certain* in *Futurity*, not that they *will* be, *because* he *foresees* them. It is the previous Truth or *Certainty* of the *future Choice* of the *Free-agent*, that is the Object of the divine *Prescience*, and the Ground of *Foreknowledge*, which yet may be infallibly true,

supposing Man to be a *Free-agent*; cannot he *certainly know* beforehand what he *will* or will *not* do, so far as any Thing depends upon his *Choice*? and if so, then a Man's *own Foreknowledge* is consistent with his *Freedom*. If we can but further suppose that God who gave Man all his intellectual Faculties, knows as much of him as he does of himself, then will God's *Foreknowledge* be consistent with Man's *Freedom*.

In like manner the great *Origen* argues, “ * To
“ speak the Truth (saith he) the *Foreknowledge*
“ of God is not the *Cause* of Events; (for God
“ lays no Necessity of sinning upon him who
“ he foreknows will commit Sin) but the Truth
“ (tho' not commonly understood) is, that
“ that which *will* come to pass, is the *Cause* of
“ his *Foreknowledge*; for the Event does not
“ come to pass because it is *foreknown*, but it is
“ *foreknown*, because it *will* come to pass.

Wherefore we may conclude, with *Austin*,
“ † That we are no way compelled, either by
“ holding

* Ἐν ἡμέρῃ λέγειν, ὅτι τὴν πρόγνωσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι γινόμενων (οὐ γὰρ ἐφαπτεται τοῦ προγνωσμένου ἀμαρτησομένου ὁ Οὐδός, ὅταν ἀμαρτανῇ, ἀλλὰ παραδεχόμενον μὲν ἀληθὲς ὅ ἐροῦμεν, τὸ ἐσόμενον αἰτίον τῶν τοιάντων εἶναι τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρόγνωσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπεὶ ἔγνωται, γίνεται· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ γινώσκαι ἔμελλεν, ἔγνωται· Apud. Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 287, 288. & Com in. Gen. p. 8. See also cont. Cels. lib. 2. p. 73, 74.

† Quocirca nullo modo cogimur; aut retenta Præscientia Dei tollere voluntatis arbitrium; aut retento voluntatis arbitrio, Deum quod nefas est, negare præscium futurorum: sed utrumque

“ holding the *Foreknowledge* of God, to reject
 “ the *Freedom* of the Will; or, by retaining the
 “ *Freedom* of the Will, to deny (which it would
 “ be impious to do) the *Foreknowledge* of God:
 “ But we maintain both, we profess both faith-
 “ fully and truly; the one, that we may *believe*
 “ aright; the other, that we may live well.

That which seems to have led *Cato* and others,
 both Antients and Moderns, to think that nothing
 is the *Object* of *Knowledge*, but *necessary* Truths
 or Events, is, the taking all *Knowledge* to be
scientific; or understanding it in the Sense of
Science, *Demonstration* or *Intuition*, and so imagin-
 ing that every *Object* of *Knowledge* is a *self-evi-*
dent, *intuitive*, *demonstrative* or *natural* Truth,
 all which are indeed *necessary*. But this Notion
 of *Knowledge* (tho' indeed Men have no other
 which is properly *Knowledge* in them) is a great
 Mistake when apply'd to the *Knowledge* of God;
 and the *Knowledge* which God hath of future
contingent Events, or of humane Actions, is of
 another Nature. God doth not know what *Free-*
agents will do, in the same manner as he knows
 what will be the Effects of *natural* Causes, or
 as he knows the *essential*, *eternal* and *immutable*
Agreements and *Disagreements* of Things, and
 their Proportions and Relations to each other:

que amplectimur, utrumque fideliter & veraciter confitemur.
 Illud, ut bene credamus; hoc, ut bene vivamus. *De Civit.*
Dei lib. 5. c. 10.

This

This is that *Knowledge* which is called *Science*, and belongs only to the Perception of *necessary* Truths or Events. But God knows the Effects of *free* Causes, or *voluntary* Agents, by the Perfection of his *Judgment*, by that *Knowledge* which is called *Wisdom*, and is of a * different Nature from *Science*, and the Objects of which are in their Natures not *necessary*, but *contingent*, and such as tho' they *certainly* will be, yet have a *physical* Possibility of *not* being: And here I must observe that it is another Mistake to think that *contingent* Things, depending on the *Will* and *Choice* of *Free-agents*, are *uncertain*; if so indeed, it would imply a Contradiction to suppose them to be *certainly* foreknown, *i. e.* to be *certain*; but they are as certain in their Events, as those Things which are *necessary*: my *present* Writing was as *certain* a Truth *yesterday* as it is *to day*, *i. e.* it was *true* and *certain* *yesterday* that I should write *to day*: Tho' yet it is evident that it was not *necessarily true* or *certain*, because I might not have lived *to day* to write, or might not have wrote tho' I did live; and God's *Knowledge* *yesterday* of my writing *to day* was as *certain* and *infallible* (tho' not *scientific*) as his *Knowledge* of any other

* *Chalcidius* says; Quod Deus sciat quidem omnia, sed unumquodque pro Natura sua ipsorum sciat: necessitati quidem subjugatum, ut necessitati obnoxium: anceps vero, ut quod ea sit natura præditum, cui consilium viam pandat. Neque enim ita scit ambigui Naturam Deus, ut quod certum & necessitate constrictum. In *Plat. Tim. c. 7. p. 254.*

Truth or Event the most *necessary*: And 'tis, I think, easy to conceive, that this sort of *Knowledge* or *Wisdom* (tho' in Men who cannot discern the Hearts or Wills of others it is very imperfect, uncertain and subject to Error, and so is not properly *Knowledge* in them) may be so *perfect* in God (*who searcheth the Hearts and Reins*, and knows all the Workings of the Mind, and the Motives exciting them, as well as he knows all the Operations of Nature working *natural* and *necessary* Effects) that he may with as much *Certainty* and *Infallibility* foresee the *certain* (tho' contingent) Effects of the one, as the *certain* and withal *necessary* Effects of the other. The *Possibility* of the Foreknowledge of *contingent* Events, and the Reconciliation and Consistency of such a Foreknowledge with *Freedom* or *Choice* of Action, would not have appear'd so perplexed and difficult, to be apprehended, had it been well considered, that every Event depending upon the *Will* of the Agent, has as much *Certainty* in its Nature, as any Effect proceeding from *natural* or *necessary* Causes, and that what is call'd *Chance* or *Fortune* is a mere empty Name without any Meaning: And the Objection made from the Freedom of humane Actions of the *Possibility* of God's being *deceived*, is just such a silly Quibble as the other of the *Possibility* of his doing *Evil*, because he is *freely* and *voluntarily* good: The Perfection of God's *Knowledge* in the one Case, as the perfect Rectitude of his *Will* in the other Case, makes

God as free from *Error* and *Sin*, as if it was *physically* impossible for him to commit either.

In short, any Man may have as clear and certain a Perception that his *Actions* are *voluntary*, as that any other Thing is *necessary*. I as clearly know that my *present* Writing is *voluntary* and *free*, and depends upon my *Choice* and *Will*; as that the *Beating* of my *Pulse* and *Heart* is *necessary*, and depends not upon my *Will*, but upon *natural Causes*: And there is as much Reason to believe that *all* Things are *voluntary*, as that *nothing* is so, or that *all* Things are *necessary*; and I desire any one to shew me that the one is more clear or certain than the other. If he says, that *Motives* which determine or cause the Mind to exert what I call *voluntary* Actions, are *necessary*, and therefore the Effects or Actions following the Motives are also *necessary*; this is just as true a Consequence, as that because *voluntary* Actions concur to the Production of *necessary* Effects, therefore these Effects are *voluntary*. As for Example, the *Motive* of my present Writing is a Persuasion of the *Falseness* of *Cato's* Scheme, and this *Persuasion*, I grant and see is *necessary*, I cannot help this Judgment; but still my Writing, I also see, is no more *necessary*, than the Encrease of the *Motion* of my *Blood*, or of the *Beating* of my *Pulse* is *voluntary*, tho' the Cause concurring to it was my *voluntary* drinking a certain Quantity of *Spirits*. Nay I can with as much Reason argue, that all *natural* Effects are *voluntary* in their
imme-

immediate Causes, or proceed from their *Choice* or *Will*, because God their *first Cause* is a *voluntary* and *Free-agent*; as *Cato* can argue from the second Causes or Motives of humane Actions being *necessary*, that the *immediate Cause*, the *Mind*, is a *necessary*, not a *voluntary Agent*: But there is no end of arguing, or rather trifling, with such sort of Fallacies. And if any reasonable Man could make a Dispute about the *Foreknowledge* of God, it must be not to argue from the *Supposition* of it, that all Things are *necessary*, which is contrary to all the Sense and Reason in the World; but the Question must be, since Man is a *Free-agent*, and his Actions plainly *voluntary*, whether they can be foreseen or not, or are the Objects of *Foreknowledge*. For if it can be prov'd that *contingent Events* are not Objects of Knowledge, then, as *Cato* observes, 'tis no Irreverence to the supreme Being, to say that he cannot do *Impossibilities*, and know Things which cannot be known, (p. 178.) But his adding, that 'tis certain he must know all Things which can be known, because they all depend upon his *Will*, (p. 179.) is very preposterous (as well as untrue) in Him to affirm, who makes all Things *necessary*. If he means by *Will* *Approbation* only, viz. that God consents and approves of Things which are effected by the *Necessity* of his Nature without any *Choice*, just as he wills or approves of his own Existence; this is an egregious Fallacy and Abuse of Words; for in this Sense things no more depend upon

the *Will* of God than his own Existence does. But, if he means by *Will* the *free* or *voluntary* Agency of God, he then destroys his own Scheme of *Necessity*; and in this Sense, tho' all Effects of God's Power truly depend upon his *Will*, or his Mind *freely* exerting that Power; yet it is not true that the Existence of all Truths depends upon his *Will*; because all *self-evident* and *demonstrative* Truths are *necessary* and *immutable* in their Natures, and independent of the *Will* of God. Lastly, if he means (as he inadvertently expresseth himself) that all Things depend upon God's *Will* exerted *necessarily*, and this, because God's *Will* is *necessarily-existing*; this is so very gross, absurd and contradictory, as, I trust, *Cato*, upon Reflection, must and would have been asham'd of having ever offered it.

The preceding Argument, concerning the Inconsistency of the *Foreknowledge* of God with the *Freedom* of humane Actions, having been much urg'd by the antient *Fatalists* against humane *Liberty*, it may not be amiss to shew, briefly, what those, who maintain'd that Men's Actions were *voluntary* and *free*, reply'd to it.

That Men are *Free-agents*, and their *Actions* in their *own Power*, was always thought to be so indisputably plain and certain, that many of the *Ancients*, who could not clearly see how this *Freedom* was to be reconcil'd with the *Foreknowledge* of God, deny'd the divine *Prescience*, lest it should imply the *Necessity* of humane Actions;

others made a Doubt about it, but others thought that *Will* in Men, and *Prescience* in God, were consistent.

* *Austin* tells us, that the *Stoics*, though they held *Fate* in all things, yet rejected *Prescience* with respect to Men's Actions, lest it should thence follow, that all things came to pass by *Necessity*. And *Cicero* relates, that † *Carneades* the *Academic* deny'd there could be any *Foreknowledge* of things future, without inferring the *Necessity* of them, which he strenuously oppos'd.

Again ** *Austin* affirms, that *Cicero*, “ in his “ Books concerning *Divination*, does in his own “ Person openly oppose the *Foreknowledge* of “ God; and that he seems to do this wholly to “ shew his Dissent to the Notion of *Fate*, and “ that he may not destroy the *Freedom* of the “ Will.

* Stoici (oppugnabant præscientiam) ut non omnia necessitate fieri dicerent, quamvis omnia Fato fieri contenderent. *De Civit. Dei, lib. 5. c. 9.* Whence we may observe, that the *Stoics* held the *Freedom* of humane Actions, as will be demonstrated at large hereafter.

† Itaque dicebat Carneades, ne Apollinem quidem futura posse dicere, nisi ea, quorum causas natura ita contineret, ut ea fieri necesse esset — ita ne præterita quidem ea, quorum nulla signa tanquam vestigia extarent, Appollini nota esse censebat: quo minus futura. *De Fat. lib. p. 356, 357.*

** In libris *De Divinatione* ex seipso apertissime oppugnat præscientiam futurorum. Hoc autem totum facere videtur, ne fatum esse consentiat, & perdat liberam voluntatem. *De Civit. Dei, lib. 5. c. 9.*

That *Cicero* denies and *ridicules* also the superstitious *Divination* of *Astrologers* and *Southsayers*, is indeed evident from these Books; but, whether he wholly deny'd God's Foreknowledge of future Events depending upon the *Will* of Men, is not, I think, very clear from his Writings. He seems indeed to think, that if God does foresee all future Events, yet that he does not impart this Foreknowledge unto Men: and in one place does expressly say; “ * that in his Opinion God cannot know “ *fortuitous* future Events.” But whether he esteem'd the future *Actions* of Men to be of this Nature, does not certainly appear; only 'tis not improbable, that being addicted most to the *Academic* Sect, he might fall in with the Opinion of *Carneades* before mentioned.

The learned *Platonic*, *Alexander Aphrodisus*, treats the Argument of *Prescience* at large in the following Manner.

“ † If any one shall say that it is agreeable to
 “ Reason that the Gods *foreknow* Things future,
 “ because it is absurd to affirm that they are ig-
 “ norant of any thing that is to come, and upon
 “ this Presumption shall endeavour to prove that
 “ all

* Mihi ne in Deum quidem cadere videtur, ut sciat quid casu & fortuito futurum sit. *De Divinat. lib. 2. p. 272.*

† Τὸ ὃ λέγειν ἔυλογον εἶναι τοὺς Θεοὺς τὰ ἐσομένα προεῖδέναι, ἄτοπον ᾧ τὸ λέγειν ἐκείνους ἀγνοεῖν τι τῶν ἐσομένων, καὶ τοῦτο λαμβάνοντας κατασκευάζειν πειρᾶσθαι δι' αὐτοῦ, τὸ πάντα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε γίνεσθαι

“ all things are effected by *Necessity* and *Fate*, this
 “ is neither reasonable nor true. For indeed,
 “ when the Nature of things will admit of it,
 “ nothing is more reasonable than that the Gods
 “ should foreknow future Events; but when
 “ the Nature of them is such as makes it impos-
 “ sible for them to be foretold and foreknown,
 “ then it is not reasonable to suppose that even
 “ the Gods know things that are impossible to be
 “ known. For what things are impossible in
 “ their own Nature, retain their Nature, and
 “ are impossible, even with respect to the Gods.
 “ For it is impossible even for the Gods to make
 “ the *Diagonal* equal to the *Side*, or twice two
 “ to be five, or any thing that is not, to be :
 “ ——— so in like manner it is impossible
 “ to foresee that which in its own Nature is
 “ possible *to be* or *not to be*, as that which
 “ *absolutely* will be, or will not be. For if the
 “ Foreknowledge of Things, which do not ex-
 “ ist,

γίνεται, καὶ καθ' ἐμαρμύνει, ἔτε ἀληθὲς ἔτε ἔυλογον. τῆς μὲν γὰρ φύ-
 σεως τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων τοῦτο χωρὶς, ἔδει ἔυλογότερον εἶναι
 μᾶλλον τῶν Θεῶν τὰ μέλλοντα ἀδυνάτε δ' ἔσσης τὴν τοιαύτην πρόσ-
 ρησιν (lege πρόφρησιν) καὶ πρόγνωσιν δέχεσθαι, ἔδει τοὺς Θεοὺς ἔυλογον
 εἶναι γίνεσθαι τὸ εἶναι τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὰ γὰρ ἀδύνατα τῇ αὐτῶν
 φύσει, καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Θεοῖς τὴν αὐτὴν φυλάττει φύσιν ἀδυνάτων γὰρ
 καὶ τοῖς Θεοῖς ἢ τὸ τὴν διάμετρον ποιῆσαι τῇ πλευρᾷ σόμμετρον, ἢ
 τὰς δις δύο πέντε εἶναι, ἢ τῶν γενομένων τι μὴ γενοῦναι. ——— Οἷς
 ὁμοίως ἀδύνατον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ φύσει ἔχειν, τὸ δύνανθαι γίνεσθαι τι
 καὶ μὴ : ἐσόμενον πάντως, ἢ ὡς μὴ ἐσόμενον, ἔτε προεῖναι : ἐν γὰρ ἢ
 παρὰ

“ ist, takes away their *Contingency*, it is evident,
 “ that if they are *contingent*, they cannot be fore-
 “ known. And that this is so, in their Opinion
 “ also, is manifest, from their supposing that the
 “ Gods foreknow things future, and then ar-
 “ guing from this Supposition, that they are
 “ therefore *necessary*, or otherwise could not
 “ be foreknown. But if *Necessity* of Things
 “ is the Consequence of the Foreknowledge
 “ and *Prediction* of the Gods, then, accord-
 “ ing to them, if things are not *necessary*,
 “ the Gods cannot foreknow their future Events.
 “ Wherefore they also ascribe the same Impo-
 “ tency to the Gods (with their Adversaries) if
 “ it ought to be call’d Impotency and Weakness,
 “ not to be able to do what is impossible to be
 “ done; and give not a whit more Power to the
 “ Deity by attributing Prediction to him; but
 “ by taking this for granted, they make the Na-
 “ ture

περὶ αὐτῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν πρόγνωσις ἀναρῆι τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνδιχόμε-
 νοι, δῆλον ὡς ἐι γάχοιτο τοῦτο, ἀδύνατος ἂν ἡ περὶ αὐτῶν πρόγνωσις
 εἴη. ὅτι ἥ καὶ κατὰ τούτους τοῦτο ἔτις ἔχει, δῆλον ἐκ τῆ λαβόντας
 αὐτοὺς ὅτι οἱ Θεοὶ προγινώσκουσι τὰ μέλλοντα, δι’ αὐτοῦ κατα-
 σκευάζειν τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἂν, ἐι μὴ ὅντα γίνοιτο
 προγινωσκόμενα. ἐι ὅ τῇ πᾶν Θεῶν προγνώσει τε καὶ προαγορεύσει,
 τὸ ἀναγκάσιον ἔπεται, καὶ κατ’ ἐντέας, ἐι μὴ τὸ ἀναγκάσιον ἐν τοῖς
 γινωσκόμενοις εἴη, οὐκ ἂν κατ’ αὐτοὺς οἱ Θεοὶ προγινώσκουσιν, τὰ μέλλοντα.
 ὥστε καὶ αὐτοὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ἀδυναμίαν τοῖς Θεοῖς φυλάττουσι, (ἐ-
 γε κατ’ ἀδυναμίαν χρὴ καὶ ἀδύναμιαν λέγειν γίνεσθαι τὰ ἀδύνατα μὴ
 δύνασθαι) οὐ ὅ τῇ Θεῶν πλέον τι δύνασθαι ἀφ’ τῆς προρρήσεως ἀνάπτουσι,
 ἀλλὰ ἀφ’ τοῦ προλαμβάνειν τοῦτο, τὴν φύσιν τὴν πᾶν πραγμάτων.
 τοιάντινα

" ture of Things to be such, as neither follows
 " from their own Supposition, nor is agreeable
 " to plain Evidence of Fact. — But if to
 " foreknow Things future, is to know things to
 " be *what they are* (for it is one thing to fore-
 " know Things, and another to make them)
 " it is evident that he that foreknows *contingent*
 " Things foreknows them as being such. For
 " it is not Foreknowledge to say, that that
 " which is *contingent*, as being future, will *necessa-*
 " *rily* come to pass. So that the Gods may fore-
 " know things *contingent*, as being *contingent*, and
 " it will not at all follow thence, that this Fore-
 " knowledge makes them *necessary*. And of
 " this Nature are their Predictions: For when,
 " in giving Counsel to any one to *choose* and *do*
 " what he ought, they foretel the Event, they
 " do not foretel it as that which will *necessarily*
 " come to pass. — We therefore neither
 " destroy Divination nor the Foreknowledge of
 " the

ταύτην εισάγουσιν, οὐδαμῶς ἀκόλoutha καὶ συναρτὰ ταῖς γινομένοις τε
 καὶ ἐπαγγίσει λέγοντες. — ἐπεὶ ὅτι ἐὰν τὸ προγινώσκον τὰ μέλλοντά
 ἐστὶ, τὸ ὁποῖόν ἐστι, τοιαῦτα, αὐτὰ γινώσκον ὅντα (ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ προγι-
 νώσκον τοῦ ποιεῖν) δῆλον ὅτι τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα προγινώσκον, ὡς τοιαῦτα
 προγινώσκονται. οὐ γὰρ πρόγινωσι τὸ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ὡς ἐσόμενον ἀναγκάως
 ἔσεσθαι λέγουσιν. ὥστε καὶ οἱ Θεοὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ὡς ἐνδεχόμενα ἂν προγινώ-
 σκων, ὃ οὐ πάντως ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ἀναγκάσιον διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην πρόγινωσιν.
 οὕτω ὅτι καὶ προλεγοντὶν ἀκόλoutha. οἱ γὰρ, μετὰ τοῦ συμβαλεῖν τὰ αἰ-
 ριδιατε καὶ πράττειν ἃ χρὴ προλέγοντες, οὐχ' ὡς ἐξ ἀναγκῆς ἐσόμενα
 περὶ ὧν προλέγουσιν. — ἡμεῖς μὲν ἂν οὔτε ἀναιροῦμεν μαγικὰν, οὔτε τὴν
 πρόγινωσιν

“ the Gods ; but we say, that they foretel things
 “ to be agreeably to their Natures.

There is a great deal of Acuteness as well as
 Caution in the Reasoning of this learned Wri-
 ter.

Ammonius Hermias proposeth the Argument of
 the *Fatalists* thus, viz. “ * The Gods, say they,
 “ either have an *absolute* Knowledge of *contingent*
 “ Events, or no Knowledge at all of them, or
 “ else have an *indefinite* Knowledge of them, such
 “ as ours is. But (add they) it is impossible that
 “ the Gods should be ignorant of any thing,
 “ who produc’d and govern all things. —
 “ Neither can they have an *indefinite* or con-
 “ jectural Knowledge of future Events only. —
 “ But (*they proceed*) ’tis evident and must be
 “ own’d, that contingent Things are appointed
 “ by the Gods, and the Events of them must
 “ be *absolutely* known by them. — One of
 “ these two things therefore (they conclude)
 “ must

πρόγνωσιν τῶν Θεῶν ὡς ἔχει φύσεως τὰ πράγματα, οὕτως αὐτοὺς περὶ
 αὐτῶν προλέγειν λέγοντες. De Fat. p. 135, 136, 139.

* Οἱ Θεοί (φασιν) ἥτοι ὁρισμένως ἴσασι τὴν ἔκβασιν τῶν ἐνδεχο-
 μένων, ἢ παντάπασιν οὐδὲ μίαν αὐτῶν ἔχουσιν ἐννοίαν, ἢ καθάπερ
 ἡμεῖς αἴρουμεν αὐτῶν ἔχουσι τὴν γνῶσιν. ἀλλ’ ἀγνοεῖν μὴ οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων
 αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται, τὰ πάντα παραγαγόντας τε καὶ διακοσμοῦντας.
 — οὔτε αἴρουμεν αὐτῶν γνῶσιν ἔχειν, ὥσπερ εἰκάζοντας περὶ τῶν
 ἐκβεησμένων. — δῆλον ὅτι καὶ διατάττειας ὑπὸ τῶν Θεῶν τὰ
 ἐνδεχόμενα ῥητέον, καὶ ὁρισμένως γινώσκουσας αὐτῶν τὴν ἔκβασιν.
 — δυοῖν οὖν θάτερον, ἢ πάντα ἀναγκάτως καὶ ὡς εἰκὸς ὑπὸ τῶν
 Θεῶν

“ must be said, either that all Events are ne-
 “ cessary, and, as is fit, are-known and foretold
 “ by the Gods; and so what is called *contingent*
 “ will be but an empty Name; or else we must
 “ say, that some Things are neither known nor
 “ taken Care of by the Gods: But this is im-
 “ possible, wherefore there is nothing *contin-*
 “ *gent*.

To the foregoing Argument *Ammonius* replies;
 “ * By distinguishing the several Kinds of Know-
 “ ledge. — These Things being so (he adds)
 “ we say that the Gods know all Things which
 “ have been, are, and shall be hereafter, in a way
 “ suitable to the Gods, that is, by a simple,
 “ absolute and immutable Knowledge; where-
 “ fore they also perfectly know *contingent* Things,
 “ since all Things in the World are produced
 “ by them — and they know not only their
 “ Natures, but their Powers and Operations.
 “ — They know Things *contingent* in a
 “ manner

Θεῶν γινώσκειν τε καὶ προλέγειν, φησόμεν ἐκβαίνειν, καὶ τὸ ἐνδε-
 χόμενον ὄνομα ἔχει κενόν, ἢ ἔτι γινώσκειν ὑπὸ τῶν Θεῶν, ἔτε προνοεῖν
 τὰ τῶδε φησόμεν ἄλλα μὴ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, ἔχεται τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον.

* Τὰ διάφορα μέτρα τῶν γινώσκειν διαίρειν ἀξιόλογον, —
 τούτων ἐν οὗτοις ἔχοντες ῥητέον τοὺς Θεοὺς γινώσκειν ἢ πάντα τὰ
 γεγνηότα, καὶ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα ἢ μέλλοντα, τὸν Θεοῖς προσήκει-
 τα τρόπον, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ μίᾳ, καὶ ἀρισμίνῃ, καὶ ἀμεταβάτῳ γνώσει,
 διόπερ καὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων περιελθεῖν τὴν εἰδῆσιν, ἅτε καὶ πάντα
 πρὶν τῷ κόσμῳ παραγόντας — καὶ οὖν ὁρῶντας ἐκ αὐτῶν μίον
 πρὸς οὐσίᾳς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς δυνάμεις αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς ἐργείας —

“ manner which is superior to the Natures
 “ of them; wherefore these having an indeter-
 “ minate Nature, *may be*, or *may not be*; but
 “ they having a Knowledge of them, which is
 “ more perfect than their Natures, know even
 “ these *contingent* Events in a determinate and ab-
 “ solute Manner. — Wherefore we ought
 “ not to think that *contingent* Things will have
 “ a *necessary* Event, because they are known by
 “ the Gods in an *absolute* manner; for the Gods
 “ knowing them does not make their future
 “ Events *necessary*, but since, as being of a con-
 “ tingent and mutable Nature, they will cer-
 “ tainly have *such* or *such* an Event; for this
 “ Reason it is necessary the Gods should know
 “ what the Event will be. And the same Thing
 “ which is *contingent* in its own Nature is not
 “ indeterminate, but determinate in the Know-
 “ ledge of God.

γινώσκειν μὲν τοὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα κριτικῶς τῆς αὐτῶν ἐκείνῃ φύσει
 διότι τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν ἀόριστον ἔχοντα τὴν φύσιν, δυναδαί τε ἐκβαίνειν
 καὶ μὴ ἐκβαίνειν, ἐκείνους δὲ ὅτε κριτικῶς τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν τὴν
 γνῶσιν αὐτῶν προεληφότες, ὁρισμένως καὶ πάντα εἰδέναι. — καὶ
 οὐ χρὴ νομίζειν ὅτι ἀναγκάειν ἐξ ἑτὴν ἐκβασις ἀ λέγομεν ἐνδεχόμενα,
 ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑπὸ Θεῶν γινώσκεισθαι ὁρισμένως, ὃ δὲ διότι γινώσκουσιν αὐτὰ
 οἱ Θεοὶ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀναγκάειν ἐκβήσεται, ἀλλὰ ἐπειδὴ φύσιν ἔχοντα
 ἐνδεχομένην καὶ ἀμφίβολον πέραν ἐξ ἑ πάντως ἢ τοῖον ἢ τοῖον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο τὸς
 Θεοὺς εἰδέναι ἀναγκάειν ὅπως ἐκβήσεται καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ μὲν φύσει
 τῇ αὐτῇ ἐνδεχόμενον, τῇ δὲ γινώσκει τῶν Θεῶν, ἐκείνι ἀόριστον, ἀλλὰ ὁρι-
 σμένον. Com. in Aristot. p. 204, 207, 208, 211.

The Reasoning of these two great Philosophers proceeds upon this, *viz.* that the *Foreknowledge* of God is not so evident in itself, as that some Things (such as humane Actions) are of a *contingent* Nature; *maybe*, or *may not be*. The Question therefore is, whether these *contingent* Things are Objects of *Foreknowledge* or not; if *Foreknowledge* necessarily implies that the Things foreknown are *necessary*, being not *necessary* but *contingent*, 'tis manifest they are not Objects of *Foreknowledge*, and 'tis no Derogation to God to say that he does not foreknow what is impossible to be foreknown; and they who assert that all the Objects of God's *Foreknowledge* are Things of a *necessary* Nature, or that his Knowledge makes them *necessary*, ought to prove that God foreknows *contingent* Things. For if he does foreknow them, he must foreknow them to be what *they are*, and not what *they are not*; that is *contingent*, not *necessary*; and his *Foreknowledge* cannot alter the *Nature* of any Thing, or make Things, which are *contingent* in their *Natures*, become *necessary* by being *foreknown*. Whence it follows, that the Notion of *Fatality* has no Foundation; and it is reasonable to think, that God, who produc'd and governs all Things, and perfectly knows the several *Natures*, *Powers* and *Operations* of every Thing, may have a certain and absolute Knowledge of *contingent* Events (since whatever *will be*, 'tis now *true* that it will be, and must be either *thus* or *thus*) without al-

tering the Nature of Things, and making the Events foreseen to become necessary.

In the next Place Cato says, that the Notion of *Liberty* of Action reflects upon God's *Wisdom* or *Power*: Upon the first, as supposing he desires or intends to bring any Designs or Purposes to pass, and yet that he has not chosen the proper Methods to attain them; or upon the latter, that he cannot obtain them if he wou'd. It intrenches upon his Providence and Government of the Universe, by giving Part of his Power out of his own Hands, and by leaving it to the Discretion of inferior and weak Beings, to contradict himself, and disappoint his Intentions; and even his Justice itself, to which all the rest (of Gods Attributes) are so freely sacrificed, is attack'd upon such Reasonings in charging Almighty God with Severity in punishing Crimes, committed thro' Weakness, Want, or predominant Appetites, and which he could have prevented by giving others. (p. 179.)

All this may seem plausible, and impose upon a weak or unattentive Reader; but 'tis easily shewn, that there is not the least true Reasoning in any Part of it; and that the Reverse to every Line of it is the real Truth.

First; the Notion of *Liberty* does not suppose God to have us'd any improper Methods to bring to pass his Designs or Purposes, or to be disappointed in the Attainment of them. God, in enduing Man with *Liberty*, or a *Power of Action*, originally

nally intended (as is evident from the Nature of the Thing) that his Actions should be the Result of that *Liberty* or *Power*; he never intended they should be otherwise than they are, or than such as he knew would be the Effects of *Liberty*. He never did or could desire or intend to bring any Designs or Purposes to pass by Men's Actions, but such as should be effected by the *Will* or *Choice* of Men, whether *Good* or *Evil*. It was plainly God's original Design and End in the Creation of Men, to make them *moral* Agents, capable of *Vertue* and *Vice*, *Good* and *Evil*, and, in Consequence of them, capable of *Rewards* and *Punishments*, *Happiness* and *Misery*; and the proper and only Methods to complete this Design and End were, the enduing their Minds with *Reason*, *Liberty*, or a *free* Power of Action, without which they could not be, in a *moral* Sense, capable either of the one or of the other; and God never intended or desired that any one should be either *Good* or *Evil* (as indeed it was impossible he should be either) without being so, *willingly* and *voluntarily*; and this End God does attain, and always will attain.

But now on the other Hand, upon the Hypothesis of *Necessity*, God's Designs or Purposes are plainly frustrated, and his *Wisdom* and *Power* wholly taken away. It is contrary to *Wisdom* for God, who is *good* (as *Cato* allows) to intend the Happiness of all his rational Creatures, and yet
to

to lay many of them under a *Necessity* of being *unhappy*: It can never be a *wise* or *proper* Method of bringing Men to Felicity, to subject them under an inevitable *Fate* and *Necessity* of being *miserable**: And if Men's Actions, and the Consequences of them, are the Result of *Necessity*, then it is evident that God hath not *Power* to attain his Designs or Purposes; he hath no *Power* to make those *happy* whom *Necessity* renders *miserable*, or to make those *miserable* (how opposite soever to his *Nature* and Attributes their Actions are) whom *Necessity* makes happy: And in short it follows, that God hath no *Power* at all over Men, or any Thing they do, that

* *Alexander Aphrodisius* says, that the Notion of the Necessity of humane Actions makes Men more *miserable* by Nature than the *Beasts* are, because the greatest Part of Men are made miserable by those *Vices* of which the brute Creatures are not capable. His Words are; Οἱ ὅ φάσκοντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡμᾶς ἵναί τε καὶ γίνεσθαι τοιούτους, καὶ μὴ καταλιπόντες ἡμῶν τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ ταῦτα πράττειν τε καὶ μὴ, δι' ὧν ἂν τοιοῦτοι γινόμεσθα, καὶ ἂν τοῦτο μὴτε τοῖς κακοῖς γινόμενοις ἐξῆναι μὴ ταῦτα πράττειν ἂς πράττοντες γίνονται τοιοῦτοι, μὴτε τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, πῶς οὐκ ὁμολογήσεται κάκιον γεγονέναι τῶν ζῶν ἀπάντων ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως τὸν ἄνθρωπον. — εἰ γὰρ ἢ μὲ ἀρετὴ τε καὶ ἢ κακία μόναι, κατ' αὐτοῦς, ἢ μὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων ζῶν οὐδέτερον τούτων εἰς ἐπιδοκτικόν, τῶν ὅ ἀνθρώπων οἱ πλείους κακοὶ — πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀβλιώτατοι ζῶν πάντων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἦν, ἔχων τὴν πε κακίαν καὶ τὸ μαλιστα σύμφορον αὐτῇ καὶ συγκυκλωμένη. De Fat. p. 128.

they are wholly independent of him, and in no wise accountable to him.

Secondly; God, by making Men *Free-agents*, hath not (as *Cato* pretends) *given any Power out of his Hands*, nor do any of his Creatures *contradict or disappoint his Intentions*; and his *providential Government* of the Universe is more illustrious in ruling over *rational* and *Free-agents* by *rational* and *moral* Laws, and conferring Rewards and Punishments on *voluntary* Obedience or Disobedience, than in any other Part of the *unintelligent* or *irrational* Creation; or than it would be, if he had subjected humane Actions to *Necessity*; just as it is more glorious for a King to govern a Nation of *Free-subjects* by *wise* and *rational* Laws, with a Power to punish them for their Disobedience, and to reward them for their Obedience, than to govern a Company of *Slaves*, bound in *Chains* and *Fetters*, and thereby incapable of doing either *Service* or *Disservice*. Thus, with Respect to God's Government of the World, if Men's *Desires*, *Intentions* and *Actions* are *necessary*, their *Minds*, in this Case, as their *Bodies* in the other, are bound in *Chains*, and not capable of performing any *Duty*; there is no place for *pious Affections* towards God, or *Submission* to his *Will*; no Room to offer *Prayer* for Benefits, or *Praise*, or *Thanksgiving* for receiving them: And in Truth, there can be no *Worship* or *Adoration*
of

of God at all, which can proceed only from
Choice and voluntary Actions.

Alexander Aphrodisius says, “ How can the Af-
“ fectors of Necessity maintain God’s Providence
“ over Men? — How can any one rightly
“ call that Providence which has no Respect to
“ the Deserts of Men, but is founded in an an-
“ tecedent *Necessity*? And what becomes of
“ Men’s *Piety* towards God, if it is not in *their*
“ *Power* not to do what they do do?

Again, “ † If this is once believed (that we
“ have nothing in our own Power) it will be ab-
“ surd to reprehend any one, to praise any one,
“ to counsel any one, to exhort any one, to pray
“ to God, to give him Thanks for any Thing,
“ or to do any of those Things which ought to
“ be done by those who believe they have in
“ themselves a Power of doing what they do;

* Πῶς δ’ ἂν σώζοιεν τοιαῦτα λέγοντες τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Θεῶν γινομένην
τῶν θνητῶν πρόνοιαν; — πῶς ἂν ἔτι τῆτο πρόνοιαν τις δικαίως λέ-
γῃ, τὴν ἢ καθ’ αἰτίαν γινομένην, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τινα ἀνάγκην προκατα-
βιβλημένην; πῶς δ’ ἂν σώζοιτο καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς Θεοὺς εὐσεβεία τῶν
εὐσεβεῖν δοκούντων, διότι μὴ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἦν, τὸ τοῦτο μὴ ποιεῖν ἢ τῶν
ποιούντων. De Fat. p. 91.

† Τῷ γὰρ τῆτο πεπιστευμένῳ, ἢ ἐπιμνησθαί τινι, ἢ ἐπαινεῖν αὐ-
τὴν, ἢ συμβουλεύειν αὐτὴν, ἢ προτρέψασθαι τινὰ, ἢ ἐξαιεῖσθαι Θεοῖς, οὐ
χάριν αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι περὶ τινος, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν, ὅσον τι τῶν ὀφει-
λομένων εὐλόγως γίνασθαι ὑπὸ τῶν καὶ τῶν ποιεῖν ἔπαινον ἢ ποιῶν τὴν
ἐξασίαν πεπιστευκέτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔξω τῶν, ἀβίωτων ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώ-
πων βίῳ, καὶ οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀνθρώπων ἔστι. Ibid. p. 99.

“ without

“without which Power Man's Life is no Life
 “nor the Life of Men?”

Hierocles says; “* Prayer is not to no Purpose, if
 “Providence superintends humane Affairs, ap-
 “pointing righteous and just Retributions to
 “Men's *voluntary* Actions.” *Eusebius*, in like
 manner, argues; “† If not only external Events,
 “but our internal Desires proceeding from *Rea-*
 “*son*, are subject to the Influence of the Stars
 “and to *Fate*; and if the Minds of Men are
 “under the Impulse of an inexorable *Necessity*,
 “then farewell *Philosophy*, farewell *Religion*.”
 And *Origen*; “** It is in vain to offer Prayers;
 “for, if all Events are *necessary* — it is *ir-*
 “*rational* to entreat God for any Thing.” Again;
 “†† From the Notion (of *Necessity*) it fol-
 “lows, that the Faculty of *Will* is wholly
 “taken away; and with it, *Praise* and *Dispraise*,
 “and

* Οὐδὲ τὸ ἔυχασθαι περιττόν, εἰ πρόνεια τῶν ἀνθρώπων πραγμάτων ἦγοίτο, νόμος καὶ δίκη πρὸς ἁμοιβὰς τῶν προσηκόντων. τούτων α.
 De Prov. & Fat. p. 16.

† Εἰ γὰρ ἄστροις καὶ εἰμαρμένῃ ἢ μόνῃ τὰ ἐκτὸς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς
 κατὰ λογισμὸν προθυμίας ἀνατίθεν, καὶ τις ἀπαραίτητος ἀνάγκη
 τὰς ἀνθρωπίνους ἐκβιάζεται γνώμας, οὐκ ἔστιται σοὶ φιλοσοφία, οὐκ ἔ-
 σται καὶ εὐσέβεια. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 242.

** Ἐυχαὶ παρέλκυσιν μάστιγι παραλαμβάνομεναι εἰ γὰρ κατὰ ἐν-
 κλησιν πᾶσι τινὰ γένεσθαι — Οἷον ἀλογίστως ἀξιῶμεν πᾶσι τινὰ
 ἡμῶν δαμνῶσθαι. Apud. Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 283.

†† Ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς ταῦτα δογματίζουσιν, ἐξ ὅλων τὸ εἶναι ἡμῶν ἀντι-
 ρεῖν; ὥστε καὶ ἱκανοὶ καὶ ψόγον, καὶ πράξεις ἀποδιδόντες, πάλιν τε

“ and the Difference betwixt Things that are
 “ commendable, and Things that are blame-wor-
 “ thy: and this being so, the so much pro-
 “ claimed Equity of the Judgment of God va-
 “ nisheth, and his Threatnings to punish those
 “ who commit Sin, and the Promises of Re-
 “ wards and Blessedness to those who do well,
 “ fall to the Ground. For there is no Reason
 “ for either the one or the other.

Secondly; from the Notion of *Necessity* it ne-
 cessarily follows, that there can be amongst Men
 no *personal* Vertue or Vice, Good or Evil; no
Merit or *Demerit*, and consequently no Ground
 for *Praise* or *Dispraise*, or for *Laws* to reward
 or punish; and indeed there can be no *Property*,
 or any Principles of Society and Government;
 which are evidently founded upon the Supposi-
 tion of Men's having a *Power of determining*
 their own Actions; and, without this Supposi-
 tion are unreasonable and vain.

That great Master of Reason, *Aristotle*, says;
 “ That Vertue respects the Affections and Acti-
 “ ons; and that Praise and Dispraise is due to
voluntary

αὐ ψεκτής· ὅπερ εἰ ἕως ἔχει, τὰ τῆς κικηρυγμένης τῆ Θεῶς κρίσεως
 ὀίχεται, καὶ ἀπειλαὶ πρὸς τὰς ἡμαρτηκότας, ὡς κολαδοησομίνες. τιμῶ
 τε αὐ πρὸς τὰς τοῖς κρείττοσιν ἑαυτὺς ἐπιδοδύκοντας, καὶ μακαριότητα
 τῶ (lege μακαριότητος ut habet MSS.) οὐδὲν ὃ ἔτι τέτων εὐλό-
 γως ἔσται γινόμενον. Ibid. p. 281.

* Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὲ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις ἔσθ'· καὶ εἰ μὲν τοῖς
 ἐκυσίοις

“ *voluntary* Actions; but Pardon to what is done
 “ *involuntarily*.

Again; “ The End (of what is desired) being
 “ the Object of the *Will*; but the means to at-
 “ tain the End being the Object of *Deliberation*
 “ and *Choice*, our Actions conversant about these
 “ must need be *voluntary* and *free*. But the
 “ Practice of *Vertue* relates to those Things,
 “ and therefore *Vertue* and *Vice* also are *in our*
 “ *own Power*.” Presently he adds; “ And this
 “ is the Opinion of all *private Persons*, and of
 “ *Lawgivers* themselves; for they punish those
 “ who do wickedly, if what they do is not
 “ thro’ *Compulsion* or *wilful Ignorance*; but they
 “ reward those who do well.

Simplicius reasons excellently on this Head of
 Argument.

“ * It proceeds (says he) from *Will* and
 “ *Choice* that we are capable of *Good* and *Evil*;
 —where-

ἐκυστοῖς ἐπαίμων καὶ ψόγῳ γινόμεναι· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀκυστοῖς, συγγνώ-
 μης, &c. *Ethic. lib. 3. c. 1.*

“ Οὐτὸ δὲ βουλευτὴ μὲν τῷ τέλει· βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρεσῶν πῶς πρὸς
 τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἰναι αἱ καὶ ἐκυστοί.
 αἱ δὲ πῶς ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι, περὶ ταῦτα, ἐφ’ ἡμῶν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία· — τοιούτοις δ’ ἔοικε μαρτυρηθεὶς καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ’ ἐκυσ-
 των, καὶ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν. καλεῖται γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται
 τὰς δρώντας μοχθηρὰς, ὅσοι μὴ βία ἢ δι’ ἀγνοίαν, ἢ μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι,
 εὐὲς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν. *Ibid. c. 7.*

* Διὰ τῆς αἰρέσεως καὶ προαιρέσεως τυγχάνομεν τοῦ τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ

“ ——— wherefore that *Goodness*, which is the
 “ proper Goodness of the Soul, is call'd *Virtue*,
 “ as being properly the Result of *Choice*, and
 “ proceeding from a *real Option*: ——— for
 “ our *Will* and *Choice* are Things in our own
 “ *Power*; the forming of our *Opinions*, our *Ap-*
 “ *petites*, *Desires* and *Aversions* are Matters of
 “ *Choice* and *Will*, being *internal* Motions of
 “ the Soul itself, and not *external Coaction*:
 “ Wherefore the Soul hath *Power* over these.
 “ On which Account, *God*, and *Laws*, and wise
 “ Men considering that we are endued with *Choice*
 “ and *Will*, make a Difference betwixt *Virtue*
 “ and *Vice*; not respecting the mere *Actions*
 “ themselves, which are not always in our *Power*,
 “ and which receive their *Essence* and *Difference*
 “ from *Will* and *Choice*.

Again; the same great Philosopher observes;
 “ * They who deny that we have a free Power of
 “ Action,

ἐναντίον. ——— διὸ τὸ ἴδιον ἀγαθὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ λέγεται ὡς ἀρετὴ
 ἕσα κυρίως, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ὅπως αἰρεῖται παραγινωσκόμεν. ——— ἐπεὶ γὰρ
 τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἡ αἰρεσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἡμῶν· ἡ γὰρ ὑπολήψις, ἡ
 ὁρμὴ, καὶ ὀρέξεις, ἐκκλισίαι εἰς τὴν αἰρεσιν, καὶ προαίρεσιν ἀναφέρονται,
 ἐνδεδοίκαται πᾶσαι τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις, καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὁλισμοί. διὸ
 καὶ κυρία τέταται ἐστὶ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ οἱ νόμοι, καὶ
 πάντες ἄνθρωποι οἱ ἐμφρονες, εἰς τὴν αἰρεσιν καὶ προαίρεσιν, ὡς ἐφ' ἡμῶν
 ὄντα, ἀποβλέποντες, τὰ τε αἰμαρτήματα, καὶ τὰ κατεσθάρματα, δια-
 κρίνουσιν. ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς τὰς πράξεις αὐτάς, ὅτι οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐκείναι,
 καὶ ὅτι ταῖς αἰρέσεσι, καὶ προαίρεσιν, ἰσθδοιοῦνται. In Epict.
 Euch. p. 13, 14.

* Οἱ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἀναιρῶντες, ἐ τὸ θέλον, ἐ τὸ μὴ θέλον, ἐ
 αἰρεσιν

“ Action, a Power of *willing*, and *not willing*;
 “ that we have *Choice* and *Preelection*, *Desires*,
 “ *Aversions*, *Appetites*, &c. such take away the
 “ *essential Difference of Virtue and Vice*; and
 “ render *Praise* and *Dispraise* groundless; and
 “ subvert the good *Laws* that are made concern-
 “ ing these things.

* *Cicero* also says; that the Consequence of
 Men's Actions being *necessary*, is, in the Opinion
 of those who maintain the *Freedom* of them, with
 whom he agrees; “ that neither *Praise* nor *Dis-*
 “ *praise*, *Honours* or *Punishments* are justly dis-
 “ pens'd. And this Supposition being *wicked* and
 “ *absurd*, they think it may with *Probability* be
 “ concluded, that all Events do not come to pass
 “ by *Necessity*.

† *Aulus Gellius* notes that it was objected to
 those who were suppos'd to be Defenders of *Ne-*
cessity; “ That it was unjust for Laws to punish Of-
 “ fenders, if Men did not commit Offences *volun-*
 “ *tarily*, but were drawn into them by *Necessity*.

αἵρεσιν καὶ προαίρεσιν, καὶ ὁρεξίν καὶ ἐκκλίσειν καὶ ὀρεξίᾳ, καὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα, ἔτσι καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ψυχικὴν διαφορὰν ἀραιοῦσι
 καὶ ἔπαινον καὶ ὕμνον οὐκ ἀπολείπουσι δίκαιον· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ
 τοῦτο καλῶς κειμένους νόμους ἀντρέπουσι, *ibid.* p. 26. 27.

* Ex quo efficitur, ut neque laudationes iustæ sint, nec vi-
 tuperationes: nec honores nec supplicia. Quod cum vitiosum
 sit, probabiliter concludi putant non omnia fato fieri quæcunque
 fiant. *De Fat.* P. 360.

† Nocentium poenas legibus inique constitutas, si homines ad
 maleficia non sponte veniunt, sed fato trahuntur. *Noct. Attic.*
lib. 6. c. 2.

Ammo-

Ammonius Hermias says; “ || Since we are Masters of some Actions, and it is in our own Power to choose, or not to choose them, to do, or not to do them; hence it is we say that our Choice and Actions are sometimes commendable, and sometimes blameable.

And *Alexander Aphrodisius*; “ * [If Men's Actions are necessary] neither Reproofs, nor Punishments, nor Exhortations, nor Praise, nor any Thing of this kind will retain its Nature, but every one of these Things will be necessary as those Actions are to which they are apply'd.

Again; “ † It is agreeable to the Nature of rational and active Animals to have it in their Power to do ill or well, because they do neither of these by Necessity. In this Sense it is true; but not to say that all our Actions are necessary,

|| Ἐπὶ κύριοι πράξεων τινων ὄντες, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὃν ἐλέαξ ἢ μὴ ἐλέαξ τὰ δὲ τινα, καὶ πράξαι ἢ μὴ πράξαι, τὰς μὲν ἐπαιντάς, τὰς δὲ ψικτάς εἶναι τῶν τι προαίρεσιν καὶ τῶν πράξεων λέγομεν, Com. in. Arist. p. 184.

* Οὐτε ἐπιτιμήσεις, ἔτι κολάσεις, ἔτι προτροπὴ, ἔτι τιμὴ ἔτι ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων τὴν δικαίαν σώσει κατ' αὐτὰς φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἔσται καὶ τῶντοι ἕκαστοι γινόμενοι κατὰ λογισμὸν, ὥσπερ ἀρκύνει ἐφ' οἷς τῶντα γίνεται De Fat. p. 87, 88.

† Κατὰ φύσιν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς πρακτικοῖς τε καὶ λογικοῖς ζώσις τὸ καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν καὶ κατορθοῦν δύνασθαι, πῶ μὴδ' ἴτερον αὐτῶν ποιεῖν κατὰ λογισμὸν; καὶ τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτοι ἔχουσιν τὰ τρέπον, οὐ μόνον

“ *necessary*, and then to say again, that they who
 “ act rationally, *do well*, and others *do ill*, but
 “ still all we do is *necessary*. ——— For no one
 “ says, that he does that which is good, who
 “ merely does a good Thing, in whatsoever
 “ manner he does it; nor that he commits *Evil*,
 “ who, in what manner soever, does an evil
 “ Thing; but in whatsoever manner he, who
 “ is at his own *Liberty*, *chooseth* and doth that
 “ which is *evil*, he it is that truly doth it; or
 “ if he doth that which is *good*, then we say he
 “ *does well*.

Again, “ * They deserve to be pardon'd, who
 “ commit a Fault *involuntarily*, because Punish-
 “ ment is not intended to be inflicted for the
 “ *mere* Fact, but for the *manner* of doing it.
 “ ——— No *Phalaris* would be so cruel and
 “ mad as to punish any one for what he could
 “ not help. What then are those Things that
 “ ought

μίνεται γε ὅτι πάντα ἃ ποιούμεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡμῶς ποιεῖν λέγουσιν,
 ἔπειτα τὰς μὲν κατορθοῦν τῶν λογικῶς ἐνεργεῖται, τὰς δὲ αἰμαρτάνει,
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ πάντα ποιούμεν. ——— οὐ γὰρ τὸν ὁπωσὺν χαλεπὸν ποι-
 οῦντα κατορθοῦν τις λέγει, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αἰμαρτάνειν τὸν ὁπωσὺν φῶλον
 τι πράττοντα, ἀλλ' ὁπωσὺν οὐ ἐξουσία τις ἐν τῷ χαλεπῷ αἰρεῖται
 καὶ πράττει, ἢ τὰ βελτίω, τοῦτον λέγομεν κατορθοῦν. Ibid. p. 155.

* Ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο, τὸ συγγνωσκῆναι μὴ ἀξίους εἶναι τοὺς αἰμαρτίας
 τοιοῦτον τι πράξαντας, οὐκ ὡς ἐπὶ τῇ γνομῇ πράγματι τῆς καλῆ-
 σιως, ὀριζομένης, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῇ τρέφῃ τῆς πράξεως. ——— ἀλλ' οὐ-
 θὴς φάλαρις ἔτι αἰμός τις καὶ αἰσθητὴς ὡς ἐπὶ τινι τῶν ἔτι γνομῇ-
 νων καλᾶζειν πρὸ ποιήσασθαι ἐπὶ τισιν ὅτι αἱ καλᾶσεις ἔσονται, οὐκ ἐπ'
 ἄλλοις

“ ought to be punish’d and what not? namely
 “ those Things which Men commit thro’ a
 “ wicked Choice. —

Again; “ * We shall be no better for know-
 “ ing what the *Law* commands, if there are an-
 “ tecedent Causes to which our Appetites are
 “ necessarily subject. And thus the Benefit of
 “ Laws commanding what we are to do, and
 “ forbidding what we are not to do, is taken
 “ away. — What are the Laws good for,
 “ when Fatality deprives us of the Power of
 “ obeying them? — the Law enjoyns what
 “ is to be done, and what not, as supposing that
 “ they who act have a Power of obeying the
 “ Commands of it; wherefore it punisheth the
 “ disobedient as Delinquents, and rewardeth the
 “ obedient as those who *do well*. But the Voice
 “ of *Fate* is that all Things are *necessary* and pro-
 “ ceed

ἄλλοις τισιν; ἐπὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν μοχθηρὰν αἰεσιν γινομένοις.
 Ibid. p. 95, 96.

* Οὐ γὰρ πλέον τι ἡμῶν ἐκ τοῦ συνίεναι τῶν προσαρμοσμένων ὑπὸ
 τῶν νόμων ἔκκει προκαταβεβλημένας αἰτίας, αἷς περιεσώσαις ἀκολου-
 θεῖν τὴν ὁρμὴν ἀνάγκη. ἔτω δὲ ἀναιροῖτ’ ἂν τὸ ἐκ τῶν νόμων χρῆσιμον,
 εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν νόμοι προσαπτικοὶ μὲν εἰσι τῶν ποιητῶν, ἀπαγορευτικοὶ δὲ
 τῶν ἢ ποιητῶν. — τί γὰρ ὅφειλ’ ὁ νόμος οἷς πείθεσθαι τὴν ἐξουσίαν
 ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαρμένης ἀφῆρηκεν; — ὁ μὲν νόμος προσαπτικός ἐστὶ
 τῶν πρακτικῶν τε καὶ μὴ, ὡς τῶν πραττέντων δυνάμειν αὐτῷ πεί-
 θεσθαι κελεύοντι, διὸ καὶ τὰς μὴ πειθομένους ὡς ἀμαρτάνοντας ζημιῶν,
 τιμῶν τοὺς πειθομένους ὡς κατορθοῦντας ἢ ἢ εἰμαρμένη πάντα τὰ
 γινόμενα ἀναγκάτως τε καὶ δι’ ὁμοίας αἰτίας φησὶ γίνεσθαι, τῶν ἢ
 δι’

“ceed from the same Cause; but those Things
 “which proceed from the same (necessary)
 “Cause, cannot be rightly call’d, some *Crimes*,
 “and others *good Actions*.

Again; he concludes his Book in these admirable Words; “ * These, O most divine Em-
 “perors ! are the Heads of *Aristotle’s* Opinion
 “concerning *Fate*, and that which is *in our own*
 “*Power*; according to which, if we form our
 “Sentiments, we shall be *pious* towards God,
 “returning him *Thanks* for those good Things
 “which we have received from him, and di-
 “recting our *Prayers* to him for other Things,
 “as having it in his Power to give or not. We
 “shall also be grateful to such good Princes as
 “you are, all whose Actions towards us pro-
 “ceed from your own *Choice*, and who act as you
 “do by taking Care to form a right Judgment,
 “and then choosing that which is right; and
 “not

δι' ὁμοίας γινομένων αἰτίας ἔχ' οἷόν τι τὰ μὲν αἰμαρτήματα λέγων,
 τὰ δὲ καταθώμεντα. Ibid. p. 164.

* Ταῦτα, ὑμεῖς, ὃ θειότατος αυτοκράτορις, τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους δόξης
 περὶ τῆς αἰμαρτήσεως καὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, κατ' ἑμὴν δόξαν, τὰ κεφάλαια,
 καθ' ἣν δόξάζοντες εἰς τι Θεοῦς εὐσιβήσομεν, τὰ μὲν εἰδότες (lege διδόντες)
 αὐτοῖς χάριν ἀπὸ ὧν φθάνομεν ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἵν' ἐπιποιήσῃτε, τὰ δὲ αἰτέ-
 μνοι παρ' αὐτῶν ὡς ὄντων, καὶ τοῦ δοῦναι, καὶ τοῦ μὴ, κυρίως.
 εἰσόμεθα δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ὑμῶν ὁμοίους ἀρχοντας εὐχαρίστοι, ταῦτα
 πράττοντας εἰς ἡμᾶς ἃ ποιεῖ ὑμῶν οἰκία προέριστις πράττειν ὑμᾶς,
 αἰρίσει τοῦ βελπίου® καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν κρίσιν αὐτοῦ φρονήζου ποιούν-
 τας ἃ ποιεῖτε, ἀλλ' οὐ προκαταβεβλημένοι τισιν αἰτίαις ἐπομένους εἰς

“ not by following some antecedent Causes, by
 “ which it is *necessary* to be led wheresoever they
 “ carry you. We shall also be careful to exer-
 “ cise *Vertue*, as having it in our Power to be-
 “ come *better* or *worse* Men.

Lastly ; *Eusebius* thus argues upon the Point ;
 “ There is no *Praise* due to the *Vertue* of those
 “ who do well ; no Love of God ; no Fruit
 “ worthy of our Labour and Diligence to be
 “ obtained if all Things proceed from *Necessity*
 “ and *Fate*. Therefore neither ought we to
 “ blame those who lead *sinful* Lives, and are the
 “ most *impious* and *profligate* ; nor to admire and
 “ praise those who are *virtuous* and *good*. Hence,
 “ as I observed, the great Glory that is due to
 “ *Philosophy*, perisheth, if it is not the Effect of
 “ *voluntary* Study and Meditation, but of the
 “ *necessary* Influence of the Stars.

ἀναγκάσιον ἔπεσθαι ἢ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἄγῃ. ποιησόμεθα ὅ και ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέ-
 λειαι, ὡς ὄντες αὐτοὶ κύριοι τοῦ βελτίους ἢ χείρους γίνεσθαι. Ibid. p.
 175, 176.

* Οὐδὲ τις ἦν τοῖς ἀσθεδαίοις ἔπαινον ἀρετῆς, οὐδὲ τις θεοφιλία,
 οὐδὲ τῶν ἐν ἀσκήσει πόνοι καρπὸς ἐπαύξει, ἀνάγκης καὶ εἰμαρμένης
 τὴν αἰτίαν πάντων ἀναδιδιδυμένης· οὐδὲ ὅτι προσήκει καταμύεμεσθαι
 τοῖς περὶ τὸν βίον πληρωμένοις, οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῖς ἀσθεῖσι ἐπὶ ῥητοπέτοις.
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀσθεδαίους θαυμάζειν· πάντῃ ὅ, ὡς ἔφω, οἰχόμεται τὸ
 μέγα τῆς φιλοσοφίας κλέος, οὐκ αὐτοπροαίρετα μελέτης καὶ ἀσ-
 κήσεως, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄστρον ἀνάγκης ἀπχωρημένοι. *Præp.*
Evang. lib. 6. p. 243.

Again;

Again; “ * This Opinion subverts the *Laws* that are made for the Benefit of Men. For to what Purpose is it, either to command or forbid any Thing to those who are under the Coercion of *Necessity*? Nor ought Offenders to be punished, as being really guilty of no Crime; nor ought they to be rewarded who perform the most glorious Atchievements. — Further this Opinion destroys all Piety towards God, if so be neither God himself, nor the Proclaimers of his Oracles confer any Benefits on us when we apply with Prayer and religious Affections; but we are bound in the Chains of a *necessary Fatality*.

Thirdly; God's *Justice* is not attack'd (as is alledg'd) by the Notion of *Liberty*; because that Notion doth not suppose that God punisheth any Crimes but such as are *wilful* and might have been avoided: and in Proportion always to the *Wilfulness* and *Obstinacy* of them. Such *Weaknesses*, *Wants* or predominant *Passions*, as by their

* Καὶ μὴν καὶ νόμος ἀντρέπει ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος, τῆς τῆ συμφορᾶς ἐνεκῆς ἀνθρώποις κειμένους. ἢ γὰρ δι' ἡ προσάττειν ἢ ἀπαγορεύειν τοῖς ὑφ' ἑτέρας ἀνάγκης καταγεγνημένοις; ἀλλ' ὅτε τῆς ἡμαρτανότητος δέησι κολλάειν, μὴ παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν ἡμαρτανότας, εἰδὲ τοῖς πᾶ κάλλιστα πράττειν τιμὰς ἀποδίδου. — ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐσεβεῖαν ἀντρέπει ἂν ἢ δι' ἡ δέξαι αὐτοὶ γὰρ μηδὲν ἡμῶν ὁ Θεός, μηδὲ μὴν αὐτοὶ οἱ τῶνδε χρησμοδῶν μὴτ' ἐυχόμενοις, μὴτ' εὐσεβεῖσι συμβάλλονται ἡμαρτανότητος ἀνάγκαις πεπιδυμένοις. Ibid. P. 244, 245.

Suddenness, Surprise, or Violence not caus'd by our Fault, or to be prevented or resisted, lead us unavoidably into any Sin, will not be punish'd by him. As the Principle of the *Morality* of all Actions, whether Good or Evil, is the rational Mind freely exerting itself to do a Thing, or refusing to do it, in any Instances of a moral Nature; so every Degree of Good or Evil is proportionate to the Degree of *Freedom* with which it is done; and in Proportion also to this Degree of Freedom from whence *Vice* or *Vertue* proceeds, God has adapted his *Rewards* and *Punishments*. If the Degree of Freedom in any Agent is very great, and yet Evil ensues from his Actions, then the Punishment will be great also; if the Degree of Freedom is very little, then the Evil committed will be attended with little Punishment, and the Good that is done will be greatly rewarded. But if the Action proceeds not from the *voluntary* Exertion of the Mind; but from either an irresistible Disorder of the animal Spirits, forcibly impelling the Mind, and leaving no Room for *Deliberation*; or from unavoidable Ignorance, or from either a mechanical or compulsive Motion of the Body, (as particularly in the Case of *Madness*, *Idiotism*, Excels of *involuntary Passion*, *Surprise*, or the Compulsion of others against our Will) in such Cases every Action, let the Consequence of it be what it will, is neither personally good or bad, *virtuous*

or criminal; and the Person is not * accountable for it. On these Principles the *Justice* both of *divine* and *humane* Laws is founded and exercised; and which the Opinion of *Fate* or *Necessity* wholly takes away and destroys. God can neither be *holy* or *good* in himself, if he has no *Will* to *choose* and prefer Right to Wrong, Good to Evil; and it is altogether repugnant to the clearest Notions of *Holiness*, *Goodness* and *Justice* to subject Men to *Pain* and *Misery* for what they cannot help, and for Things in which they have no Power.

It is as absurd to make *Pain* the Consequence of *evil* Actions, and *Pleasure* of *good* Actions, as *vice versa* upon the Supposition of their being *necessary*, which takes away both their *Distinction* and very *Natures*, and makes all Things, the greatest *Evil* and the greatest *Good*, alike indifferent with respect to *Morality*: And upon the Scheme of *Necessity*, the Worship of the one true God, and the most impure Idolatry; *Piety* and *Impiety*, *Profaneness* and *Godliness*, are all one;

* Μόνον υπεύθυνον ἀπέφγγαν (οἱ Θεοὶ) τῶν ἐπὶ σοί. "We are accountable for those Things only which are in our Power." Arrian. Epiict. p. 121.

And Alexander Aphrodisius says; Ἐφ' ἡμῶν τὸ γινόμενον μετὰ τῆς κατὰ λόγον τε καὶ κρίσιν συγκαταθέσεως. "That which is in our Power (and for which we are accountable) is done with the Assent accompanied with Reason and a Power of judging." De Fat. p. 73.

the

the one no more disagreeable to God, or contrary to his *Nature* than the other; or justly deserving either *present* or *future* Misery more than the other, as proceeding equally, not from Men's *voluntary* Actions (and consequently not being their *Acts*) but from the * *Necessity* of the divine Nature itself. So also again, *Truth* and *Falshood*, *Mercifulness* and *Cruelty*, *Justice* and *Injustice*; and, in short, the greatest Vertues and most heinous Crimes must be equally acceptable to God; because equally (that is neither of them truly) *good* or *evil* in themselves; and equally derived from the *Nature* of God, as the *original Cause*

* Upon the Notion of *Necessity* the *Sarcasm* of *Anomæus* will be just. Τὶ αἰτιοὶ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἡ ὑμετέρα ἀνάγκη; ἡ δίκαια ποιεῖς, ὦ Ἀπόλλον, εἰδ' ὅθως ἐπιτιμᾷς τοῖς εἰδὲν ἀδικῆσαι ἡμῶν ὁ ὧ Ζεὺς εἴτε, ἡ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀνάγκης ἀνάγκη, τί ἡμᾶς πῖπτει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑαυτὸν, ὅτι τοιαύτῳ κατέδειξεν εἶναι τὴν ἀνάγκην; "What are we to blame, is it not your *Necessity* that is only in the Fault? You are unjust, *Apollo*, nor is it right in you to blame us who have committed no Crime. And this *Jupiter*, who is the *necessary* Cause of your *Necessity*, why does he punish us, and not himself rather, for being the Author of such a *Necessity*? *Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. c. 7.*

And *Lucian*, in like manner, ridicules *Fatality*: "Εργε τὰ δίκαια ὁ Μῆνις δικάζειν μέλλοι, τὴν εἰμαρμένῳ ἀντὶ τῷ Σίσυφῳ καλέσεται, καὶ τὴν Μοῖραν ἀντὶ τῷ ταντάλῳ τί ᾧ ἐκεῖνοι ἠδίκησαν, πειδόντες τοῖς ἐπιπύγμασι; "If *Minoi* would distribute *Justice*, he should punish *Fate* instead of *Sisyphus*, and *Destiny* instead of *Tantalus*: For what Wrong have they done who were subservient to the Commands of Fate? *Jupit. Consul. p. 678.*

of them. And as there can be no *real Guilt* or *personal* Crimes committed by Men, so there can be no Foundation for the making *Laws*, to punish any Men as *Offenders*. All Law is founded upon the Supposition of Men's having a *Power* over their own Actions; and never punisheth Transgressors but upon a Supposition of *personal Guilt*, and that the criminal or illegal Fact was committed by them *voluntarily*, and with *Choice*, and might not have been committed. On this is grounded the Nature of Laws and Reason of Punishments for the Breach of them, that Men, as *rational* and *Free-agents*, may avoid doing those Things which they know are *evil*, and attended with Punishments; which is absurd, and renders all Punishment *unjust*, upon the Supposition, that they have no Power to avoid the doing of them. There is as much *Justice* in punishing *Infants*, *Ideots* and *Madmen*, for the Mischief which they do, as in punishing any others for the greatest *Enormities*, upon the Supposition of their Actions being *necessary*: And there is as much Reason to punish a Soldier for having a *Fever* or any bodily Infirmary, which renders him unfit for Service, as for deserting or running away; for if Men's Actions are not in their *own Power* and *Choice*, it is as absurd to think (besides the evident *Injustice* of the Thing) that the Terrors of *pœnal* Laws will prevent their doing *Evil*, as that they will prevent their falling into *Fevers*, &c.

The

The Notion of *Necessity* also renders *Vertue* and *good Actions* undeserving of *Praise* or *Commendation*, and incapable of *Rewards*: And there is as much Sense and Reason in rewarding Men for being *tall*, *handsome* or *strong*; or in praising and commending *Trees* for their *Fruitfulness*, or *Flowers* for their sweet *Smells*, or the *Sun* for his *Light*; as in bestowing *Commendations* and *Rewards* on Men for their best *Actions*.

To this Purpose *Philo*, the learned *Jew* observes; “ * Man being endued with the Knowledge of his being a *Free-agent*, and his *Actions* “ being in his own *Power*; and the *Operations* of his *Mind* being, for the most Part, *voluntary*, is deservedly blam’d, if he knowingly “ commits *Evil*, and deservedly prais’d for his “ *voluntary* good *Actions*. But with Respect to “ other *Things*, such as *Trees* and *Beasts*, neither “ is the *Fruitfulness* of the one praise-worthy, “ nor the ill Turns of the other culpable; because the one or the other proceeds not from “ *Choice* and *Will*.

* Ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐλευθεργοῦ καὶ αὐτοκελεύει γινῶσκει λαχόν, καὶ προαιρετικαῖς χάριμιν τὰ πολλὰ ταῖς ἐνεργίαις, ἐικότως ψόγον μὲ ἔχει ἐφ’ οἷς ἐκ προνοίας ἀδικεῖ, ἔπαινον δὲ ἐφ’ οἷς ἐκὼν κατορθοῖ τῶν μὲν καὶ ἄλλων φυτῶν καὶ ζώων, ὅτε αἱ εὐφροαί ἐπαινιτῶνται, οὕτως αἱ κακοπραγίαι ψεκτῶνται, τὰς δὲ ἐφ’ ἐκείνους κινήσεις καὶ μεταβολὰς ἀπροαιρέτως καὶ ἀκυσίως ἔλαβον. Quod Deus sit immutab. p. 300.

And

And *Ænomaus* says; “ * ’Tis the same as if
 “ any should *praise* and *reward* any one for being
 “ *beautiful of Body*; and should *dispraise* and *pu-*
 “ *nish* those who are *deform’d*.

As to *Cato’s* again alledging, that God might
 have prevented the Crimes he punisbeth, by giving
 other Faculties, i. e. by making us other sort of
 Creatures than we are; this is nothing to the
 Purpose. God’s *Justice* (about which the pre-
 sent Argument is) is only concern’d in propor-
 tioning Punishments to Men’s Crimes, and Re-
 wards to their virtuous Actions proceeding from
Choice and *Will*. The making us what we are,
 is a Point in which God’s *Wisdom* and *Goodness* is
 concern’d, and which, I think, we have no Reason
 to impeach, or can justly call in Question. It is, no
 Doubt, consistent with *Goodness* and *Wisdom* in
 God to exercise his *Knowledge* and *Power* in the
 Production of all *Variety* of *animate* and *inanimate*,
unintelligent and *rational* Beings; and his *Wif-*
dom as much, or much more, appears in our
 Creation, upon the Supposition of human Acti-
 ons being *voluntary*, as upon their being *necessary*.
 So that *Cato* has fail’d in every part of his Argu-
 ment, and every Pretence to support it is weak
 and groundless: and instead of defending, he has

* Έοικε ὅ ὡς εἰ τις τοὺς καλοὺς τὰ σώματα ἱπποῖν καὶ γε-
 ραῖσι, τοὺς ὁ ἀγρὺς ψέγοι καὶ κολάζει. Apud Euseb. Præp.
 Evang. lib. 6. c. 7.

quite destroy'd (how undesignedly soever) all the Attributes of God, which properly make him God, i. e. a *moral Governor* of the Universe. And he has fatally subverted not only the Foundation of all *Religion* and *Piety*, but also of all *Vertue* and *Vice*, *Right* and *Wrong*; and has banished all *Property*, and the *Laws* upon which all humane Society is established.

In the next Paragraph *Cato*, in a most unaccountable and contradictory Manner, at the same time that he is pleading for the *Necessity* of humane Actions, says, that *they depend upon Men's Will to do them*. (p. 179.) Then surely they are *voluntary*; no, but he will prove, that Men have a *Will* to act *necessarily*, i. e. to act without *Will*, that they act *necessarily* by their *Will*, i. e. by *Necessity*, and not by *Will*. Such Reasoning, I think, was never offered either *by* or *to* reasonable Men before. But however let us hear him.

The Will (he says) *is directed by the reasoning Faculties* [no Doubt, it either is or should be, tho' Experience shews that it is not always directed by them] *which depend again upon the good or ill Organization of the Body — and a thousand Events, Accidents — and Objects which encompass him — all or most of which Causes, and many more which probably determine him, must be confess'd to be out of his Power*. (p. 179, 180.) All this I grant, and as much more of this kind as can be offer'd; but what is all this to the Purpose? Where is the Consequence that Men's
Actions

Actions are necessary? *Thinking*, *judging*, and *reasoning* well or ill, which is oft-times the Effect of Things which are out of our Power, is one Thing, and *acting* is another Thing. The whole of *Cato's* Reasoning is no more than this, namely, that *external Reasons*, *Causes* and *Accidents* of various sorts, which are out of our Power, necessarily affect Men's *Understandings*, and occasion various and different Judgments of Things, and even of the same Things at different Times to be form'd in their Minds, all which they cannot help, because they must judge (whether right or wrong) according to the Evidence they have of them: But this is no Argument at all that their *Actions* are necessary: Supposing Men always to act according to their *Judgments* of the *Nature* and *Truth* of Things (which it is certain they do not) it can only thence be truly concluded, that such as the *Judgment* is, such will be the *Action* resulting from it; but it cannot be at all truly concluded, that the *Action* is necessary. And every Man has within himself as clear and certain Evidence and Perception, that every *Action* of his is *voluntary* and *free*; as he hath, that the precedent *Judgment*, which he forms concerning the Objects, which are the *Motives* of his *acting*, is necessary, and not free. The Truth is, God hath not made Men mere unintelligent Machines; but hath given us (with a Power of Action) *Reason* and *Understanding* to enable us to act *rationally*; to be as it were a

Light to shew us the *best Way*, that we may walk in it if we *will*; and that, if we lose our *Way*, or slip or fall, we may blame ourselves only for it. The Mind then always is or should be *directed* and *determined* to *act* upon precedent *Reason*, upon *rational* Motives, or what appears to it at the time of *acting* to be such; but nevertheless it is *directed* and *determined* by them to *act*, not by *Necessity*, but by its *Will*: And tho' the *Motives* or *Reasons* upon which the Mind *acts* are *out of our Power*, and the Judgment form'd upon them is *necessary*, yet the *Act* following them is not a *necessary* Consequence, but *Matter of Choice*; the Mind by its *Will* chooses that which either *necessarily* appears to the Judgment to be *right* to be *done*, or most for our present Interest or Good.

The Argument which is here urg'd for *Necessity*, from every *Action* resulting from a *precedent Motive* or *Reason*, which Reason or Motive is often out of our Power, is one of the famous * Objections which the *Fatalists* of old made against the *Liberty* of humane Actions; and therefore it may not be amiss to let the Reader

* *Plutarch* observes that two of the great Objections against humane Liberty of Action were 1. Τὸ μηδὲν ἀναίτιον γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ προηγουμένης αἰτίας 2. Τὸ πολυβούλητον τοῦτο, ὅτι πᾶν ἀξιόμιον ἢ ἀληθὲς ἐστὶν ἢ ψευδές. De Fat, lib. p. 574.

(101)

see how the greatest, both *Heathen* and *Christian* Philosophers, reply'd to it.

*Cicero** tells us, concerning *Chrysippus*, (who was a rigid *Stoick*, and whom his Adversaries charg'd as holding the *Necessity* of humane Actions in Consequence of his Assertion, that all Things proceeded from Fate or a Chain of antecedent Causes) that in order "to assail the Argument from whence *Necessity* was inferred, holding at the same time that nothing happened "without a *preceding Cause*, he distinguished "the Kinds of Causes, that he might avoid "*Necessity*, and still hold *Fate*. Of Causes, "saith he, some are *perfect* and *principal*, (efficient) Causes, others are assistant and immediately precedent. Wherefore, when we say "that all Things come to pass by the *Fatality* of "antecedent Causes; we do not understand this "*Fatality* to belong to the *perfect* and *principal* (efficient) Causes, but only to the immediately "precedent assistant Causes; upon which Distinction he thus reasons; If all Things come "to

Chrysippus autem cum & necessitatem improbare, & nihil vellet, sine præpositis causis, evenire, causarum genera distinguit, ut & *Necessitatem* effugiat, & retineat *Fatum*. Causarum enim, inquit, alie sunt perfectæ & principales, alie adjuvantes & proximæ. Quamobrem, cum dicimus omnia fato fieri *causis antecedentibus*, non hoc intelligi volumus, causis perfectis & principalibus, sed causis antecedentibus, adjuvantibus, & proximis. Itaque illi rationi, quam paulo ante conclusi, sic occurrat. Si omnia fato fiant, sequi illud quidem, ut omnis *causis fiant*.

“ to pass by *Fatality*. it does indeed follow, that
 “ they come to pass with *antecedent Causes*, but
 “ these are not the *perfect* and *principal* (efficient)
 “ Causes of the Event, but only the assistant
 “ Causes which are nearest to the other: Which
 “ assistant Causes, altho’ they are *not in our Pow-*
 “ *er*, it does not thence follow, that our *Affec-*
 “ *tions* are *not in our Power*; but this would fol-
 “ low, if the perfect and principal Causes were
 “ not in our Power.

Cicero † acknowledgeth this Reasoning of
 Chrysippus to be very much labour’d and obscure;
 but what he meant, he endeavour’d ingenuously
 to explain by the rolling of a || Cylinder and Whip-
 ping

fiant antepositis, verum non principalibus & perfectis, sed adju-
 vantibus & proximis. Quæ si ipsæ non sint in nostra potestate,
 non sequitur, ut ne appetitus quidem sit in nostra potestate: at
 hoc sequeretur, si omnia perfectis & principalibus causis fieri
 diceremus, ut cum hæ causæ non essent in nostra potestate, ne
 ille quidem esset in nostra potestate. De Fat. lib. p. 360, 361.

† Apud A. Gellium lib. 6. p. 367. And *Ænonianus* charges
 his Notion with making the human Mind (*ψυχή*) half a
 slave. Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. c. 7.

|| Revertitur ad Cylindrum & Turbinem suum, quæ moveri
 incipere, nisi pulsa, non possunt: id autem cum accidit, *su-*
apte natura, quod superest, & Cylindrum volvi, & versari Tur-
 binem putant. Ut igitur, inquit, qui protrudit Cylindrum, dedit
 ei principium motionis; volubilitatem autem non dedit: sic vi-
 sum objectum imprimeret illud quidem & quasi signabat in ani-
 mo suam speciem, sed assensus *nostra* erit in potestate, eaque
 quem admodum in Cylindro dictum est, *extrinsecus* pulsa, quod
 reliquum est, *suapte vi*, & natura movebitur. *Cic. ibid.* 361,
 362.

ping of a Top, which, tho' they could not begin to move without being impelled by an external Force, yet after Motion was given to them they would continue to move, as it were, of themselves, by the internal Power of their own Volubility, which belongs to their Nature, and was not given to them by that which was the first and immediate external Cause of their Motion. So in like manner he suppos'd, that external impulsive Causes, which were subject to Fate, or out of our Power, were the antecedent and first Causes, or Occasions of the internal Motion of the Mind, i. e. that they set the Mind on Work; but yet that our Inclinations, Purposes and Actions following were in our Power, and under the Direction and Government of the Will. From which Explanation it appears that Chrysippus meant, by the perfect and principal Cause of Action, the internal efficient Cause, or the voluntary Motion or Exertion of the Mind itself into Action; and by the assistant precedent Cause, he meant the external Cause or

Aulus Gellius also represents this Similitude of Chrysippus in Explication of human Liberty. very elegantly and clearly, viz. Hujus deinde rei exemplo non hercle nimis aliene neque illepide utitur. sicut, inquit, lapidem Cylindrum si per spatia terre prona atque deruta jaceas, causam quidem ei, & initium præcipitantiæ feceris; mox tamen ille præceps volvitur, non quia tu id jam facis, sed quoniam ita sese modus ejus & formæ volubilitas habet: sic ordo, & ratio, & necessitas fati genera ipsa & principia Causarum movet; impetus vero consiliorum mentiumque nostrarum, actionisque ipsas, voluntas consueque proprias, & animorum ingenia moderantur. Noct. Attic, lib. 6. p. 365, 366.

Motive of Action; and so his Reasoning is just and right.

And that *Chrysippus* really meant that Men's *Actions* were in their own *Power* (tho' external Causes out of their *Power*, which he call'd *Fate*, concurr'd to the Production of them) and that they were the Effects of *voluntary Choice*: *Gellius* * informs us from his own express Words; " Wherefore (says he) it is a Saying of the *Pythagoreans*; you may know that Men bring Evils " voluntarily upon themselves: Men's Calamities " proceeding from their own selves; and their " Sins and Vices resulting from their own *Appetites*, *Intentions* and *Purposes*. Wherefore he " says we ought not to endure or hear those " wicked, slothful, pernicious and audacious Men; " who, when they are convicted of a Fault or " an Offence, fly to a necessary *Fatality* for Re-
" fuge,

* Infert deinde (*Chrysippus*) verba hæc, his, quæ dixit, congruentia.

Διὸ ὑπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορείων οὕτως εἴρηται

Γινώσκει δ' ἀνθρώπους αὐθαίρετα πύματ' ἔχοντας.

Ὡς τῶν βλαβῶν ἡκίστους παρ' αὐτοῖς γινόμενων, καὶ καθ' ὅρμην αὐτῶν, αἰμαρτανόντων τε καὶ βλαπτομένων, καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν καὶ πρόθεσιν. Propterea negat oportere ferri audirique homines aut nequam aut ignavos, & nocentes & audaces: qui quum in culpa & in maleficio relictī sunt, perfugiunt ad fati necessitatem, tanquam in aliquod sani Asylum, & quæ pessime fecerunt, ea non

“ fuge, and attribute their wicked Actions, not
 “ to their own Temerity, but to *Fate*.

From this Explanation of the Notion of *Chrysippus* it will appear further, that the Dispute betwixt him and his learned Scholar *Carneades* and others (who deny'd there were any *antecedent Causes* or * *Fatality* of Men's Actions, and affirmed, that the *Motion* or *Exertion* of the Mind was purely *voluntary*) was only a Dispute about Words; each of them understanding the Word *Cause* in a different Sense. His Reasoning, which the *Epicureans* urg'd against *Chrysippus*, *Cicero* sets forth thus, *viz.*

“ † When they (the *Epicureans*) had admitted that there was no Motion *without a Cause*,
 “ they needed not (*Carneades* taught them)
 “ grant, that all Events came to pass by *antecedent Causes*: For that there was no *external*
 “ and *antecedent* Causes of our *Will*; therefore
 “ the common Custom of saying, that any
 “ one *will* or *will not* do a Thing *without a*
 “ *Cause*, is an *Abuse of Speech*; for when we say
 “ *without*

non suæ temeritati, sed fato esse attribuenda dicunt. Ibid. p. 366.

* Quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animarum motus voluntarii. *Cicero de Fat. p. 359.*

† Cum concessissent motum nullum esse sine causa; non concederent omnia, quæ fierent, fieri causis antecedentibus: voluntariis enim nostræ non esse causas externas & antecedentes. Comuni igitur consuetudine sermonis abutimur. cum ita dicimus.

“ *without a Cause, we mean only without an*
 “ *external and antecedent Cause, not without any*
 “ *Cause at all. — An external Cause is not*
 “ *requisite to the voluntary Motion of the Mind;*
 “ *for voluntary Motion in the Nature of the*
 “ *Thing is in our own Power and Choice: and*
 “ *that not without Cause; for the Cause of*
 “ *it is the Nature of the Mind itself.*” Pre-
 sently after he shews (which was the Point of
 the Dispute) what is truly and properly the
 Cause of a Thing, viz.

“ * That is the Cause, which effects that, of
 “ which it is the Cause; as a Wound causeth
 “ Death; ill Digestion a Disease; Fire causeth
 “ Heat. Therefore Cause is not so to be understood
 “ as if that which is antecedent merely to a Thing
 “ was the Cause of it; but that only is the
 “ Cause which is the antecedent efficient Cause.

Whence it is evident, as † *Cicero* observes
 upon the Matter, that they who thought the

velle aliquid quempiam, aut nolle sine causa. Ita enim dicimus
sine causa, ut dicamus sine externa & antecedente causa, non sine
aliqua. — ad animorum motus voluntarios non est requi-
renda externa causa. Motus enim voluntarius eam naturam in se-
ipso continet, ut sit in nostra potestate, nobisque pareat: nec id
sine causa; ejus enim rei causa, ipsa natura est. De Fat. p.
 352, 353.

* *Causa autem ea est, quæ id efficit, cujus est causa: ut vul-*
nus mortis; cruditas morbi; ignis ardoris. Itaque non sic
causa intelligi debet, ut quod cuique antecedit, id & causa sit,
sed quod cuique efficienter antecedit. Ibid. p. 357.

† *Ex quo facile intellectu est, cum utrique patefacta atque*
explicata sententia sua, ad eundem exitum veniant, verbis eos
non re dissidere, &c. Ibid. p. 363.

volun-

voluntary Motions of the Mind were not affected by any *Fatality*; and *Chrysippus* who held a *Fate* to belong even to humane Actions, tho' he allow'd them to be *voluntary*, and not effected by *Necessity*, really meant the same Thing; only those *external* Motives which *Chrysippus* still'd *antecedent Causes* and *Fate* (expressly declaring his Meaning at the same Time, that they were not the *perfect* and *principal*; i. e. *efficient* Causes of Action) *Carneades*, and others, the *Academics*, wou'd not allow to be properly *Causes* at all; insisting that the *efficient* Cause only was the true Cause of Action; " * and that in what Things " soever the antecedent Causes were such, that " it was not in our Power, that the Things " should be otherwise, these Things were properly effected by *Fate*: but those Things, the " effecting of which are in our own Power, are " wholly exempt from *Fate*." Understanding *Fate*, which they excluded from Men's Actions, in the Sense of a *necessary* impulsive Cause; whilst *Chrysippus* understood the *Fate* which he ascrib'd to them, in the Sense of a concurrent Cause or Motive of Action only: Which shew'd there was no real Difference in their Opinions; and that both agreed that Men's Actions were in

* Consent, quibus in rebus causa antecesserint ita, ut non sit in nostra potestate, ut aliter illa eveniant, illas fato fieri: quæ autem in nostra potestate sint ab his Fatum abesse. De Fat. p. 363.

their principal, perfect or efficient Cause truly voluntary.

And hence we may observe, that when *Plutarch* charges *Chrysippus* with holding, “ * That “ not the least Thing either rests or moves otherwise than according to the Appointment of “ God, whom he makes the same with *Fate* “ ——— and that he makes *Fate* (which he “ calls *Necessity*, &c.) an invincible and uncontrollable and immutable Cause.” He either mistakes or strains *Chrysippus*’s Notion too far; or else *Chrysippus* is only speaking of the *Fatality* or *Necessity* of external Providential Events; and not of humane Actions; from which *Fatality* or *Necessity* *Plutarch* himself implies that he exempts them; owning that, with Respect to Men’s Actions, he (*Chrysippus*) “ † made *Fate*, not the perfect (i. e. the efficient, as hath been above observed from *Cicero*) “ but only the precedent (i. e.) “ the concurrent Cause only.

Again; *Cicero* himself answers the Argument against *Liberty*, which is here made, in these Words; viz.

* Μηδὲ ἰσχυρὰ μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι μηδὲ τε λᾶχισιν, ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὸν τῷ Διὶ λόγον· ὃν τῇ εἰμαρμένῃ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι. ——— τὴν εἰμαρμένην αὐτῶν ἀνίκητον, καὶ ἀκώλυτον, καὶ ἄτρεπτον ἀποφαίνων, αὐτὸς Ἀτροπον καλεῖ καὶ Ἀδράστιαν, καὶ ἀνάγκην, καὶ πεπωμένον ὡς πέρας ἄπασιν ἐπιτιθεῖσθαι. *De Stoic. Repug.* p. 1056.

† Οὐκ αὐτοτελῆ αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ προκαταρκτικὰ μόνον ἐποιεῖτο τὴν εἰμαρμένην. *Ibid.*

“ * Altho’

“ * Altho’ some are more inclin’d to some Things
 “ than others are, thro’ *natural* antecedent Causes;
 “ it does not thence follow that there are *natural*
 “ antecedent (efficient) Causes of our *Wills* and
 “ *Desires*: for if so, nothing would be *in our own*
 “ *Power*. But now we readily own that to be *acute*
 “ or *dull*, of *strong* or of *weak* Constitutions, is
 “ *not in our Power*: But he that thinks it
 “ thence follows, that even to *sit* or to *walk* is
 “ not Matter of *Will* and *Choice*, does not per-
 “ ceive the Tendency of that Consequence. For
 “ altho’ there are *antecedent* Causes of Men’s
 “ being born with *quick* or *slow* Capacities, with
 “ *robust* or *infirm* Constitutions; Yet it does not
 “ follow, that our *sitting* and *walking*, and *doing*
 “ *any Action* is determined and appointed by these
 “ Causes.” He adds presently;

“ † *Vices* (he means *vicious Inclinati-*
 “ *ons*, as his preceding Instances shew) may
 “ grow from *natural* Causes; but to extirpate
 “ and

* Non enim si alii ad alia propensiores sint propter causas naturales, & antecedentes, idcirco etiam nostrarum voluntatum atque appetitionum sunt causæ naturales & antecedentes: nam nihil esset in nostra potestate, si res ita se haberet. Nunc vero fatemur, acuti hebetesne, valentes imbecilline simus, non esse id in nobis: qui autem ex eo cogi putat, ne ut *sedeamus* quidem aut *ambulemus* voluntatis esse, is non videt quæ quantaque res consequatur. Ut enim & ingeniosi, & tardi ita nascantur antecedentibus causis, itemque valentes & imbecilli: non sequitur tamen, ut etiam *sedere* & *ambulare* & rem *agere* aliquam principalibus (forſan naturalibus, ut supra) definitum, & constitutum sit. De Fat. p. 344, 345.

† Ex naturalibus causis vitia nasci possunt: extirpari autem
 & fun-

“ and eradicate them, so as that he who hath
 “ these vicious Propensities may be wholly freed
 “ from them, is not in the Power of *natural Causes*,
 “ but is effected by the *Will*, by *Study* and *Disci-*
 “ *pline*.” Than which Reasoning nothing can
 be more truly and strongly offer'd.

To the same Argument the learned *Alexander*
Aphrodifus thus replies ; “ * Those Things
 “ which proceed from a *Cause*, do not always
 “ proceed from an *external Cause*; on which Ac-
 “ count something is in our own Power, of which
 “ we *ourselves* are the proper Cause, and not any
 “ *external Cause*. Wherefore those Things
 “ which in this Respect are *without Cause*,
 “ have yet a Cause from ourselves. For Man
 “ himself is the *original and Cause* of those *Acti-*
 “ *ons* which are done by him, and this is pro-
 “ perly to be a Man, to have a Principle of Action
 “ within himself, as it is the Property of a Globe
 “ to be roll'd down a steep Place. Wherefore
 “ other Things are impelled by external Causes,
 “ but

de funditus tolli, ut is ipse qui ad ea propensus fuerit, a tantis
 vitiis avocetur, non est id positum in naturalibus causis, sed
 in Voluntate, Studio, Disciplina. Ibid. p. 345.

* Οὐ γὰρ πάντες αἱ τὰ γινόμενα κατὰ αἰτίαν ἔχοντες ἔχουσι τὴν
 αἰτίαν ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἰσχύος, ὅτι ἢ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ὅτι
 τῶν ὅταν γινόμενων ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν κύριοι, ἀλλ' ἐκ ἑαυτῶν τις αἰτία. διὸ
 ἀνεκτικῶς τὰ ὅταν γινόμενα γίνονται, παρ' ἡμῶν τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχοντα. ὁ γὰρ
 ἀνθρώπος ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γινόμενων πράξεων, καὶ πάντες οἱ
 τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπου, τὸ τῷ πράττειν ὅταν τὰ ἀρχὴ ἔχοντες ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὡς
 τῇ σφαίρᾳ τὸ κατὰ τὴν κεντρικὴν κυλισμένην φέρουσα, διὸ τῶν μὴ ἄλλων
 ἔκαστον

“ but Man is not, because it is essential to him
 “ to have a Principle and Cause (of Action) within
 “ himself, so as not to be impell'd by exterior Causes.
 “ If we had one View in our judging about Actions,
 “ it might with Reason be said, that our Judg-
 “ ments about the same Things was always the
 “ same: But since it is not so; (for those Things we
 “ make choice of we choose sometimes for the
 “ Goodness, sometimes for the Pleasure, some-
 “ times for the Profit of them, and these do not
 “ produce the same Effects) it happens that we
 “ sometimes prefer the Motives to that which is
 “ good before all others; again, at other times
 “ our Judgment leads us to prefer that which is
 “ pleasant or profitable. For as we seek for no
 “ other Cause why the Earth is carried down-
 “ ward according to its Gravity, and why Animals
 “ act as they do by Appetite, than that each of
 “ these has of itself an efficient Cause derived
 “ from

ἵκετον ἔπειτα ταῖς ἔχουσι αὐτῶν περιεσώσαι αἰτίαις, ὅ δ' ἀπορροῦν ἐκ
 ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτῶν τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῇ ἔχουσι ἀρχὴν τε καὶ αἰτίαν οὐκ αὐτῶν, μηδὲν
 τῶς ἐπεὶ ταῖς περιεσώσαι ἔχουσι αὐτῶν καὶ ὅδ' ἡμῶν ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀνα-
 τίων κρίσις, πρὸς εἰς γινόμενη σκοπὸν, ἵσως εἰρήνην λόγον τὸ αἰ-
 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὁμοίως ἡμῶν κρίσις ταῖς κρίσις, ἵσως δ' ἐκ
 ἔχουσι (αἰρέμεθα ὅδ' αἰσώμεθα, ποτὶ μὲν ἀλλὰ τὸ καλὸν τι, ποτὶ δ'
 ἀλλὰ τὸ ἡδὺ, ποτὶ δ' ἀλλὰ τὸ συμφέρον, καὶ ἡ τ' αὐτὰ συνέσταται καὶ ἀν-
 χεται οὐκ ἔστι ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν κινηθέντα ἡμῶς τὰ αὐτὰ περιεσώσαι προ-
 κείμενα, αὐτὸς δ' ἄλλα, πρὸς τὸ ἡδὺ, ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, τὰ αὐτὰ περιεσώσαι
 κρίσις ποιούμενους. ὡς ὅδ' αἰσώμεθα ἄλλα τινὰ αἰτίαν δι' ἣν κατὰ
 βαρύνεται τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ ἢ γῆ φέρεται κάτω ἢ δι' ἣν αἰτία αἰσώμεθα τὸ
 ζῶον, πρᾶσσι καθ' ὁρμήν, τῶ ταύτην ἵκετον αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν ἐξ αὐτοῦ

“ from its Nature: so neither is there any other
 “ Cause to be sought of those different Actions
 “ which we do at different Times, in different
 “ Circumstances, but only the Man himself.
 “ For this is to be a Man, namely, to be the
 “ *Original* and Cause of those Actions which are
 “ done by him.

To which, on the same Argument, I shall add
 the Opinions of the two most learned Christian
 Philosophers, *Eusebius* and *Origen*.

Eusebius says; “ * Altho’ a thousand *external*
 “ fortuitous Obstacles oppose the Temper of our
 “ Bodies, and the *voluntary* Desires of our Minds,
 “ yet the *freely-exerted* Vertue of the Soul is able
 “ to withstand them all; demonstrating that the
 “ Power which we have within us of *choosing*
 “ that which is good, is unmatchable and in-
 “ vincible.

Origen’s Observation is as follows, *viz.*

πρὸς τὰ γινόμενα σωτηριῶν, τοιοῦτον ὃν τὴν φύσιν, ὥτως οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ἀλλὰ τ’ ἄλλως γινόμενων ἐπὶ περιεῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλως
 τινὰ αἰτίαν ἀπαιτητέον, παρ’ αὐτὸν τὸν ἀνθρώπον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τὸ ἀν-
 θρώπου εἶναι, τὸ γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία εἶναι τῶν δι’ αὐτοῦ γινόμενων πράξεων.
De Fat. p. 80, 83.

* Καίτοι μυρίαν ἔχοντες ἔμποδων, τῇ τε τοῦ σώματος φύσει τοῖς
 τε κατὰ προαιεσιν ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ὁρμαῖς, κατὰ τι συμβεβηκὸς προαιεπ-
 τόντων, ὅμως πρὸς ἅπαντα τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀρετῆς τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀντί-
 χεῖ, ἀμυχοὶ καὶ ἀήττητοι τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν τῶν καλῶν τὴν αἰεσιν ἐπιδικ-
 κόμενοι. *Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 252.*

“ * We confess (saith he) that many Things
 “ which are *not in our Power*, are Causes of many
 “ Things that are *in our Power*; without which,
 “ namely, those Things which are *not in our*
 “ *Power*, other Things, which are *in our Pow-*
 “ *er*, would not be done. But those Things
 “ which are *in our Power*, and are done conse-
 “ quentially to *antecedent* Things, which are *not*
 “ *in our Power*, are done so as that notwith-
 “ standing these *antecedent* Things, we might
 “ have done *otherwise*. But if any one would
 “ have it, that our *Free-will* is wholly inde-
 “ pendent of every Thing in the World, so as
 “ that we do not *choose* to do some Things by
 “ reason of certain (precedent) Accidents, he
 “ forgets that he is a Part of the World, and
 “ comprehended within humane Society, and
 “ the circumambient Air.

Having thus shewn from the Reason of Things,
 and the Arguments of the most rational Enquirers

* Ὅτι μιν τοῖσι πολλῶν τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν αἰτία πλεῖστα τῶν οὐκ ἐφ'
 ἡμῶν εἰσι, καὶ ἡμῶς ὁμολογήσομεν· ὅν μὴ γνωμένον, λέγω ὅτι τῶν οὐκ
 ἐφ' ἡμῶν οὐκ ἂν πέδῃ τινὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐπράττετο. πρᾶττε (lege
 πρᾶττεται, ut est in Philoc.) ὅτι τὰδε τινὰ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἀκό-
 λυθα τοῖς ὅτι τοῖς προγνωσμένοις (lege προγνωμένοις, ut habet
 MSS. & Philoc.) οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ἐνδιχομένῃ τοῦ ἐπὶ τοῖς
 αὐτοῖς προγνωσμένοις (lege iterum προγνωμένοις, ut Philoc.)
 καὶ ἔτι πρᾶττε παρ' αὐτῶν πρᾶττομεν· εἰ δέ τις ζητᾷ τὸ ἐφ'
 ἡμῶν ἀπολειψόμενον εἶναι τοῦ παντός, ὥστε μὴ ἀλλὰ τὰδε τινὰ συμβε-
 βηκότα ἡμῶν ἡμᾶς αἰρετοῦ τὰδε, ἐπιλέγεται κόσμῳ μὲν ὅν, καὶ ἡμ-
 περιχομένῳ ἀνθρώπων κοινωνίᾳ καὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος. Orig. apud
 Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 290. & Com. in Gen. p. 11.]

of former Ages, that there is not the grand Weight or Truth in the Argument which is insisted on against *Liberty*, and for the *Necessity* of humane Actions, namely, their being consequential to, directed and determined by *external Things* which are *not in our Power*: because that altho' many outward Events which are not in our Power may concur to excite the Mind to Actions, which, without them, it would not do; yet it is evident and plain that the Mind acts not by the *necessary* Impulse of *external Causes* or Motives, but by an *internal voluntary* Motion or Exertion: And tho' external Causes or Accidents determine the Mind to act, (as being Grounds which the Mind may think it reasonable to act upon) yet it is and can be determined to act only by its *Will*. And for a further direct Proof of this Point, I will offer one Argument more, namely,

It is evident, that after Reasons or Motives, not in Men's Power, are offered to them to act, and they cannot help thinking it right to act upon them, and are in their last Judgment determined to act upon them (and the Event shews that they do act upon them) they can yet *deliberate* with themselves before they act, and can *suspend* the *Action* without any *external* Motive whatsoever; which clearly shews that the *Action* proceeds from *Will* and *Choice*, and is *voluntary* not *necessary*.

Cato himself allows, that *Choice* and *Preference* imply *Doubt* and *Deliberation*, which tho' not

not true, as I have shewn; yet, on the other side, it is true, that *Deliberation* and *Suspension* imply *Will* and *Choice*: For it is, I think, Demonstration, that if the Motives of acting are such as impel the Mind *necessarily* to act, *i. e.* to act not by *Will*, but by *Necessity*, then there can be no *Suspension* of Action; but the Moment that the Mind is impelled it must act just as a Balance moves the Instant that the Weight is hung upon it: *Necessity* has no Regard to *Time*, but, if it acts at all, acts equally in every Moment of *Time*; and, if it is the immediate *efficient* Cause or Power of Action, must act as soon as it takes place, or impells the Mind; and I would desire to be told what Power of the Mind it is (if it is not that which we call *Will*) which is able perpetually to resist, without the Assistance of any external Motive, the Operations of *Necessity* by *Suspension* of Actions. That this *Suspension* is caus'd by the *Will*, and consequently that the Action following is *voluntary*, may farther appear by there being no *Suspension* or *Deliberation*, where the Actions or Effects are not *voluntary*, as whether the *Pulse* or *Heart* should beat, and in the Case of the Actions of *Madmen*, of Men in a *Fever*, or under a violent *Surprise* or *Passion*; the more of *Necessity* there is, there is always the less of *Deliberation* and *Suspension*; and if the Motive *necessarily* produces the Action, it produces it also *instantaneously*. This Argument may be worth Consideration; and to it I shall subjoin the Opinion of the great *Aristotle*; who thus argues;

“ * De-

“ * *Deliberation* and *Choice* is one and the same
 “ Thing: for that which was *deliberated* upon
 “ is the Matter of *Choice*. ——— Now the
 “ *elective* Faculty, being *deliberative*, and that
 “ which *desires* those Things which are *in our*
 “ *Power*; the *Choice* itself is the *deliberative Desire*
 “ of those Things which are *in our Power*: For
 “ judging upon *Deliberation* we afterwards de-
 “ sire what we *deliberated* upon.

And the learned *Alexander Aphrodifius* says;

“ † Certainly Man hath not the Power of
 “ *Deliberation* in vain, as it must be if he acts
 “ *by Necessity*. But it plainly appears that Man
 “ alone hath by Nature this Power above the
 “ rest of Animals, that he is not like them led
 “ merely by *Sense*, but is endued with *Reason*,
 “ whereby to judge of Objects. By which Reason
 “ examining the Objects of *Sense*, if he finds them
 “ to be really what at first they appear'd to be,
 “ he

* Βουλευτὸν ὃ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό ——— τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βελῆς
 προκρίβει, προαιρετὸν εἶναι ——— ὄντ' ὃ τὴν προαιρετοῦ; βουλευτοῦ, ὅτε-
 τοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἀν' εἰς βουλευτικὴν ἐρεξίς τῶν ἐφ'
 ἡμῶν ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσαοῦ γὰρ κρίναντες, ὁριζόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βέλυσιν.
 Ethic. lib. 3. c. 5.

† Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ βουλευσάτω τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐκ εἰς μάτην αὐτῷ ὑπάρ-
 χει. ἢν δ' ἀν' εἰς μάτην βουλευτικός, εἰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπραττε τὰ πρατ-
 τόμενα· ἀλλ' ἐναργῶς φαίνεται τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ὁ ἄνθρωπος μόνος
 τοῦτο παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔχων πλέον, τὸ μὴ ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις ταῖς φαι-
 νασίαις ἔπειθ', ἀλλ' ἔκειν τῶν προσπιπτόντων κριτὴν τὸν λόγον. ὃ χρά-
 μιν' εἰ μὴ ἐξεταζόμενα τὰ φαντασθέντα; οἷα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐφάνη, καὶ
 εἶσι,

“ he assents to the Evidence of his Senses, and
 “ pursues the Objects of them. But if he finds
 “ them different from what they appeared, he
 “ does not continue in his first Conception of
 “ them, being convinc’d by *Reason* upon Consi-
 “ deration of the Falsity of them. Wherefore
 “ we *deliberate* only about such Things as are *in*
 “ *our Power* to do or *not*: And when we act
 “ without *Deliberation*, we often repent and
 “ blame our selves for our *Inconsideration*. Also,
 “ if we see others act unadvisedly, we reprehend
 “ them as guilty of a Fault, and the Ground of
 “ our *Consultation* with others is, that Things are
 “ *in our own Power*.

Cato proceeds; and argues next for the *Necessi-*
ty of humane Actions from the Proceedings of
 divine *Revelation*. *What* (says he) *can be meant*
by (God’s) *offering Rewards and denouncing Punish-*
ments, but as Causes to produce the Effects design’d,
i. e. to save those whom Almighty God in his deep

ἔστι, συγκατατίθεται τῇ φαντασίᾳ, καὶ ἔτω μέντισιν αὐτά· ἐῖς ἃ ἀλ-
 λοῖα φαίνεται, ἐκ ἧτις ἔμεινεν ἐπὶ τῆς προλήψεως, ἐλέγχοντ^α αὐτὰ
 τοῦ λόγου, ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ συμβουλευσάμενος περὶ αὐτῶν. βουλευόμεθα γοῦν περὶ
 μόνων ὧν δυνάμεθα πράττειν. εἰ δὲ ποτε μὴ βουλευσάμενοι πράττοι-
 μεν, πολλάκις μετανοοῦμεν καὶ μετὰμένομεθα ἑαυτοῖς τῆς ἀβουλίας.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλως ἴδωμεν ἀβέλως πράττοντας, ἐγκαλοῦμεν ὡς ἀμαρ-
 τήσαντας, ἀφ’ ἧμιν τε συμβέλλει τοῖσδε χρῆσθαι, ὡς ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ὄντων
 τῶν τοιούτων. Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. p. 271, 272.
 & Aphrodis. lib. de Fato.

Wisdom

Wisdom has preordain'd to Bliss, and to be influenc'd by these Motives. (p. 180.)

All this is reasonable and right upon the Supposition of *humane Liberty*, and Men's Actions being *voluntary*; but is very unreasonable and absurd upon the Hypothesis of *Necessity*. Supposing Men to be *rational* Creatures, and that their Actions are in *their own Power*; nothing is more reasonable, wise and good in God than to propose suitable *Rewards* and *Punishments*, i.e. *Happiness* and *Misery*, whether here or hereafter, as rational and persuasive Motives for the Mind of Man to exert its *Will* into Actions correspondent to the divine Will and Commands. A reasonable Mind cannot but think it reasonable to act upon these Motives; and they answer God's End in proposing them, as being in their Natures most effectual to procure a *willing* Obedience to his Laws, and leaving the Sinner without Excuse and self-condemned in refusing to comply with them. But now on the other Hand; supposing Men's Actions *necessary*; and these Motives of Rewards and Punishments to be proposed and design'd by God to procure in Men a *Necessity* of doing good Actions, and of avoiding evil ones, in order to their Salvation; then it is evident that God's Design is frustrated, by their not producing the Effects intended, and his Wisdom thereby falls to the Ground: because Men daily do resist these Motives, and even the best Men are not always influenc'd by them, and sometimes

act opposite to them; which they could not possibly do, if they were *necessary* Causes working *necessary* Effects; for if their Operations were *necessary*, all Men's Actions to whom they are propos'd, must be *necessarily* good.

Or if it is pretended, that all who are influenced by them are *necessarily* influenc'd;

First; This is not true, because if they were *necessarily* influenced, the Motives being always the same must have always the same Effects; but on the contrary the most vertuous Men are not always influenc'd by them, which proves that they are not *necessarily* influenc'd at all.

Secondly; To suppose *necessary* Means to influence *some* and not *others* of like Nature, and equal Capacities and Passions is a Contradiction; and yet it hath always been found true by Experience, not only that Men of the same Education, equal Abilities, and as far as can be discerned, like natural Passions, have been opposite to each other in their Actions; but also that Men of the very worst natural Dispositions and Practice have reform'd themselves, and become eminently vertuous and good by their own Care, and a diligent Use of their rational Faculties: And that others of naturally good Dispositions, and vertuous Behaviour, have, thro' Carelessness and Neglect of the Use of their Reason, been corrupted and become notoriously wicked.

Which

Which plainly shews that *Cato's necessary* Motives work only as Men's *Wills* permit them; and, contrary to their Natures oft-times have the *least* Effect on those Minds which are *least dispos'd* to resist them, and the *strongest* Effect on those which are *most inclin'd* to oppose them; which proves that there is a *Power* within every one's Breast, which is able to conquer the strongest Propensions of Nature, and the greatest Motives that can be offer'd either to *Vertue* or *Vice*; and which cannot be compelled or forc'd by any external Means or Causes whatsoever.

Thirdly; It is repugnant to the Notion of the *Wisdom* of God, for him to propose *necessary* Motives of Action to such as cannot possibly be influenc'd by them, or must *necessarily* act contrary to them: To propose equally to all, what he is suppos'd to know cou'd not possibly influence all, nay, and what was ordained by him, not to influence all, is contrary both to *Wisdom* and *Goodness*: And, no Doubt, had the Motives propos'd by God work'd as *necessary* Causes by Force and Compulsion, his Wisdom and Goodness would not have permitted him to have propos'd them to any *necessarily* in vain, *i. e.* to such as were incapable of being influenced by them.

Fourthly; How comes *Necessity* to make a Distinction betwixt one Man and another; and
abso-

absolutely to *preordain* one to *Bliss*, and another to *Misery*? If Men are to be *saved* or *damned* by *Necessity*, without any Actions properly of *their own*, it is evident it must work equally on all, and *save all*, or *damn all*; just as *Mortality*, the *Light of the Sun*, the *Return of the Seasons*, and all other natural and necessary Effects are common equally to all. And they, who *erroneously* believe that some are *preordain'd* to *Bliss*, and others to *Misery*, by the absolute Power and Decrees of God, are not yet so absurd as to suppose these absolute Decrees to be the *necessary* Result of the divine Nature (*Necessity* not making any such Distinction and Preference of one Man to another) but they suppose them to proceed from the inscrutable divine *Will*. And as there is neither *Justice*, *Wisdom* or *Goodness* in *preordaining* some to *Salvation*, and some to *Destruction*, so it is plain there is no *Necessity* for such a *Preordination*, and consequently there can be no such Thing.

Therefore on the contrary to this Reasoning of *Cato*, the Motives of Rewards and Punishments being proposed by God indifferently to all, and being comply'd with by some, and rejected by others; it hence follows, that these Motives, or any other, which in their Nature must be less than these, do not *necessitate* the Mind to act, nor were intended by God to do so; but were proposed as *rational* Means only to a *rational* Mind, to excite, persuade or determine it to

R

act

act by its *Will*, correspondent to the divine Laws; and God thereupon *preordain'd* those to Bliss, who should *voluntarily* be led by those Motives to *do good*; and those to Misery, who should *wilfully* refuse to be directed by them, and suffer any others to lead them *into Evil*.

From the preceding Observation of the Methods of the divine Proceedings with Men, Cate thus concludes;

What Sort of Reasoning then is this to say that Heaven gives to every Man sufficient Power and Motives to choose the best, which yet prove insufficient? That he has made every Man free to act or not to act by a Rule, and yet has plac'd him in such a Situation as to find a thousand Obstacles in his way to that Freedom; and that he has given him a Judgment capable to determine right, and Opportunities rightly to exercise that Judgment; and yet by making use of that Judgment and these Opportunities, he often judges directly contrary? And all this is to make good a System, as yet own'd but by a very small Part of Mankind, and for which I can find no Foundation in Reason and Scripture.
(p. 181.)

But. (in Answer.) First; *What sort of Reasoning is this?* to suppose that Heaven has subjected every Man to two opposite necessary Principles or Causes, the one of *Virtue*, the other of *Vice*, which draw them forcibly by Turns into *Good* and *Evil*, *Happiness* and *Misery*.

To suppose God to be so *divided* with himself, as to have made it *necessary* for every Man to do both *Good* and *Evil*, to *obey* his Laws and to *disobey* them? Nay, *what sort of Reasoning* is it to suppose *Evil necessarily* to proceed from a *necessarily good* Nature; to suppose a *necessarily good and happy* God to lay a great Part of Men his Creatures under a *Necessity* of being * *wicked* and *miserable*? But

Secondly; That the *Power* and *Motives* which Heaven gives to every Man to *chose the best*, are *sufficient*, is evident; because they do influence *many*; whereas, if they were in themselves *insufficient*, *none* would be influenced by them: and therefore their not influencing *all*, is an Argument against *Cato* that it is the Opposition of Men's *Will* to them, and nothing else, that renders them (not *insufficient*, but) tho' *sufficient*, yet *ineffectual*.

Thirdly; That there are Obstacles in Men's way to the right Use of their Freedom, is no Ar-

* The Notion of *Necessity* directly makes God the Author of all *Sin* and *Evil*: And Men might justly alledge in Excuse of their Wickedness what *Homer* represents one saying,

— Εἰς δ' οὐκ αἰτίος ἑμῆς,

Ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς, καὶ πόσει καὶ ἡρώδεσσιν ἑρινός·

Apud Ammon. Herm. p. 187.

gument at all against Freedom, but only proves, that Men, who are capable of *Vice* as well as *Vertue*, have Motives to the *one* as well as to the *other*, which they *freely* comply with or *freely* reject.

Fourthly; That Men have *contrary* Judgments of Things at different Times, is nothing at all to the Purpose, whether Men's *Actions* be supposed *voluntary* or *necessary*; *judging* is one Thing (and not in our Power farther than the making use of the Means proper to form it) and *acting* is another Thing.

And that Men have a Power given them to choose the best, and are free to act or not to act by a Rule, which Cato endeavours here to expose as a strange sort of Reasoning, has been largely demonstrated to be just and true Reasoning, both (*a priori*) from the *Nature* and *Attributes* of God, and (*a posteriori*) from the Works of *Creation* and *Providence*; and from all the *Sense* and *Reason* of Mankind. And the System founded upon this Reasoning is attended with no Difficulties in the Thing itself, but only in the Explanation of the *Modus* of it. We do not know the *Manner* of the *Agency* of the Mind; or the *Manner* of God's *Forefight* of future and contingent Events; yet the Things themselves are very evident: nor do we know any more the *manner* how *necessary* Causes work *necessary* Effects, and how God foresees

foresees *them*. But on the other Hand we see very clearly from the Nature of Things, that God is a *Free-agent*, and has endued Man with *Freedom* of Action; and our own *Sense* and *Reason* as much convince us of the Certainty of this Liberty, as they do of the Existence of any Thing without us, of the Existence of even *Matter* itself.

I am not more sure, that when my Eyes are open to the Sun I must necessarily see Light, than that, by my mere *Will*, I can freely shut them, and hinder the Light from coming to them. But

I have also shown, that the System of *Necessity* is inconsistent with the *divine Perfections*, destroys God's *Power*, *Wisdom*, *Holiness*, *Goodness* and *Justice*, and all the *moral* Attributes of his Nature, and consequently his very *Being* and *Existence*. It besides manifestly overthrows the Notion of all *Religion* and *Morality*, and the Foundation of all *humane Society*. And for *Cato* to say that the System of *Liberty* is *own'd but by a very small Part of Mankind*, and has no *Foundation in Scripture*, is so very unreasonable and unaccountably *romantick*, (as may appear from the foregoing Observations) that one might think he had never read one Book of *Heathen* or *Jewish Philosophy*; or ever look'd into *Scripture* and the Writings of the *antient Christians*. But he proceeds;

I must

I must beg leave to think it very audacious in a small number of Men to determine the Workings of Providence by their own narrow Schemes, at the Expence too of condemning the Opinions and Reasonings of the greatest Part of the World in all Ages. All or most of the Sects of Philosophers in Greece and Rome held Fate or Necessity as the several Sects amongst the Jews did, except the Essenes, a very small Sect indeed, not exceeding few thousands. The Mahometans thro' the World hold Predestination; the Calvinists and some other Protestant Sects hold it now. (p. 181, 182.)

Here Cato discovers the whole Weakness on which his Notion is founded; he had either heard or read of the Words *Fate* and *Necessity*, without at all knowing what they mean; and supposing them (without any Consideration at all of the Matter) to have been always apply'd to Men's *Actions*, and to be understood to be the efficient Causes of them, seems to have built his Scheme of *Necessity* on this Imagination, without enquiring into the Reason of Things, or the real Sentiments of any Sects of Philosophy whatsoever.

In order therefore to undeceive and convince the Reader of this fundamental Error, which, I hope, *Ignorance* and not *Design* had led our Author into: I will briefly (besides what has been already observ'd on this Head above) shew him,

First;

First; Directly and distinctly, that the most celebrated Philosophers of all Sects (even the Stoics themselves) both amongst Heathens and Jews, as well as Christians, have ever held and maintain'd, both that God himself is a *Free-agent*, and that Men's *Actions* are in their own Power, and that they act with *Will* and *Choice*.

Secondly; I will shew him what the antient Philosophers meant by *Fate*; and that they thought it consistent with the *Freedom* of humane *Actions*.

First, That God is a *Free-agent*, I observed above (p. 16) was the Opinion of the learned Stoic *Seneca* amongst the *Romans*: And *Epictetus* himself plainly was of the same Opinion: *Jupiter* is represented speaking thus to him, viz.

“ * I have given to Thee a Part of myself,
“ viz. the Power of *desiring* and *rejecting*, of
“ *choosing* and *refusing*; and in short the Power of
“ making a right use of Objects.

And he had observed a little before, “ That
“ the Gods, as was fit, had † put alone into our
“ Power.

* Ἐδωκα μὲν σοι μέρος τι ἡμέτερον, τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην τῶν ὀρεκτικῶν τε καὶ ἀφορμητικῶν, καὶ ὀρεκτικὴν τε καὶ ἐκκλητικὴν, καὶ ἀπλῶς τῆς χρησικῆς ταῖς φαντασίαις. Arrian. Epict. lib. 1. p. 84.

† Ὡς περ ἢ ἡ ἀξίον, τὸ κράτιστον πάντων καὶ κυριῶν, οἱ
Θεοί

“ Power the right use of Objects, which is the
 “ most excellent Endowment, and that which
 “ governs every Thing besides.

Philo, the learned Jew, says, that * God is
 an active, not a passive, Being. And again;
 “ † That the Soul of Man alone, receiving from
 “ God the Power of voluntary Motion (or Ex-
 “ ertion) and being in this Respect made in the
 “ *Likeness* of him, is set at Liberty, as far as
 “ possible, from the grievous Tyranny of Ne-
 “ cessity.

And indeed the Notion of God being a *Free-
 agent*, and doing all Things according to his
Will, was so universally receiv'd among all Sects
 of Philosophers, that I do not find that even
 those few (for they were indeed but a few, and
 those chiefly *Astrologers* and *Genealogists*) who did
 hold the *Necessity* of humane Actions, did main-
 tain, that the Actions of God were *necessary*.

The frequent Expressions, both amongst *Po-
 ets* and *Philosophers*, that *Jupiter* and the *Gods*
 were subject to *Fate*, and their stiling God
 sometimes *Necessity*, mean quite a different Thing

Θεοὶ μόνον ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐποίησαν τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν ὀρθὴν ταῖς φαντασίαις.
 Ibid.

* Δραστήριον ὃ τὸ ὄντως ὄν, ἔ πάχον ἀναγκαίως εἶναι. p. 184.

† Μόνη ὃ ἡ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ δοξαμένη (lege δεξαμένη) παρὰ Θεῶν
 τὴν ἐνέσιον κίνησιν, καὶ κατὰ τῆτο ὁμοιωθεῖσα αὐτῷ χαλεπῆς καὶ
 ἀργαλειωτάτης διοποιῆς τῆς ἀνάγκης, ὡς οἶόν τε, ἐλευθερωθεῖσα, &c.
 Lib. quod Deus fit immutab. p. 300.

from

from God being a *necessary* Agent, or the Effects of his Power being the *necessary* Results of his Nature (as I shall prove presently.) Whence I proceed to shew, that the Doctrine of the *Freedom* of humane Actions was the general receiv'd Opinion of the Philosophers of all Ages.

A. Gellius, speaking of the *Freedom* of humane Actions, observes, “ * That *Homer*, the wisest and most antient Poet, says ;

“ O! how do mortal Men accuse us Gods ?

“ They say their Evils all proceed from us :

“ But they, not *Fate*, bring Mischief on themselves

“ Thro’ their own voluntary Wickedness.

And * *Diogenianus* the *Peripatetic*, shows from this Passage, that *Homer* did not hold the Notion of the *Necessity* of humane Actions, and that his Expressions about *Fate*, meant quite another Thing.

* *Primus autem Homerus sapientissimus & antiquissimus Poetarum dixit in hisce versibus ;*

ὦ πόποι οἷον δὴ νῦν θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται.

Ἐξ ἡμῶν γὰρ φασὶ κακὰ ἔμμεναι οἱ ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ

Σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μῦθον ἄλγε, ἔχουσιν.

† *Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. c. 8.*

And *Lucian* in the Person of *Triephton* sheweth that *Homer* taught a *conditional* Fate only; which varied according to the different Nature of Men's Actions. To *Critias*, who had asserted from *Homer* the Notion of *absolute* Fate, *Triephton* replies; “ * How then does this same “ Poet, good *Critias*, make Fate of a twofold “ and ambiguous Nature, *viz.* That *one* Event “ befalls a Man's doing *one* Action, and *another* “ Event his doing *another* ?” Of which he produces Instances out of *Homer*.

That the ancient *Pythagoreans* were Maintainers of the *Freedom* of humane Actions has been shewn above (p. 104.) and may be farther concluded from their known Agreement with the *Platonists* afterwards, who, as I shall prove, were zealous Assertors of *Free-will*.

Balbus, the *Stoic*, in *Cicero* says; “ † Let us “ hear *Plato*, a *God*, as it were, of Philosophers; “ who teacheth that there are two sorts of “ *Motion*, one that is properly *our own*, another “ that is *external*; but that which *moves itself* by

* Καὶ πῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ποιητὴς, ὃ καλεῖ Κριτία, διττὴν ἐπιλέγει τὴν εἰμαρμένην καὶ ἀμφίβολον, ὡς τὸ ἢ μὲν τι πράττει τοῖς δὲ τέλει συγκύρσαι. τοῖον ἢ ποιῶσιν ἑτέρω τέλει ἐντυχῆν; In *Philopat.* p. 1123.

† Audiamus Platonem quasi quendam Deum Philosophorum: cui duos placet esse Motus, unum, *sumus*; alterum, *externum*: esse autem divinius quod ipsum *ex se sua sponte moveatur*,

“ *by its own Choice*, is of a more divine Nature,
 “ than that which is impelled by an *external*
 “ *Force*. This *Self-motion* he placeth in the
 “ *Mind* only, from which he thinks the *Be-*
 “ *ginning of Motion* is derived.” This Testimo-
 ny of *Plato's* Opinion is not only most clear and
 strong in itself, but is more remarkable, as shew-
 ing at the same Time the Sense of the *Stoics* to
 agree with it, as I shall distinctly shew pre-
 sently.

Plutarch in like manner tells us, that *Plato*
 “ * Demonstrated that the Soul is an intelligent
 “ Substance endued with *Self-motion*.” Again;
 “ † That it is always a *Self-moving* Being, and
 “ the Fountain and Beginner of Motion.

Xenocrates, *Plato's* Scholar, “ || Taught, that
 “ the Substance of the Soul was a *Self-moving*
 “ Principle.

The famous *Platonic Hierocles* says; “ ** The
 “ Action of humane Minds proceeds from a *free*

veatur, quam quod pulsu agitetur alieno. Hunc autem motum
 in solis animis esse ponit, ab hisque principium motus esse
 ductum putat. *De Nat. Deo. Lib. 2.*

* Ψυχὴν εἶναι νοητὴν ἀπεφύρατο ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινητὴν *De Placit.*
Philos. lib. 4. c. 2.

† Ὁ Πλάτων τὴν ψυχὴν προσεῖπεν φύσιν αὐτοκίνητον αἰεὶ καὶ κινή-
 σιαις πηγὴν καὶ ἀρχήν. *Idem de Anim. Procreat. p. 1013.*

|| Ξενοκράτης τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν εἶσιν, ἀριθμὸν αὐτὸν ὑφ' ἑαυτῆς κινέ-
 μενον ἀποφηνάμενος. *Ibid. p. 1012.*

** Ἀνδραπέταν ὃ ψυχῶν ἀίεργια ἢ αὐτοκίνητος προαίρεσις καὶ τὰ
 λεγόμενα ἐφ' ἡμῶν. *De Fat. p. 28.*

“ *Self-moving Principle* ; and is that which is
 “ properly said to be *in our own Power*.

Again ; “ * Our Nature is *rational*, and there-
 “ fore is endued with a Power of *Deliberation*,
 “ and is led either to good or evil Counsels by
 “ its own *free Choice*.

And that *Plato* and his Followers constantly maintained the *voluntary Motion* or *Exertion* of the Soul, and the *Freedom* of humane Actions is so indisputable and well known to all who are vers'd in the antient Gentile Theology, that I need not cite more Testimonies from Writers of this Sort : And, if any has the least Doubt in this Point, he may find abundant Satisfaction in † *Plotinus* and ‖ *Chalcidius*, &c.

Leucippus, *Democritus* and *Empedocles*, indeed the Founders of the *Epicurean* or *Atomical* System, *Heraclitus*, the Predecessor of the *Stoics*, and some others (whose Notions shall be distinctly considered hereafter) held *Fate* in the Sense of *Necessity*, as ‡ *Cicero* informs us, and made
 the

* Λογικῆς ἣ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἔσσης καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου βουλευτικῆς. οἰκεία
 ὅ προαίρεσις πρὸς τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς βελύειν προσαγομένης. In Car.
 Pyth. p. 162.

† Ennead. 3. de Fato & Provid. Lib. 1. 2, 3.

‖ In Plat. Tim. c. 7. Fabric. vol. 2.

‡ Ac mihi quidem videtur cum duæ sententiæ fuissent veterum Philosophorum, una eorum qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri, ut id fatum vim *Necessitatis* afferret, in qua sententiâ *Democritus*,

the Motion and Exertion of the Mind subject to it. But yet *Epicurus* and his Followers, and the most eminent of the *Stoical* Sect also rejected the Notion of *Necessity*, and held the *Motions* and *Actions* of Men's Minds to be *voluntary* and *free*.

“ * *Epicurus* taught that there might be a
“ *voluntary* Motion (or Exertion) of the Mind.

Again; “ † *Epicurus* wrought and laboured the
“ Point to deliver the *voluntary* Agency of the
“ Mind from the eternal (necessary) Motion (of
“ his Atoms) that Wickedness might not be
“ left *unblameable*.

Again; “ † *Epicurus* taught that *our Power* of
“ *Action* was uncontrollable, the Consequence
“ of which was, that some Things were *blame-*
“ *able* and other Things *commendable*.

mocritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Aristoteles fuit: altera eorum quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum *motus voluntarii*.
Lib. de Fat, p. 359.

* Doceret (*Epicurus*) esse posse quendam animi motum voluntarium. Ibid. p. 352.

‡ Ὅ μ' Ἐπίκουρος ὁ μωσγάπως ἐρέσεται καὶ φιλοτεχνῇ τῆς αἰδέας κινήσεως μηχανάμενος ἐλευθεῖσθαι καὶ ἀπολῦσαι τὸ ἐκείσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς μὴ καταλιπεῖν ἀνέγκλητον τὴν κακίαν. Plat. de Stoic. Repug. p. 1050.

† Τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀδύσποτον, ὃ καὶ τὸ μαιμῶν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολυθεῖν πέφυκεν. Apud. Diog. Laert. lib. 10, p. 659.

Lastly;

Lastly; the *Epicurean* Notion of *Liberty* is very elegantly describ'd by || *Lucretius*.

The antient *Stoics* also maintained the Freedom of humane Actions.

Zeno, the Father of the *Stoics* (as *Cicero* calls him) in his Letter to King *Antigonus* tells him;
 “ * It is manifest that you are not only by Nature inclin'd to Greatness of Mind, but by
 “ Choice also.

Again; † That which is good is *eligible*, as
 “ being that which is most worthy to be *chosen*.

It hath been already prov'd p. 104 — 108, and will be farther shewn hereafter that *Zeno's* famous Scholar *Chrysippus* professed that humane Actions were in Men's own Power; whence it

|| Nec simile 'st, ut cum impulsus procedimus ictu,
 Viribus alterius magnis, magnoque coactu.

Nam tum materiam totius corporis omnem
 Perspicuum 'st nobis invitis ire, rapique,
 Donicum eam refrenavit per membra *Voluntas*.

Jamne vides igitur, quanquam vis extima multos
 Pellit & invitos cogit procedere sæpe,

Præcipiteisque rapit; tamen esse in pectore nostra
 Quiddam quod contra pugnare, obstareque possit:

Quoius ad *arbitrium* quoque copia materiali
 Cogitur interdum flecti per membra, per artus:

Et projecta refrenantur, retroque residit?

De Rer. Nat. lib. 2.

* Φανερός εἴ ἐ μένον φύσει πρὸς εὐγενείαν κλίνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ προαιρέσει. *Diog. Laert. lib. 7. p. 370.*

† Αἰετὸν ὅ (τὸ ἀγαθόν) ὅτι τοιαῦτόν ἐστιν, ὥς ἐν λόγῳ αὐτὸ αἰρεῖται. *Ibid. p. 426.*

appears

appears that the learned Dr. Cudworth* is mistaken, when he says, that *the antient Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus, asserted that God acted necessarily in the general Frame of Things in the World; from whence, by a Series of Causes (they thought) doth unavoidably result whatsoever is done in it. Which Fate is a Concatenation of Causes, all in themselves necessary.*

For which Opinion concerning these two most eminent *Stoics* the learned *Doctor* produceth not the least Evidence. That which deceived him, and hath also deceived others both *antients* (as *Cicero* and *Gellius* observe) and *moderns*; is their Notion of a Series and Concatenation of Causes; which Causes, tho' they were supposed *necessarily* to produce each other, yet they were not supposed to proceed *necessarily* from God, the *original* and *first Cause*, but to be derived from the perfect *Wisdom* of his Nature, and his *Will*, as *Seneca*, the *Stoic*, has informed us: And were not thought to be the *efficient Causes* of humane Actions, (which they expressly exempted from the Coercion of them) but were only understood to be *Motives* or *secondary Causes*; whilst they placed the *principal* and *efficient Cause* of Action within the Mind itself: So that the *Necessity* of this *Stoical Chain* of Causes was only supposed to operate in the Production

* Intel. Syst. p. 4.

of external providential Events consequential to Men's Actions, which were taught to be *voluntary* and in their own Power. And it plainly appears from the Words of *Balbus*, the *Stoic*, alledg'd above (p. 130.) out of *Cicero*, that the *antient Stoics* agreed with the *Platonics* in asserting the *free* and *voluntary* Motion, Exertion or Agency of the humane Mind. To proceed therefore;

The great *Stoic*, Philosopher, and Emperor *Marcus Antoninus* says; “ * God hath put it
“ altogether in *Man's Power* not to fall into real
“ Evils.” (He means moral Evil or Sin.)

Again; he says; “ † The governing Principle of the Soul is that which moves and
“ turns itself, and makes itself what it *wills* to
“ be, and makes also every Event which be-
“ falls it appear to itself to be what it *wills*
“ to be.

Again; “ || Whatsoever are the *Actions* of
“ the Soul, are all in its *own Power*.

* Τοῖς μὲν κατ' ἀληθείαν κακοῖς, ἵνα μὴ περιπίπτῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐπ' αὐτῶν τὸ πᾶν ἔθεντο (Θεοί.) De Scip. lib. 2. Sect. 2.

† Τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ἐστὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸ ἐγείρον, καὶ τρέπον, καὶ ποιεῖν μὲν ἑαυτὸ οἷον ἂν καὶ θέλῃ ποιεῖν ἢ ἑαυτῷ φαίνοσθαι πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον οἷον αὐτὸ θέλει. Lib. 6. Sect. 8.

|| Ὅσα αὐτῆς (ψυχῆς) ἐστὶν ἐνεργήματα, ταῦτα πάντα ἐπ' αὐτῇ ἐστίν. Ibid. Sect. 32.

Again; “ † The Good and Evil of a rational
 “ and political Creature, consists not in *Passion*
 “ but in *Action*: As neither does his *Virtue* and
 “ *Vice* consist in *Passion* but in *Action*.

Again; “ * It is the Property of the rational
 “ Soul to make itself such as it *wills* to be.

Once more; “ † A Man ought to come to
 “ the End of his Life with Purity, Quietness
 “ and *Readiness*, submitting to his Fate without
 “ *Compulsion*.

Nothing is more noted in ancient Philosophy
 than that famous Aphorism of the *Stoic Epictetus*,
 whereby he distinguisheth Things into two sorts,
 viz. “ || Those that are in our Power, and those
 “ that are not in our Power. The Things in our
 “ Power are our Opinions, Appetites, Desires,
 “ Aversions, and, in one Word, all our Actions.
 “ But the Things not in our Power are the Body,
 “ Possessions, Reputation, Authority, and, in one
 “ Word, whatsoever are not our own Actions.

‡ Οὐκ ἐν Πίσμῃ, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειᾳ, τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ πολιτικοῦ, ζῶν
 καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ἐν δὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειᾳ ἐστὶν.
 Ibid. lib. 9. sect. 16.

* Τὰ ἴδια τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, ὅποια αὐτὸς βούλεται
 ποιεῖν. Lib. 2. §. 1.

† Ἐφ' ὃ (τὸ τέλος τοῦ βίου) δι' ἐλευθέρου καὶ ἀνὰ νόμον, ἀποφασίζοντες
 ἀβιάσας τῇ αὐτοῦ μοίρᾳ συμφοροσμένον. Lib. 3. in fin.

|| Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν εἰναι ἐφ' ἡμῶν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν: ἐφ' ἡμῶν αἱ
 ὑπόληψις, ὁρμή, ὁρεῖς, ἐκλήσεις, καὶ ἐν λόγῳ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐργάζομεθα
 ἐκ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ὅ τοι σῶμα, ἡ κτῆσις, δόξαι, ἀρχαί, καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, ὅσα
 οὐκ ἡμεῖς ἐργάζομεθα. Eucherid. c. 1.

On which Aphorism of *Epictetus*, *Simplicius* comments thus; viz. " || Those Things, he saith, are in our own Power which we can command, and over which we have Power: And those Things we say are in every one's Power which he receives not from another, and which another cannot hinder: Such are the internal Motions (or Exertions) of the Soul proceeding from the Determination and Choice of the Soul itself. For the Will cannot be mov'd by an external Cause: and tho' the Thing chosen be an external Object, yet the Choice itself, and the Exertion of the Soul towards the Thing chosen, is internal.

Again; " * These are properly our own Actions, as being perform'd by our own free Choice alone ——— to form our Opinions and Desires are our own proper Actions, and in our

|| Ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐκείνα λέγει, ὧν κύριοί ἐσμεν, καὶ ὧν τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχομεν ταῦτα καὶ ἐκ' αὐτῶν ἐκείνῳ λέγομεν, ἃ μὴ παρ' ἄλλου ἔχει, μηδὲ ὑπ' ἄλλου τινὸς ἐμποδιζοῦσθαι δύναται. ταῦτα δὲ εἰς τὰ κίνηματα τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ ἐνδοθεν ὑπ' αὐτῆς κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς κρείον καὶ αἰρεσὶν γινόμενα οὐ ὅδ' δυνατὸν ἔξω κινῆσθαι τὴν αἰρεσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἰρετὸν ἔξωθεν ἢ, ἡ αἰρεσις αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ τῇ αἰρετῷ κίνησις ἐνδοθεν εἰσι.

Comment. in *Epict.* p. 7.

* Οἰκεία ἢ ἡμῶν ἔργα εἰς ταῦτα, ὡς ὅφ' ἡμῶν μόνων κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰρεσιν ἐνεργούμενα ——— το ὅ υπολαμβάνειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν εἰν ἴδια ἔργα ἐν τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ κείμενα. διὸ καὶ

“ own Power; wherefore the Good and Evil that
 “ we do are in our own Power.

And the Expression [$\tau\acute{o}$ ἐφ' ἡμῶν] the internal
 Agency of the Mind, or Power of Action, so much
 noted and used by ancient Philosophers of all
 sorts, is thus interpreted by the learned Alexander
 Aphrodisius, viz. “ * All who are not prejudic'd
 “ in any particular Opinion understand the Ex-
 “ pression, viz. The Power of acting that is in
 “ us, to mean our having a Power to act or not
 “ to act, without being impell'd by any external
 “ Causes; or carried whithersoever they drive us.
 “ And this Choice is the proper Action of Men.
 “ For Choice is the Exertion (of the Mind) with
 “ Desire towards that to which we were before
 “ deliberately inclin'd. Wherefore there is no
 “ Choice concerning those Things that are neces-
 “ sary; nor about those Things, which, altho'
 “ not necessary, are not yet done by ourselves;
 “ nor even in respect of all Things which are
 “ done by ourselves, but in those Things only
 “ which

*Scito of Necessity: But peripatetic Cicero was certainly
 ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἐστίν. Ibid. 28, 29.*

* Τοῦτο ὅ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, πάντες ὅσοι μὴ θεοὶ τινὶ παρῶσιν, πα-
 ραλήφουσιν εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς μὲν καὶ τοῦ πράττειν καὶ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν
 κύριοι, οὐκ ἐπόμενοι τισὶν ἔχουσιν ἡμᾶς παρῶσιν αἰτίαις, οὐδὲ ἐπιδόου-
 λαις, ἢ ἐκείνῃ αἰτίᾳ, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 περὶ ταῦτα. ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ προκρίνειν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς μὴ ὁρέεσθαι ὁρμήν,
 προαίρεσις. διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναγκάσις γινόμεναις ἡ προαίρεσις, ὅτε ἐπὶ
 τοῖς μὴ ἀναγκάσις μὲν, εἰ μὴ δι' ἡμῶν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν πάσι τοῖς δι'
 ἡμῶν,

“ which are so done *by ourselves*, that it is in our
“ Power either to do them or do them not.”

Carneades, the eminent Scholar of the *Stoic*
Chrysippus, and the Founder of the *Academical*
Sect, was a great Assertor of the Freedom of
humane Actions, as * *Cicero* tells us at large; in
so much that he would not allow that Things
future, which depended on humane Actions,
could be † *foreknown*. And that *Cicero* himself
was a Defender of the Doctrine of *Liberty*, has
been shewn above (p. 108.) and his Book
concerning *Fate* is an ample Proof of it, and is
highly deserving the Perusal of all those who fa-
vour or maintain the Scheme of the *Necessity* of
humane Actions.

Nothing remains to complete the Proof of
the *Liberty* of humane Actions, being the gene-
ral and receiv'd Opinion of all Sects of antient
Gentile Philosophers, but the Consideration of
the *Aristotelic* Doctrine in this Point.

Cicero, as hath been observ'd above (p. 133.)
reckons *Aristotle* amongst those who held that hu-
mane Actions were subject to *Fate*, taken in the
Sense of *Necessity*: But herein *Cicero* was certainly
mistaken, for *Plutarch* in his Treatise of the Opi-

ημῶν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν τοῖς γινόμενοις δι' ἡμῶν, ἀν' ἡμῶν τοῦ πράττειν,
καὶ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν κίρνοι. Lib. de Fat. p. 59, 60.

* De Fato, p. 352. — 363.

† Ibid. p. 356.

nions of the antient Philosophers remarks no such Thing concerning *Aristotle*, tho' he does observe that *Democritus* and *Heraclitus* (to whom he adds *Parmenides*) were of that Opinion which *Cicero* ascribes to them; and had *Aristotle*, who was so much more eminent than the others, been of the same Opinion, he could hardly have neglected to have taken notice of it.

But farther * *Hierocles*, expressly says that *Aristotle's* Philosophy agreed with *Plato's*, and that the most learned *Anaximandrus*, who perfectly understood the Philosophy of both of them, shew'd that they agreed together.

This Concurrence of the *Platonic* and *Aristotelian* Philosophy he again insists on, and speaks with † Contempt of those who pretended they disagreed: and in particular declares that they were of the same Opinion in the Notion of *Fate*, and that he himself agreed with them. “ || That it
“ was not the senseless *Necessity* of the *Fortune-*
“ *tellers*; nor the *Stoical* Compulsion — but
“ that it was the judicial Operation of the divine
“ Power, effecting Events according to the Laws
“ of

* *De Provid.* p. 42.

† *Ibid.* p. 46.

|| Οὐκ ἄλλαν νομίζειν αὐτὸν εἰμαρμένην ἀλλ' ἢ Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ Πλάτωνα νομίζειν ἰσχυροῦς. τὴν τε γὰρ τῶν γενεθλιαλῶν ἀνάγκησιν ἀπέχεται οὐδ' ἄλλως προσέταται, οὐδὲ τῇ Στοικῇ βίαν — ἐκείνη γ' — ἢ τις τῶν ἐκβαλλόντων κατὰ τὸν τῆς προνοίας Θεοῦ διὰ τὴν δικαιοσύνην τοῦ

“ of Providence, and determining the Order and
 “ Series of our Circumstances in the World ac-
 “ cording to the *free Purposes* of our *voluntary*
 “ *Actions*.

And *Aristotle* himself expressly asserts and ex-
 plains at large the *Freedom of humane Actions*. He
 lays the Foundation of * *Praise* and *Dispraise* in
 Men's *voluntary Actions*. He proves *Freedom*
 from † *Deliberation* and *Desire*, which he makes
 to be the same with *Choice*. He expressly de-
 clareth that our *Actions* are ‡ *voluntary* and by
Choice; that the Practice of *Vertue* and *Vice*
 is in our own *Power*: And that this is evidently
 the Opinion not only of all *private Persons*, but

Δίει ὑπάρχει ἐνέργεια, τάξει καὶ εἰρημῇ πρὸς τὰς προαιρετικὰς ὑποβί-
 σαις τῶν αὐτεξουσίῳ ἔργων ἐπανορθωμένη τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς. Apud Phot.
 Bibliot. p. 552.

* Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάνθ' τε καὶ πράξεις ἔστι· καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐκ-
 σοῖς ἐπαυρῶν καὶ ψόγων γινόμενων, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀκακοῖς, εὐφροσύνης, &c.
 Ethic. lib. 3. c. 1.

† Βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό. — τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ
 προκρίβειν, προαιρετὸν ἐστὶ. — ὅτ' δὲ τὸ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ, βουλευτοῦ,
 ὁρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν· καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἀν' εἰς βουλευτικὴ ὁρεξις τῶν ἐφ'
 ἡμῶν, ἐκ τοῦ βουλευτικοῦ γὰρ κελαιντὲς ὁρεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν ἐλευσίαν.
 Ibid. c. 5. See above p. 78.

‡ Ὅτ' δὲ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους· βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν
 τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἰν' ἀν
 καὶ ἐκείνοι· αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι, περὶ ταῦτα. ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὴ καὶ
 ἡ ἀρετὴ ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. — τοῖς τοῖς δ' ἔοικε μαρτυ-
 ρεῖα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὅφ' ἐκάστων, καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν. κοινά· ἔστι
 γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τὰς δρῶντας μοχθηρὰ ὅσοι μὴ βία, ἢ δὲ ἀννοίαν
 καὶ μὴ αὐτοὶ αἰτίαι, τὰς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν. Ibid.
 c. 7. See above 57.

of Legislators themselves, who punish those who commit Evil, if they do it not thro' Compulsion or voluntary Ignorance; and reward those who do well. And the learned *Alexander Aphrodisius* and *Ammonius Hermias* have wrote each a Treatise to shew the Agreement of *Aristotle* with the *Platonic* Notion of *Fate* and humane *Liberty*.

Thus it appears (and I might add many more Testimonies to the same Purpose) that the most antient celebrated Philosophers of all Sects, even the *Stoics* themselves, unanimously taught the *Freedom* of humane Actions. And the principal Maintainers of absolute *Fate* or *Necessity* were the *Astrologers* and *Fortune-tellers* amongst the *Stoics*, who were condemned and despised by the truly learned in Philosophy of all Sects. And from hence I proceed to shew the Notion of the antient *Jews*.

Philo says, besides what has been already before-mentioned, (p. 96, 128.) “ * The Author
“ of the Soul, who created it, hath given to
“ it alone the Privilege of *Freedom*, and hath
“ taken from it the Chains of *Necessity*, and set
“ it at *Liberty*; and hath endow'd it with the
“ Power of *Will*, to be a most suitable and pe-
“ culiar

* Μόνῃ δ' αὐτῇ (scilicet ψυχῇ) ὁ γενήσας πατὴρ ἐλευθερίας
ἡξίωσε καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἀνείς δισμά, ἄφειτοι εἴασε, δωρηάμενος
αὐτῇ τῇ περικοπιδάτῃ καὶ οἰκίῃ κλήματι αὐτῇ (lege αὐτῇ) τοῦ
ἐκυσίου

“ culiar Property of its own, which it was capable of receiving.

And with respect to the several *Sects* amongst the *Jews*, who all (*Cato* affirms) except the *Essenes*, held *Fate* or *Necessity*; *Josephus*, on the contrary informs us, that of the three *Sects*, the *Pharisees*, the *Sadduces* and the *Essenes*; “ * The *Pharisees* ascribe some, not all Things to *Fate*; “ but say that some Things are in our Power, “ and may be or may not be.

Again; “ † The *Pharisees*, tho’ they ascribe “ all Things (all Events) to *Fate*, do not yet “ deny the free Exertion of the humane *Will*; “ supposing God to have so constituted Things, “ that Men advance in *Vertue* or *Vice*, partly “ by his Influence, and partly by their own “ Will.

ἐκείνη μοῦσαν ἢ ἰδίωτο δέξασθαι. Quod Deus sit immutab.
p. 300.

* Οἱ μὲν ἢ Φαρισαῖοι τινὰ καὶ οὐ πάντα τῆς ἐπιμετρίας εἶναι λέγουσιν ἔργον. τινὰ δ’ ἐφ’ ἑαυταῖς ὑπάρχειν, συμβῆναι τε καὶ οὐ γίνεσθαι. Judaic. antiq. lib. 13. c. 9. p. 442.

† Πράσσειν ἐπιμετρήντα πάντα ἀξιοῦντες (Φαρισαῖοι) ὅτι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ βυλόμενον τῆς ἐπ’ αὐτῆς (forte legendo αὐτῷ) ὁρμῆς ἀφαιροῦνται. δοκῶσαν (lege δοκῶσαντες) τῷ θεῷ κατὰ γένεσιν, καὶ τῷ ἰκέειν (forte legendo ἰκέειν) βουλευτηρίῳ, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διδόναντι προχαρῶν (forte προχαρῶν) μὴ ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας. Antiq. Judaic. lib. 18. c. 2.

And

And this Notion of the *Pharisees* he more clearly explains elsewhere, viz. “ || The *Pharisees* ascribe all Things to Fate and God. But to do right or not, is (they teach) for the most part in Men’s Power: But that Fate also assists them in every Thing.

Whence their real Notion appears plainly to have been that *some Things*, i. e. outward Events which happen to Men proceeded from Fate or the divine Providence; but that Men’s Actions, their doing Right or Wrong, was in their own Power; yet so as Fate, or providential second Causes operated with them, concurring to their Actions, either as *Motives*, which *Chrysippus* in *Cicero* call’d (*adjuvantes Cause*) *assistent Causes*; or by their Influence; Providence ordering (they thought) external Events to befall them, according to their Actions. That this was the true Opinion of the *Pharisees*, and that they did not think Men’s Actions were subject to any absolute Fate or Necessity, appears further from the Notion of the *Sadducees*, who, he says, “ * Wholly deny’d Fate, asserting there was no such Thing; “ and

|| Φαρισαῖοι μὴ ——— ἐμπαρμένη τε καὶ διὰ προέκτατον πάλιν. καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν τὰ δίκαια, καὶ μὴ, κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κινῆσαι. Βούλει δὲ εἰς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὴν ἐμπαρμένην. De Bel. Jud. lib. 2. c. 12. p. 788.

† Σαδδουκαῖοι τὴν μὴ ἐμπαρμένην ἀνέκουντο, αἰδῶντες αἰνῶντα ἀξιώματα.

“ and that it was not the Cause of any Events
 “ unto Men; and that all Things were *in our*
 “ *own Power*, so that we ourselves were the
 “ Causes of our own Happiness; and that Evils
 “ befell us thro’ our own Folly.” To which he
 adds,

“ * It was their Opinion that God neither did
 “ any Evil or regarded any; but they say that
 “ Good and Evil is propos’d to Men’s *Choice*,
 “ and they indifferently befall every one accord-
 “ ing to the Conduct of his own *Will*.” So
 that the *Sadducees* not only attributed all Men’s
Actions to their *Will* and *Choice*; but suppos’d
 also that their good or bad Fortune in the World,
 their outward Happiness or Misery, was not di-
 rected by *Fate* or *Providence* at all, as the *Phari-*
sees held, but was merely the Consequence of
 their own *voluntary Doings*.

Thus it is prov’d, that the two great and nu-
 merous Sects amongst the *Jews* agreed in the
 Opinion of the *Freedom* of humane Actions;
 and just on the direct contrary to *Cato’s Relati-*

αἰχιοῦντες. ἔτι κατ’ αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τέλος λαμβάνειν ἅπαντα ἢ
 ἐφ’ ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς πίνονται. ὡς καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς γι-
 νομένους, καὶ τὰ χεῖρα ὧν ἡμετέραι ἀβουλίας λαμβάνοντες. *Antiq. Jud. lib. 13. c. 9. p. 442.*

* *Σαδδουκαῖοι* — ὁ Θεὸς ἔχει τὸ δρᾶν τι κακὸν, ἢ ἐφεῶν πί-
 νονται φασὶ ἢ ἐφ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκλογῇ, τότε καλὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν προ-
 κινᾶται, καὶ τὸ κατὰ γνώμην ἐκαστοῦ τῶν ἐκείνων προσιεῖται. *De*
Bel. Jud. lib. 2. c. 12. p. 788.

on of the Matter, it can only be alledged, that the small Sect of the *Essenes*, not much above four thousand in Number, as * *Philo* and *Josephus* tell us, held the Opinion of *Fate* or *Necessity* in *Cato's* Sense; but neither does that at all certainly appear; for *Josephus* only says of them;

“ † The Sect of the *Essenes* make *Fate* to be the Director of all Things; and teach that nothing happens unto Men, but by the Decrees of it.

In which Words he does not say that they ascrib'd humane *Actions* to the over-ruling Power of *Fate*, or to *Necessity*; but only all outward *Events* which beset Mankind.

In which respect *Philo* explains their Notion to be; “ ‡ That they thought God was the Author of all good Things, but of nothing that is evil.” So that their Opinion seems not to have been much different from that of the *Pharisees*: And they did not deny the Freedom of Men's Actions, but only ascrib'd all external Events, especially all good Things that beset them, to *Fate*, God, or divine Providence.

* Παλῶν ὑπὲρ τετρακισχίλις. p. 876. Ἄνδρες ὑπὲρ τετρακισχίλιοι τ' ἀριθμὸν ὄντες. *Joseph. Antiq. Jud. lib. 18.*

† Τὸ τῶν Ἑσσωτῶν γένος πάντων τὴν εἰρημνίαν κυρία λατρεύεται, καὶ μηδὲν δὲ μὴ κατ' ἐκείνης ψῆφον ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντᾷ. *Antiq. Jud. lib. 13. c. 9. p. 442.*

‡ Τὸ πάντων μὲν ἀγαθῶν αἰτία, κακῶν δὲ μηδανὸς νομίζουσιν εἶναι τὸν θεόν. (lege vel τὸ θεὸν vel τὸ θεῖον.) p. 877.

And accordingly * *Josephus* tells us, that they agreed in Opinion with the *Pharisees* in all other Points, excepting what he had mentioned, viz. their not sacrificing in the Temple, and having a particular and more reclusive way of living, and possessing all Things in common with each other.

Lastly; Nothing can be more unreasonable than *Cato's* pretending that the Doctrine of *humane Liberty* has no *Foundation in Scripture*; when, on the contrary, nothing can be more clear and certain, than that the whole *Scriptures*, both of the old and new Testament, are built upon, and presuppose, as well as expressly teach, that Men's Actions are in *their own Power*, and the Result of their *Will* and *Choice*. That God has propos'd to their *Choice*, *Good* and *Evil*, *Life* and *Death*, *Happiness* and *Misery*; and has not only commanded them to *choose* the one, and *refuse* the other, but has made all his Promises and Threatnings † *conditional*; which would be absurd,

* Τα μὲν λοιπὰ πάντα γνώμη τῶν Φαρισαίων ὁμολογεῖται. Jud. Antiq. lib. 18. c. 2.

† Hebræis quoque consilium datum est a Deo cum prædictione rerum futurarum, in istum modum: Si præceptis meis parebitis, bona terrarum omnia penes vos erunt. Lac itaque & mellisflui fluctus non deerunt. Si contemseritis, poenarum imminentium seriem divina vox prosecuta est. Quippe quod esset dubium id quod erat positum in hominis potestate, parere ve contemnere iusta cœlestia. Quod si optionem eorum præcederet decretum

absurd, if it was not in Men's Power to perform or not perform the *Conditions* proposed to them. And if *Cato* had had any regard for, or had ever read the Writings of the *primitive Christians*, he must have seen and own'd, that no Doctrine was more unanimously and universally insisted on, and inculcated by them than that of *humane Liberty*: And the contrary Doctrine of the *Necessity* of humane Actions was a principal Branch of the Error of the **Valentinians*, *Marcionites*, and *Manichees*, who, in consequence of it, led most † profligate and wicked Lives.

If the Reader has a mind to know the Notion of the ancient Christians on this Subject, I would recommend to his Perusal two as learned Writers, and as well skill'd in the Philosophy of their times as any the World affords, namely *Origen* and *Eusebius*, who have treated this Argument at large, one in the first Chapter of his third Book of *Principles*; and the other in the

decretum inevitabile, *necessarioque* contemnendam esse; abundaret prædictio, abundarent etiam promissa & minæ. *Chalcid. in Plat. Tim. p. 263.*

* See Iren. contra Hæres. lib. 1. c. 7. p. 35. Tertul. contra Marc. lib. 2. c. 6. & de Anim. lib. c. 21. Orig. Philoc. c. 21. p. 54. & Huet. Origen. p. 106. August. Tom. 6. p. 24. &c.

† Iren. cont. Hæres. lib. 1. c. 6.

‡ Or Philocalia c. 21. where the Greek is extant.

sixth Book of his Præparatio Evangelica. But to alledge the Opinions of such ignorant *Enthusiasts* as the *Mahometans*, and some few rigid *Calvinists* Notion of *Predestination* (neither of which Notions are yet the same with this Author's Notion of *Necessity*, as might easily be proved, if it was any Thing to the Purpose) is below a Man of Sense in the Way of Reason and Argument.

I proceed in the next Place to shew what was the antient *philosophical* Notion of *Fate* or *Necessity*, and that it was thought to be consistent with the *Freedom of humane Actions*.

That there is such a Thing as * *Fate*, and that many Events are effected by it, was the general Opinion of all Philosophers, † *Anaxagoras* amongst the Gentiles and the ‖ *Sadducees* amongst the *Jews* only excepted, who were both of Opinion that nothing was the Effect of *Fate*, and that it was a mere *empty Name*. And as these wholly deny'd *Fate* in every Sense, so it must be

* Τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὴν εἰμαρμένην καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ γίνεσθαι τινα κατ' αὐτὴν ἰκανῶς ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων συνήθεισι πρόληψις. Alex. Aphrodis. de fato lib. p. 11.

† Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ κλαζόμενος, καὶ τοὶ τ' ἄλλοι ὃν ἐν τοῖς τὴν φυσικὴν φιλοσοφίαν φιλοσοφήσαντι οὐκ ἀπερρίμνουν, οὐκ ἀξιοπίστους ἀντιμαρτυροῦν τῇ κοινῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστι κατὰ εἰμαρμένης. λέγει γὰρ ἑστὸς γε μηδὲν τῶν γινομένων γίνεσθαι κατ' εἰμαρμένην, ἀλλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοῦτο νόμον.

‖ See above p. 146.

confessed

confessed that there were some others, who carried the Notion of it as far in the other Extreme, and taught that every Thing, all Events, and even *humane Actions* were effected by the impulsive *Necessity* of it. I shall therefore (to obviate the Cavils and Pretences of the *Fatalists*, and Assertors of the *Necessity* of humane Actions, who are apt, at random, and without having consider'd the Matter, to alledge the antient Philosophers for their Opinion) shew the Reader who those were who really held their Sentiments, and on what Reasons and Arguments their Notion of Fatality was founded; and then set forth distinctly and particularly that Notion of *Fate* or *Necessity*, which was the concurrent receiv'd Opinion of all Sects of Philosophers.

Plutarch tells us, that * *Parmenides* and *Democritus* held, " That all Things came to pass by "*Necessity*; and that this *Necessity* was *Fate*, and "*Justice* and *Providence*, and the *Maker* of the "*World*.

† *Heraclitus* was of the same Opinion. To

* Παρμενίδης ἡ Δημόκριτος πάντα κατὰ ἀνάγκην τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἡ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ Δίκη, καὶ πρόνοια, καὶ κοσμοποιόν. *De Placit. Philos.* p. 884. And *Ænomaus* chargeth *Democritus* with making the humane Mind (θελον) a Slave to *Necessity*. *Apud Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 6. c. 7.*

Ἡράκλειτος πάντα καθ' εἰμαρμένην, τὴν ἡ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀνάγκην. *Ibid.*

these

these *Cicero* joins || *Empedocles*, and, by Mistake, * *Aristotle*, as I prov'd above. It appears also from *Cicero*, that the ancient † *Diodorus* was of the same Opinion, who maintain'd that all Truths in *Futurity*, as well as those which are *actual*, are necessarily such, and cannot but be.

These are the principal Assertors of the Doctrine of absolute *Fatality* that we know of; and they who followed their Opinion, all founded the Arguments and Reasons of it in the Supposition of the Truth of the *material System*, or that nothing existed but *Body* and *Matter*, which Notion our Author himself rejects.

First; Those of the *atomical Sect*, who followed the Opinion of *Democritus*, alledg'd, that all Things, even humane Actions, were effected by the eternal † necessary Motion, and perpendicular Impulse of self-existent corporeal Atoms, by whose fortuitous Concurrence and Union all

|| De Fat. lib. p. 359.

* See above p. 140, 141.

‡ Ille (*Diodorus*) id solum fieri posse dicit, quod aut fit verum, aut futurum fit verum: & quicquid futurum fit, id dicit fieri necesse esse: & quicquid non fit futurum, id negat fieri posse. *Lib. de Fato*, p. 346. and again p. 349.

† Id (scilicet quod atomus gravitate ferretur naturali & necessaria cum ita moveretur animus, ut atomorum motu cogeretur) *Democritus* autor atomorum accipere maluit, necessitate omnia ferri, &c. *Ibid.* p. 352.

Things

Things were form'd. But this Notion is almost too ridiculous even to be mentioned, and is particularly confuted by * *Plotinus*, and, I think, is now universally exploded.

Secondly, Those amongst the *Stoics*, who adher'd to the Doctrine of *Heraclitus*, were of three several Opinions.

“ † Some derived all Things from the *first Cause* of the Universe, which they said pervaded all Things, and not only gave Motion to, but was the *efficient Cause* of every Thing, stiling it *Fate*, and the supreme Cause, and supposing it to be it self all Things, and that not only all other Things which exist, but even the inward Purposes of our Minds also proceeded from the efficient Power of it; as the Members of an Animal are not mov'd of themselves, but by that governing Principle, which is in every Animal.

This was making no Agent in the World but God only, and humane Actions to be nothing but the Operations of God in Men, actuating

* *Ennead. 3. lib. 1.*

† Οἱ ἐπὶ τὴν τῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες, ἀπ' αὐτῆς κατέγυσαν πάντα, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντων φοιτήσαντες αἰτίαι, καὶ ταύτην μόνον οὐ κινήσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιῶσαι ἕκαστα λέγοντες, εἰμαρμένην ταύτην καὶ κυριαρχίην αἰτίαι δέμενοι, αὐτὴν εἶναι τὰ πάντα· οὐ μόνον τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ἀγαθήσεις ἐν τῶν ἐκείνης εἶναι κινήματα. οἷον ζῶον μορῶν μὴ κινουμένων ἑκάστην ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἐν ᾧ τοῦ ἡγεμονεύει· ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζώων. *Plotin. Ennead. lib. 1. c. 3.*

them and every Thing else as the Soul does the Body.

And * Plotinus excellently argues against the precedent Notion, as being "an Excess of Necessity." And that in Consequence of it, "We are neither our *own* Persons nor any Action is *our own*; neither is it *we* that purpose, but our Purposes are the the Purpose of another Person; neither do we *act at all*. — But (he concludes) every individual Thing ought to be *its own self*, and our Actions and Purposes be *our own*; and every one's good and bad Actions to proceed from every one's *self*; and we ought not to ascribe the doing of Evil to the universal first Cause.

Thirdly; "Others thought that the Circumvolution of the Universe effected all Things by its Motion, and by the Positions and Appearances of the Planets and fix'd Stars with Respect

* Τὸ σφοδρὸν τὸ ἀνάγκης — ἔτι ἡμεῖς, ἡμεῖς, ἔτι ἡμεῖς οὐδὲ λογίζομεθα αὐτοὶ, ἀλλ' ἐτέρου λογισμὸς, τὰ ἡμέτερα βουλευόμεθα. οὐδὲ πράττομεν ἡμεῖς· ἀλλὰ ᾧ δέ τι καὶ ἔκαστος, ἕκαστος εἶναι, καὶ πράξεις ἡμετέρας, καὶ ἀγαθοῖς ὑπάρχειν. καὶ τὰς ἑκάστου καλὰς τε καὶ αἰχρὰς πράξεις παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἑκάστου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ παντὶ τῇ γούτ' πᾶσι αἰχρᾶν ποιῶσιν ἀναπνεύειν. Ennead. 3. lib. 1. c. 4.

† Ἄλλοι, τὴν τοῦ παντός φασιν περιέχουσαν καὶ πάντα ποιούσαν τῇ κινήσει, καὶ ταῖς πᾶσι ἀστροῖς πλασμαμένην, τε καὶ ἀστροῖς ὁμοῦ καὶ

“ Respect to each other, and, founding upon
 “ these the Art of Prognostication, would have
 “ it that every Thing came to pass thereby.

This was the astrological Notion of Fate, founded upon mere Ignorance in Astronomy and natural Philosophy, and therefore was ridicul'd by the learned Antients, as it is by all truly learned Philosophers at this Day.

Plotinus observes concerning it, “ That it is
 “ another way [*viz.* different from the *Stoics* be-
 “ fore mentioned, who made God alone or the
 “ first Cause act every Thing] of ascribing every
 “ Thing we *do*, our Purposes and Passions, our
 “ Wickedness and Appetites to the Universe
 “ (or to God :) and attributing nothing to our-
 “ selves, leaves us like Stones that are cast, and
 “ not as Men, who *act of themselves*, and from
 “ their own Nature:” Adding, “ But we
 “ ought to ascribe that which is *our own* (*viz.*
 “ our Actions) to *ourselves*; and making a Di-
 “ stinction, *viz.* that we ourselves are the *effi-*
 “ cient Cause of some Things, and that in some
 X 2 “ Things

καὶ χρηματισμαῖς πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἀπὸ τῶ ἐν τέτοιον πρόβησιν πεισμένοι,
 ἕκαστω ἐντεῦθεν γίνεσθαι ἀξιοῦσι. Ibid. cap. 2. Alex. Aphrodis. re-
 presents their Opinion in like manner. p. 103, 104.

* Οὐκ ἔστι τρεῖς τρόποι ἀπεινῶς ἀναπόδωκεν τὰ ἡμέτερον, βελῆς καὶ
 πύθη, κακίαν τε καὶ ἁρμῶς. ἡμῶν δὲ οὐδὲν διδόναι, λήθους φερομένους κατα-
 λήπτει εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἀνθρώποις, ἔχουσιν παρ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶ αὐτῶν φύσεως
 ἔργον, ἀλλὰ χρὴ διδόναι μὲ τὸ ἡμέτερον ἡμῶν, — ἀλλ' ἔργον
 καὶ

“ also we are *passive* and under the Impulse of
 “ *Necessity*, not ascribe all Things to the fore-
 “ mentioned Causes.

Fourthly; Another Notion of Fatality was
 “ founded in the Supposition of * a mutual
 “ eternal Concatenation and Chain of Causes,
 “ whereby Things posterior always follow those
 “ which are antecedent, and are resolved into them,
 “ as existing by them, and having no Existence
 “ without them; and are necessarily consequent
 “ to those which precede them: This was ano-
 “ ther way of asserting an absolute Fatality.”
 And this was the most plausible and most insisted
 on by the Maintainers of *Necessity*; and was
 grounded on the Supposition that every Motion
 was caused by an *external* Impulse of Matter,
 and that there was no internal Principle or
 Cause of Motion or Action in the Mind at all;
 which the Opposers of this Fatality prov'd there
 was by strong undeniable Evidence both of *Sense*
 and *Reason*.

νον· πῶς μὲν ἡμῖς ἐργαζόμεθα, πῶς δὲ πάρομεν ἐκ ἀνάγκης, μὴ πάν-
 τα ἐκείνοις ἀναπθέειν. Ibid. c. 5.

* Τὴν πᾶν αἰτίαν ἐπιπλοκὴν πρὸς ἄλλα, καὶ τὸν ἀνῶθεν εἰρμόν,
 καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς προτέροις αἰεὶ τὰ ὕστερα, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκ' ἐκείνων αἰτι-
 ναι δι' αὐτῶν γινόμενα, καὶ ἄνευ ἐκείνων οὐκ ἂν γινόμενα, δαλεῖν τε
 τοῖς πρὸς (lege πρὸ) αὐτῶν τὰ ὕστερα. ταῦτα εἴ τις λέγει, ἐξηραμένη
 ἕτερον τρόπον εἰσάγων φαίνεται. Ennead. 3. lib. 1. c. 2.

Plotinus's

Plotinus's Reply to the foregoing Opinion is
 “ * That it is near akin to that which makes
 “ every *Affection* and *Exertion* of ours to proceed
 “ from the Soul of the Universe. And if any
 “ one who holds this Fatality is willing still to
 “ grant that we and every one of us have a
 “ Power of *acting from ourselves*, yet neverthe-
 “ less he holds an absolute *Necessity* of all Things;
 “ and since all Things are comprehended in this
 “ Chain of Causes, every Thing must be as it is:
 “ For since all Things are contain'd in this Fate,
 “ there is nothing to hinder, or make them to
 “ be otherwise than they are. And Things being
 “ thus impelled as by one universal Cause, no-
 “ thing will be left in our Power, but to be
 “ carried wheresoever they impel us: For our
 “ *Senses* will follow these antecedent Causes, and
 “ our Desires will be form'd according to them;
 “ and so our Power of Action will be only an
 “ empty Name.” Whence, He adds, there will
 “ be

* Ἐστὶ μὲν καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ δόξα ἐγγύς ἐκείνης τῇ πᾶσαν κατὰ (lege
 καὶ) κρίσιν καὶ κίνησιν ἡμετέραν ἐκ τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς ἥκειν λε-
 γούσης. εἰ καὶ βέλτερά τις ἡμῶν καὶ ἐκάστοις χαρίζεται εἰς τὸ
 πασι ἡμῶν ποιεῖν τι. ἔχει μὲν ἔν τινι πάντως πάντων ἀνάγκη,
 καὶ πάντων ἐξημεμένων τῶν αἰτίων, ὅσα εἰσι ἕκαστον μὴ ἐ-
 νιοῦσθαι ἐδὲν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ καλύσσειν ἢ ἄλλως γένεσθαι ποιῆσον εἰς πάντα εἰληπταί,
 ἐν τῇ ἐξημεμένῃ. τοιαῦτα ὅντα ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ἐξημεμένα, ἡμῶν
 ἐδὲν καταλείπει ἢ φέρεσθαι ὅπη ἂν ἐκείνα ᾖ. αἵτε ᾧ φαντασίου τοῖς
 προσηγουμένοις (subintelligitur ἔφονται) αἵτε ὅρμαι κατὰ ταύτας
 ἴσονται. ὀνομά τι μόλιον τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔσθαι. — οἷον καὶ τὸ τῶν
 ἄλλων

be only a mere *spontaneous* Motion or Impetus in us, "such as there is in other *Animals*, and in " *Infants* and *Madmen*, who are acted upon by " the blind Impulse of their Appetites.

Cicero agrees with *Plotinus*, that the * *Nation of an eternal Chain of Causes deprives the Mind of Man of its free Will, and subjects it to a necessary Fatality*; which Opinion, he says, † is not tolerable.

Plotinus concludes his Arguments against the Fatalists by putting the Question, " || What " other Cause then besides these (forementioned) " can be introduced, which will both solve the " Difficulty of any thing being without a Cause, " and preserve the Series and Order of Things, " and allow something to be in our Power, and " neither yet destroy Prognostication and Divination?" To which he answers, " That " we ought to admit the *Soul* to be another principal

ἄλλαν ζῶον καὶ τὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ὁμιᾶς τυφλὰς ἰάνται, καὶ τὸ πῶν μηχανομένον, ὁμιᾶσι γὰρ ἔσται. Ibid. §. 7.

* At qui introducunt causarum seriem sempiternam, ii mentem hominis voluntate libera spoliata necessitate fati devincunt. *Lib. de Fato* p. 350.

† Hæc (scilicet sententia omnia fato fieri) non est tolerabilis. Ibid. p. 351.

|| Τίς ἐν ἑλλή ἀίτια παρὰ ταύτας ἐπαλῶσαι ἀνάγκη τε ἡδὲ καταλείπειν, ἀκαταδίαν τε τηρεῖν καὶ πᾶν, ἡμᾶς τί τε εἶναι συγχωρεῖται, προῤῥήσεις τε καὶ μηχαναίαια εὖτε ἀν' ἀναιρήσει; ψυχῇ. ὃ δὲ ἀν-

" *principal Cause* (of Action) — not only
 " the Soul of the Universe, but the Soul of
 " every particular Man also, as well as that
 " — and that it is a *primary efficient Cause*."
 And then he proceeds to shew at large wherein
 the Freedom of the humane Soul consists.

Thus I have considered the several Opinions
 of the ancient *Fatalists*, which resolv'd into two;
 the one made every Thing the necessary Effect of
 the eternal Motion and Concourse of Atoms; the
 Absurdity of which, as supposing an eternal
 Chain of *Effects* without any original *Cause* or
Agent at all, evidently appears; and which, by
 inferring the Necessity of human Actions, and
 thereby taking away the Foundation and distinc-
 tion of *Virtue* and *Vice*, and the consequent
Praise and *Dispraise* due unto them, was rejected
 by * *Epicurus* himself on this very Account.
 The other made no *Agent* in the World but God,
 who was suppos'd to be infus'd like a Soul thro'
 the whole Universe, and to act in every Thing
 by an eternal Chain of Causes, necessarily con-
 nected with each other, and all derived from

χὴν ἔσαν ἄλλα — οὐ μόνον τὴν ὅλαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἑκάστην
 μὲν ταύτης — πρωτουργὸς αἰτίας ἔσης. Ibid. c. 8.

* Ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ὁμολογῶντες εὐφραίνεται καὶ φιλοτιμῶν τὴν αἰσθη-
 σιάν, μηχανώμενος ἐλευθεῖσθαι καὶ ἀπαλῦσαι τὸ θεοῦσιαν ἐπὶ
 τῷ μὴ καταλιπεῖν ἀνεγκλήτου τὴν κακίαν. Plutarch de Stoiā
 Repug. p. 1050.

God (who was call'd Fate) as the original and supreme Cause of all.

This latter, tho' more plausible than the former, yet so plainly inferred (as both * *Plotinus* and † *Cicero* observe) such a Fate as made Men's Actions *necessary*, whereby the Nature of *Virtue* and *Vice*, of *Rewards* and *Punishments* were so wholly destroy'd, that it made the Notion itself *intolerable*, as *Cicero* calls it; insomuch that the Defenders of it were forc'd to allow notwithstanding (tho' inconsistently with themselves) that there was a *Power of Action* or *free Agency* in Men's Minds; and durst not affirm that humane Actions were *necessary*: and the Opposers of it were so averse to it on this Account, as to recur to the other Extreme, and maintain that the *voluntary Motion or Exertion of the Mind was not at all influenced by Fate, or antecedent Causes*. These two rigid opposite Tenents, as they were thought, made the famous * *Chrysippus*, and the most reasonable and learned of the Antients of all Sects, step in as Moderators betwixt these two Opinions, and come to an Agreement on all sides, that

* Ennead. 3. lib. 1. c. 4. Cic. lib. de Fat. p. 350.

† Ibid. p. 351.

§ Cum duæ sententiæ fuissent veterum Philosophorum, una eorum qui censerunt omnia ita fato fieri, ut id fatum vim necessitatis afferret — altera eorum quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, ibid. p. 359.

* Ibid. p. 359, 360.

as on the one hand *Necessity* was to be excluded from *humane Actions*, that so the Distinction of *Virtue* and *Vice*, and the *Rewards* and *Punishments* both of divine and humane Laws founded upon them, might be preserv'd inviolated; so on the other hand *Fate*, even with respect to humane *Actions* (as well as to external Events consequent upon them, in which it was absolute and uncontrollable) was so far to be retain'd, as that it was to be allow'd that *antecedent Causes* were the Motives of acting, or influenc'd the Mind to act, tho' the *principal* and *efficient* Cause of Action was a *natural Power* and *free Exertion* of the Mind itself.

This Distinction of *Fate* and *Necessity*, and middle Opinion founded upon it, prevail'd amongst all sorts of Philosophers, *Stoics* as well as *Platonics*, &c; (excepting the ignorant *Astrologers* and *Fortunetellers* amongst the *Stoics*) accordingly we learn from *Plutarch* that * *Plato* (the great Assertor of the Freedom of the Mind) " admitted " *Fate* with respect to the humane Soul and Life; " but adds withal, that the Cause (of Action) is " in ourselves. The *Stoics* in Agreement with

* Πλάτων ἐγκρίνει μὴ τὴν εἰμαρμένην ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχῶν καὶ βίῳ, συνιστάγει δὲ καὶ τὴν παρ' ἡμῶς αἰτίαν· οἱ Στωικοὶ Πλάτωνα ἐμφορῶς καὶ τὴν μὴ ἀνάγκην ἀνίκητόν φασιν αἰτίαν καὶ βιασικὴν. τὴν δὲ εἰμαρμένην, συμπλοκὴν αἰτιῶν τεταγμένην, ἐν ᾗ συμπλοκῇ ἢ ἐν τῷ παρ' ἡμῶς, ὅτι τὰ μὴ εἰμαρῆναι, τὰ δὲ ἀειμαρῆναι, de Placit. Philos. p. 884, 885.

“ *Plato* say, that *Necessity* is an invincible and
 “ compulsive Cause; but that *Fate* is the deter-
 “ min’d Connection of Causes, in which Con-
 “ nection our *Power of Action* is contain’d: so
 “ that some things are destin’d, and others not.

And *Austin* says, “ * That the *Stoics* distin-
 “ guish’d the Causes of Things (into *antecedent*
 “ and *efficient*, as hath been before observ’d) that
 “ they might exempt some from *Necessity*, and
 “ subject others to it: and amongst those which
 “ they allow’d not to be *under Necessity*, they
 “ plac’d our *Wills*; lest otherwise if subjected to
 “ *Necessity*, they should not be *free*.

Hence it appears that there is no real Difference betwixt the *Platonical* and *Stoical* Philosophy in the Opinion of *Fate* and the *Freedom of humane Actions*; and that which hath led Men thro’ Mistake to think that it was the constant and settled Doctrine of the *Stoics*, that humane Actions were subject to an absolute *Fatality* or *Necessity*, is their asserting in general Terms that *all things* were originally fix’d and determin’d by the Laws or Decrees of *Fate*, and are carried on and effected by an immutable Connection and

* Unde nec illa *Necessitas* formidanda est, quam formidando Stoici laboraverunt causas rerum ita distinguere, ut quasdam subtraherent *Necessitati*, quasdam subderent: atque in his, quas esse sub *Necessitate* noluerunt, posuerunt etiam nostras *voluntates*, ne videlicet non essent liberae, si subderentur *Necessitati*. De Civit. Dei, lib. 5. c. 10.

Chain of Causes: whereas this *Fatality* or *Necessity* with respect to Men was only understood of *external* providential * Events which were appointed consequential to the Nature of their Actions, presuppos'd to be *free* and *in their own Power*. For the most eminent and rigid *Stoics* plainly assert the Freedom of humane Actions, as hath been prov'd above; and the *Platonics*, who are known to be most zealous for the Cause of *Liberty*, do yet with the *Stoics* constantly maintain *Fate*, and a determin'd Order and Series of antecedent Causes.

From the preceding Observations then we learn what was the true Opinion in general both of the *Platonics* and *Stoics* concerning *Fate*; namely, that it was no other than the *Laws of Divine Providence*, whereby all Things are govern'd according to their *several Natures*; and therefore particularly in respect of Men, it was understood to be the *Rules* and *Decrees* of Divine Providence determining the Events of humane Life, and dispensing Rewards and Punishments according to the Nature of Mens *voluntary* Actions.

They thought that God govern'd the World by his sovereign *Will*, which they call'd *Providence*; by which he made fix'd and unalterable Laws for the Administration of the whole Universe; and that he determin'd Mens Conditions, and their

† Ὅτι ἂν σοι συμβαίῃ, τὐτό σοι ἐξ αἰῶνος προκατασκευάζετο,
 ἔῃ ἡ ἐπιπλοκὴ τῶν αἰτίων συνέλαβε τὴν τε σὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐξ αἰῶνος,
 ἔῃ τὴν τέτου σύμβασιν. M. Anton. lib. 10. sect. 5.

Happiness or Misery, whether here or hereafter, according as their *Actions* freely chosen, and done *voluntarily*, should be. So that *Fate* in reality was no other than * *Providence*, or the immutable Law and Rule of God's Government of the World; and which was call'd *Necessity* (not as being suppos'd to effect *necessarily*, or to be the *necessary efficient* Cause of humane Actions, but) because it was the *necessary* Law of all Nature; and the external Effects of it, or the Events produc'd by it by a Series of antecedent Causes, in Consequence of Mens *voluntary* Actions, were unavoidable and necessary.

That this is the true antient Notion of *Fate* or *Necessity*, I shall further distinctly prove by a brief and indisputable Deduction of Particulars.

Chrysippus says; "† Fate is the Reason of the " World, or the Law of Providence by which " all things in the World are govern'd." And *Gellius* tells us, that *Chrysippus* held that the " ‡ Order and Reason and Necessity of Fate was a " Motive

* Nonnulli putant præsumi differentiam providentiæ fatique, cum res una sit: quippe providentiam Dei esse voluntatem, voluntatem porro ejus seriem esse causarum — porro series causarum est fatum cognominatum. Chalcid. in Plat. Tim. c. 7. p. 237. edit. Fabric.

† Εἰμαρμένη ἔστιν ὁ τῷ κόσμῳ λόγος, ἡ νόμος τῶν ὄντων ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικουμένη. apud Plutarc. de Placit. Philos. p. 885.

‡ Ordo & ratio & necessitas fati genera ipsa & principia causarum movet: impetus vero consiliorum mentiumque nostrarum,

“ Motive of Action to the general and efficient
 “ Causes of it; but that every ones own *Will*
 “ and Dispositions directed the Exertion of our
 “ Minds and Purposes, and the Actions of them.”

And *Diogenianus* the Peripatetic writing against *Chrysippus* says, “ * It is manifest from the Di-
 “ stinction which he (*Chrysippus*) makes, that
 “ the Cause (of Action) which is in us, is ex-
 “ empt from Fate.” And he cites *Chrysippus* as
 declaring, “ † That it is evident that many things
 “ are done by our own Power, but yet neverthe-
 “ less that these things are connected with Fate,
 “ by which the Universe is govern’d.

Cicero in the Person of *Velleius* represents the
Stoical Notion of Fate to be, “ || That all Events
 “ proceed from the eternal Truth and Connec-
 “ tion of Causes.” *Diogenes Laertius* says it was
 their Opinion, “ § That Fate is the Connection

rum, actionesque ipsas voluntas cujusque propria & animo-
 rum ingenia moderantur. Noc. Attic. lib. 6. p. 365, 366. See
 above p. 85.

* Ἐξ αὐτῆς ἡ τῆς διαστολῆς, ἣν ποιῆται χρύσιππος, δῆλον γίνεται
 ἀπολεῖσθαι τὴν εἰμαρμένην τὴν παρ’ ἡμῶν αἰτίαν. Apud Euseb. Præp.
 Evang. lib. 6. c. 8.

† Φησὶν — τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἡμῶν πολλὰ γίνεσθαι δῆλον εἶναι, ἐδὲ ἡ
 ἥττον συγκαθεμιάρθαι καὶ ταῦτα τῇ τῶν ὅλων δαικίᾳ. ibid.

|| Εἰμαρμένη dicunt: ut quicquid accidat, id ex eterna veri-
 tate causarumque continuatione fluxisse dicatur. De Nat. Deo-
 rum lib. 1.

§ Ἐστὶ ἡ εἰμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη, ἢ λόγος καθ’ ὃν ὁ
 κόσμος διατάσσεται, lib. 7. p. 459, 460.

“ of

“ of the Causes of things, or that Reason by
 “ which the World is govern’d.

Seneca (the *Stoic*) says; “ * Fate is nothing
 else but the Connection of Causes.

Marcus Antoninus † the Emperor and *Stoical*
 Philosopher frequently expresses his Notion of
 Fate in like manner. But that in this *Fate* or
 Chain of Causes the *Power of Action* in Men was
 contain’d, and was (ὕπὲρ μὲρον) exempt from the
Necessity of Fate, we are assur’d (from *Plutarch* ||)
 was the common Opinion of *Stoics* and *Platonists*.
 And *Tacitus*, speaking of the *Stoics*, says;
 “ ‡ They attribute indeed a *Fatality* unto Things,
 “ but not as proceeding from the Motion of the
 “ Planets (which was the *Astrological* Notion
 “ only) but from the Principles and Connection
 “ of natural Causes: And yet they leave the Con-
 “ duct of our Life to our own Choice, which be-
 “ ing chosen, a certain Order of Events (they
 “ think) follow.

Alcinous sets forth *Plato’s* Opinion of Fate in
 the following Manner: “ § He understands Fate
 to

* *Fatum nihil aliud fit quam series implexa Causarum. De
 Benef. lib. 4. c. 7.*

† *De Scip. lib. 5. §. 8. lib. 10. §. 5.*

|| *De Placit Phil. p. 884, 885. cited above.*

‡ *Fatum quidem congruere rebus putant; sed non è vagis
 stellis, verum apud principia & nexus naturalium causarum: ac
 tamen Electionem vitæ nobis relinquunt, quam ubi elegeris, cer-
 tum imminet ordinem. Annal. Lib. 6.*

§ *Εἰπωμεν ——— λεγει ——— ὅτι εἰ τις ἀνέλθῃ ψυχὴ τοῦτον βίου
 καὶ*

“ be this; that if any Person choseth such a sort
 “ of Life, and will do such and such Actions,
 “ such and such Consequences will follow.
 “ Wherefore the Soul is unrestrain’d, and hath
 “ it in its own Power to act or not, and in this
 “ Respect (of any particular Action) is not com-
 “ pelled: But the Consequence of it’s Action will
 “ be effected by Fate: As for Example, if *Paris*
 “ will carry away *Helen*, which it is in his Pow-
 “ er to do or not, the Event will be, that the
 “ *Grecians* will make War against the *Trojans*
 “ for her.

Hierocles teacheth that “ * Fate is the judici-
 “ al Operation of the Deity, effecting Events ac-
 “ cording to the Laws of Providence, and di-
 “ recting humane Affairs in the Order and Course
 “ that is suitable to their *free* Purposes and *volun-*
 “ *tary* Actions.” The precedent Arguments up-
 “ on which he builds his Notion are; *viz.*

“ † If (says he) bodily and external Events fall
 “ out fortuitously and by Chance, what becomes
 “ of

καὶ τάδε τινα πράττει, τάδε τινα αὐτῇ ἔψεται. ἀδίσποτοι ἔν η̅ ψυχῇ, καὶ
 ἐπ’ αὐτῇ μὲν τὸ πράττειν ἢ μὴ, καὶ ἡ κατηνάγκασται τῆτο τὸ ἡ ἐπέ-
 μνον τῇ πράττει καθ’ εἰμαρμένῳ συνεπινοήσεται. οἷον τῷ Πάρις ἀρ-
 πάσει τὴν Ἑλένην, ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ὄντι, ἀκολουθήσει τὸ, πολυμήχεσι Τρώ-
 εσσιν περὶ τῆς Ἑλένης οἱ Ἕλληνες. De Doc. Plat. c. 6.

* Εἰμαρμένη ——— τῶν συμβαινόντων κατὰ τὸ τὸ προνοίας Θεοῦ
 δικαστικῇ τοῦ Διὸς ὑπάρχει ἐνέργεια, τάξει καὶ εἰρμῷ πρὸς τὰς προαι-
 ρητικὰς ὑποθέσεις τῶν αὐτεχουσίων ἔργων ἐπαναρθωμένη τὰ καθ’ ἡμῶν.
 De Fat. p. 42.

† Ποῦ γὰρ ἔστι ἢ ἔν τισι τῆς θείας κρείττους καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἀξίαν ἀγα-
 νομήης

“ of the Superintendency of God, to judge and
 “ recompense every one according to his De-
 “ serts? For we will not suppose these Things to
 “ happen without Appointment, and say that
 “ our just *Purposes*, and our *Judgments* and *De-*
 “ *sires* proceed from an overruling *Necessity*: for
 “ if so we should not impute Virtue and Vice
 “ to *ourselves*, but to that *Necessity*. Nor is it
 “ reasonable to suppose all Things to be the *ne-*
 “ *cessary* Effects of them, I mean the Actions of
 “ the Soul, as well as the Things that are with-
 “ out us, and concern the Body. Nor ought we
 “ to ascribe all Things to the unintelligent and
 “ undirected Circumvolution of the Universe;
 “ there being a Mind that presides over all
 “ Things, and a God who is the Author of the
 “ World. That which necessarily remains there-
 “ fore is; that the *Choice* we make is *in our own*
 “ *Power*, and that a righteous Recompense is
 “ awarded according thereto by celestial Beings
 “ and Judges appointed by God, and who have
 “ the

ομῆς ἔσαι ἢ ἐπιμέλεια, τῶν παρὰ τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς εἰκῇ, καὶ
 ὡς ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν συμπιπτόντων, εἰ ᾧ ταῦτα μὲν ἄτακτα καταλείψο-
 μεν· τὰς δὲ δίκης προαιρέσεις, καὶ κρίσεις, καὶ ὁρμὰς ἀπὸ κρείττονος
 ἀνάγκης ἐγγίνασθαι φήσομεν. ἔτω ᾧ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ὅσα ἡμᾶς
 αὐτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκείνην αἰτιασάμεθα. οὐδὲ μὲν πάντα τῇ παρ' ἐκείνου
 ἀνάγκῃ εὐλογον ἀνατιθέναι· τὰ τ' ψυχῆς λόγῳ, καὶ σώματι, καὶ τῶν
 ἐκτὸς. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πάντα ἀνείσθαι ταῖς ἀλόγοις καὶ ἀνεπιμετρητοῖς φθοαῖς,
 τοῦ τοῦ πάντων ἡγεμονικῆ καὶ Θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων ὄντος αἰτίης ἀναγκαῖον
 ἢ τὸ λειπόμενον τὰς μὲν προαιρέσεις ἐφ' ἡμῶν, τὰς δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς προαιρέ-
 σεσι δικάμεις ἀμοιβὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰθεράσι κῆρας, καὶ ὑπὸ Θεοῦ

“ the Care of us committed to them. —
 “ And the Supposition of a Recompence, ac-
 “ cording to our Merit, immediately infers a
 “ Providence and *Fate* as the consequent of it;
 “ and judicial Providence, which orders the
 “ Events of humane Affairs, according to Right
 “ and Equity, depends upon the Principle of our
 “ *Will* and *Choice*: So that *Fate* is a Part of uni-
 “ versal Providence, and the Rule of Judgment
 “ upon the Souls of Men.

To which he adds presently after; “ * To
 “ *choose* is in the Power of the Mind; but the
 “ Events following the *Choice* are determined by
 “ a judicial Providence, recompensing the Pur-
 “ poses of the Soul, according to its Desert: and
 “ thence we are said both to *choose* our Condi-
 “ tion of Life, and to have it destin’d to us. For
 “ the Recompence, ordain’d to follow our
 “ Works, both manifests the *free* Motion (or
 “ Operation) of our Mind, and the divine Su-
 “ perin-

τέταγμένοις δικασαῖς καὶ πεφυκόσιν ἡμῶν ἐπιμελειᾷ — ἢ τε
 ᾧ τὴν πρὸς ἀξίαν ὑπόθεσιν πάντως συμπράγει τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς εἰμαρ-
 μένην καὶ ἡ προνοητικὴ κρίσις δίκην ἐ νόμον τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τάττειν,
 τῆς αὐτεξούσιου ἡμῶν ἐ προαιρετικῆς ἀρχῆς δεῖται. ὥστε μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ
 ὅλης προνοίας εἰμαρμένην, τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀνθρώπινους ψυχὰς δικαστικῶς
 ἀρμοζόμενον, Ibid. p. 26, 27.

* Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐλέαζ ἐπ’ αὐτὴν (scilicet ψυχὴν) κεῖται τὰ ἢ ἐπὶ
 συμβαίνοντά ταῖς αἰρέσεσι τῇ τῆς προνοίας κρίσει ὥρῃσαι, πρὸς ἀξίαν,
 ἀμειβομένη τὰς ψυχικὰς ἀληθείας. καὶ ἔτι αἰρεῖσθαι τε ἅμα ἐ
 κληροῦν τὸν αὐτὸν βίον λεγόμενα. ἢ ᾧ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐργασμένοις ἡμῶν
 τεταγμένη ἀμειβῇ ἐ τὴν αὐτεξούσιον κίνησιν, καὶ τὴν δίκην ἐπιστάσαν
 εἰσφέρει.

“ perintendency over us. So that it is evident
 “ that the Motions (or Operations) of our
 “ Minds from Beginning to End are *free* —
 “ and that the Recompence of our Deserts is not
 “ *without Appointment*, — as neither is *Fate*,
 “ which is the Chain and Connection of the
 “ *humane Will* with the divine Judgment: So
 “ that we *choose* what we will thro’ an *unre-*
 “ *strain’d Liberty*, but often suffer against our
 “ Will, thro’ the unavoidable Power of Provi-
 “ dence.

Chalcidius expresseth the *Platonic* Notion of
Fate in like manner; viz. “ * Such, (says he)
 “ in my Opinion, is that heavenly Law, which
 “ is call’d *Fate*, commanding Men that which is
 “ right, and forbidding the contrary; but to
 “ obey is in our own Power, and free from the
 “ *Coercion of Fate*. To praise him that does
 “ well is both agreeable to this Law and to the
 “ common Judgment of all. — Moreover to
 live

εμφανι ὡς ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος αὐτεξούσιος ἔχει ἡμεῖς τὰς κινήσεις
 ——— ὅτι μεθυστάς ἢ τὰς πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν αὐτιδότης ———
 ἔ τὴν εἰμαρμένην πλέγμα ἔσται ἔ συνδρομὴν ἀνθρώπου προαιρέσεως
 καὶ θείας κρίσεως. ὡς ἰλιάδῃ ἡμεῖς ἀ βυλόμεθα, ἀλλ’ τὸ τ’ προαιρέ-
 σεως ἀδελωτοῦ, πάχει ἢ πολλάκις ἀ μὴ βυλόμεθα, ἀλλ’ τὸ τῆς
 προνοίας ἄφυκτον. Ibid. p. 31, 32.

* Talis est, opinor, lex illa coelestis, quæ *fatum* vocatur,
 sciscens hominibus honesta, prohibens contraria; sequi porro
 nostrum est, & a fati iugo liberum: laudari vero agentem bene,
 tam juxta legem quam juxta commune judicium. — male
 porro

“ *live ill* is in the *Power* of Man, and therefore
 “ Punishment proceeds from a *fatal Necessity*,
 “ in consequence of the Law. All these Things
 “ relate to the Mind of Man, which is *free*, and
 “ *acts by its own Choice*.

Again; “ * *Fate* is the Decree of Providence,
 “ comprehending our *voluntary Actions*, as the
 “ precedent Grounds of it: comprehending also
 “ the Recompence of our Deserts. *Punishment*
 “ and *Approbation*, which are by *Fatality*, and all
 “ those Things which happen fortuitously or
 “ by Chance, are the Consequents of it.

But in order to understand more fully and distinctly the antient philosophical or theological Notion of *Fate* or *Necessity* (the misunderstanding and misapplication of which has been the great Occasion of producing this monstrous Scheme of the *Necessity of humane Actions*, which our *Cato* maintains) we are to observe that it was distinguished into two *Senses* (tho' in Reality amounting to the same) in the one of which it was understood *substantially* to mean that *intelligent divine Being*

porro vitam disponere proprium est hominis, proptereaque puniri plane est ex necessitate fatali; utpote quod legem sequatur. Hæc porro omnia sedem habent in animis hominum; quæ anima libera est, & agit ex arbitrio suo. In *Plat. Tim.* p. 271.

* Fatum providentiæ scitum est, continet autem ea quæ sunt in nostra potestate ut præcedentia: continet etiam meritum collationem. Sequuntur animadversio & approbatio, quæ sunt fatalia; eaque omnia quæ casu fortunæ fiant. *Ibid.* p. 279.

or Substance, which govern'd the World by the Administration of the Laws of Providence; in the other it was taken *abstractedly* or *virtually*, for the *Laws* or *Decrees* themselves of the divine Government of the World.

“ * Fate (says the great Philosopher *Chalcidius*) was understood by *Plato* in a twofold Sense, the one relating to its *Substance*; the other to its *Energy* and *Power*.

Thus also † *Platarch* represents it.

Fate, in the Sense of *Operation* or *Power*, is call'd by *Plato*, “ in his † *Phædrus*, an unavoidable Decree; in his *Timæus* the Laws which God endited to ‖ cœlestial Beings concerning the Nature of the Universe.” The Sense of which he immediately explains; *viz.*

* *Fatum*, juxta *Platonem*, dupliciter intelligitur & dicitur: unum, cum substantiam ejus animo intuemur: alterum cum ex his quæ agit, & esse id, & cujusmodi vim habeat, recognoscimus. *Com. in Plat. Tim. p. 236.*

† Πρῶτον τοίνυν ἴδωμεν ὅτι εἰμαρμένη διχῶς, καὶ λέγεται, καὶ νοεῖται ἢ μὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, ἢ ὅτι οὐσία. *Lib. de Fat.*

‡ In *Phædro* quidem scitum inevitabile, in *Timæo*, leges quas Deus de universæ rei natura dixerit cœlestibus animis. *Chalcid. ibid. Plutarch expresses it; Νόμος δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ τῷ παντὸς φύσει ὁ Θεὸς εἴπῃ ταῖς ἀθανάτοις ψυχαῖς. De Fat. p. 568.*

|| By cœlestial Beings *Chalcidius* seems to mean (πρόνοια) *Providence*, which he speaks of as the *second God*; and the (ψυχὴ) *Soul of the World*.

“ * By

“ * By unavoidable Decree we may understand
 “ an irrevocable Law proceeding from an irre-
 “ sistible Cause (*viz.* the supreme God) and by
 “ the Laws which God endited to (coelestial)
 “ Beings concerning the Nature of the Universe,
 “ the Law which is consequential to the Nature
 “ of the World, and by which the Universe is
 “ governed.

“ † *Fate*, in the Sense of Substance (he pro-
 “ ceeds to tell us) is the *Soul of the World*.
 Which *Plutarch* also informs us it was.

It was call'd *Lachesis* or (*ἀνάγκη*) *Necessity*; both
 as being supposed to be *necessarily-existent*, and the
necessary Substratum for the Formation of rational
 Beings; as also because the *Laws* of it were fix'd and
immutable, and to which they supposed God had
 subjected all Beings, and even bound himself un-
 der an irrevocable and *necessary* Obligation.

* *Possumus ergo inevitabile quidem scitum interpretari legem
 minime mutabilem ex inevitabili causa: leges vero quas de
 universa natura dixit animis Deus, legem, quæ mundi naturam
 sequitur, & qua reguntur mundana omnia. Ibid. § p. 237.*

In which Explanation he follows *Plutarch*, who calls the
 one; Λόγος θεῶν ἀπαράβατος δι' αἰτίαν ἀνεμπόδιστον. And the
 other; Νόμος ἀκλόνητος τῇ τε παντὸς φύσει, καὶ ὃν διαχέεται
 τὰ γινόμενα. Lib. de Fat. p. 568. Again; Λόγον αἰδῶν καὶ
 νόμον αἰδῶν τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως. De Placit. Philos. p. 885.

† In *Substantia* positum, *Fatum mundi anima est. Chalc. ibid.*
Plutarch has it; εἰρημαμένη κατ' οὐσίαν ὅμοιος εἶναι σύμπασα ἢ τοῦ
 κόσμου ψυχῇ. Lib. de Fat.

Chalcidius styles this *Lachesis* or *Necessity* “ || the
“ divine Law, by which Things future are con-
“ nected with Things past and present.

And it is, with Respect to the immutable
Laws of Providence, that † *Plotinus* calls God
“ the Necessity and Law of all Things.

Cicero ‡ in like manner (speaking of the *Platonic* Philosophy) observes, that this *Fate* or
Soul of the World, by whose *providential Wisdom* all Things, both in *Heaven* and *Earth*, are
governed, is call'd *Necessity*; because nothing can
happen otherwise than according to the Laws of it,
whereby the eternal Order of the Universe is immu-
tably preserved by *Fatality*.

The *Stoics* express their Notion of *Fate* (sub-
stantially) in Agreement with the *Platonists*.

“ * *Heracitus* styles the Substance of *Fate* that
“ Reason which pervades the Substance of the
“ Universe,

|| *Lachesis*, hoc est, *necessitatis* orationem, divinam legem,
qua præteritis & item præsentibus connectuntur futura. p. 237.

† *Ἀνάγκη τῶν ἅλλων καὶ νόμος*. *Ennead.* 6. p. 743.

‡ Quam vim *animum* esse dicunt *mundi*: eandemque esse
mentem, sapientiamque perfectam, quem *Deum* appellant, om-
niumque rerum quæ sunt ei subiectæ, quasi prudentiam quan-
dam procurantem cœlestia maxime, deinde in terris ea quæ per-
tinent ad homines; quam interdum *necessitatem* appellant, quia
nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fata-
lem & immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni. *Acad-*
dem. Quest. lib. 1.

* *Ἡράκλειτος* οὐσίαν εἰσαρμόνης λόγου τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ
παντός

“ Universe, the same (he adds) is an æthereal
 “ Body, the generating Seed of the Universe.”

Euripides expresses the *Stoical* Sense; “ * *Ju-*
 “ *piter*, or the Necessity of Nature, or the Rea-
 “ son of Men. For *Necessity* and Mind is the
 “ (substantial) Power which diffuseth itself thro’
 “ the Universe.

“ *Velleius*, in *Cicero*, represents the Opinion
 “ of the *Stoic Chrysippus*; “ † That he says ;
 “ that the Power of that perpetual and eternal
 “ Law which is, as it were, the Guide of our
 “ Life, and Director of our Duty, is *Jupiter*; the
 “ same he also calls *Fate* and *Necessity*.” Again;
 “ The ‖ *Stoics* held a *Necessity* which they call’d
 “ *Fate*.

Again; *Diogenes Laertius* tells us it was the
Stoical Notion, “ * That *God*, and *Mind*, and
 “ *Fate*, and *Jupiter* was one and the same, to
 “ which they gave many other Names also.

παντες διχοντα. αὐτὴ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰθέριον σῶμα, αἶψα τῆς τοῦ πα-
 τὸς γενέσεως. *Plut. Placit. Phil. p. 885.*

* Ζεὺς ἐστὶ ἀνάγκη φύσεως, εἴτε νῆς βροτῶν.

καὶ ὅς ἀνάγκη καὶ νοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ διέχουσα διὰ πάντων δύναμις. *Apud*
Plut. de Anim. Procreat. p. 1026.

† Idemque etiam legis perpetuæ & æternæ vim, quæ quasi
 dux vitæ & magistra officiorum sit, *Jovem* dicit esse, eandem-
 que *fatalem necessitatem*, appellat. *De Nat. Deor. lib. 1.*

‖ *Fatalem necessitatem*, quam *εἰμαρμένην* dicebant. *Ibid.*

* Ἐν τῇ εἰναι θεόν, καὶ νοῦν, καὶ εἰμαρμένην καὶ Δία, πολλὰς τῇ
 εἰρημασίαις προσωνομαζέτω. *Lib. 7. p. 450.*

Alexander

Alexander Aphrodisius says; “ * They (the Stoics) say that *Fate*, and *Nature*, and *Reason*, by which the Universe is governed, is *God*.

Lastly, *Seneca* the Stoic says; “ † What else is *Nature* but *God* and the divine Reason which is infused into the whole World and the Parts of it? ——— and if you call the same *Fate* you will not be mistaken.

There was no other Difference betwixt the *Platonic* and *Stoic* Notion of *Fate*, but only that the Stoics thought that *Fate* considered (*Substantia* or κατ' οὐσίαν) as a *substantial* divine Being which was the *Soul of the World*, was the (περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ) *supreme God*, whom they stil'd “ || The first Cause of the Universe;” and “ ‡ *Fate* and the Necessity (or necessary Cause) of Things:” Whereas the *Platonics* made *Fate* (δὲ δεύτερον θεόν, ἑτερον νοῦν, secundam Mentem) a *second God*, a *second Mind*, inferior and subservient to the *supreme God*.

The preceding Observations will explain the Meaning of the strong poetical Expressions of the *Gods*, or even of *Jupiter* himself the *supreme*

* Τὴν ὃ εἰμαρμένον αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ τὸν λόγον κατ' οὐσίαν διακρίναι τὸ πᾶν, θεὸν εἶναι φασίν. Lib. de Fat. p. 107.

† Quid enim aliud est natura, quam Deus & divina ratio toti mundo & partibus ejus inserta? — eundemque & Fatum si dixeris, non mentieris. De Benefic. lib. 4. c. 7.

|| Τὴν τῆ πατρὸς ἀρχὴν — εἰμαρμένην. Plotin. Ennead 3. lib. 1.

‡ Fatum & necessitatem rerum. Tertul. Apol. c. 21.

God, being *subject to Fate*; by which, agreeably to the *Platonical* and *Stoical* Philosophy, was understood, that all subordinate Beings, how divine soever, were subject to the *immutable Laws of Providence*, which were the *Will* and *Command* of the *supreme God*; and according to which God himself was determined *invariably* to act, and so was said to be bound by and to obey his own Laws, as being most *wise* and *perfect*.

With Respect to the Subjection of the inferior Deities to *Fate*, *Chalcidius* gives us *Plato's* Opinion:

“ * The Command of God, which the subordinate Gods obey, is, I think, that Reason, call'd *Fate*, which contains the eternal Government of Things, and is derived from Providence.

To the same Purpose *Plato* himself cites *Pindar* saying, “ † That the Law (of Providence) rules over all, both mortal Men and the immortal Gods.

And *Simonides*; “ ‖ The Gods themselves do not resist *Necessity*,” i. e. the uncontrollable Laws of divine Providence.

* *Iustum Dei, cui parent Dii secundi, ratio est, opinor, continens ordinationem perpetuam, quæ fatum vocatur, idque trahit originem ex providentia. In Plat. Tim. p. 239.*

† *Νόμοι εἶναι πάντων βασιλῆα θνητῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων.* Apud Plat. in Gorg.

‖ *Ἀνάγκη οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.*

And *Seneca*; “ * Whatsoever it is that commands us thus to live or die, it binds the Gods also under the same Necessity: an irrevocable Course (of Providence) carries on both human and divine Things; the very Maker and Governor of all Things wrote indeed the Fates, but also follows them; commanded once for all, and himself always observes what he commanded.

Lucan† expresses the same Notion in a lively and poetical manner.

With Respect to God’s being unalterably determined to act according to the fix’d Laws of his Providence, and so to be, as it were, bound by them; *Seneca* styles God || *his own Necessity*.

And *Cicero* interprets a *Greek* Poet as saying; “ § That the supreme *Jupiter* cannot prevent that which is decreed to come to pass.

* Quicquid est quod nos sic vivere jussit, sic mori, eadem necessitate & deos alligat: irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor ac rector, scripsit quidem fata, sed sequitur. Semper paret, semel jussit. *De Provid. c. 5.*

† Fixit in æternum causas quæ cuncta coercent,
Se quoque lege tenens; & secula jussa ferentem
Fatorum immoto divisit limite mundum. *Lib. 2.*

|| Ipse (Deus) est necessitas sua. *Præf. ad Quæst. Nat.*

§ Quod fore paratum est, id summum exuperat Jovem;
Cic. de divinat. lib. 2. p. 275.

And

And *Herodotus**; “ It is impossible for God
“ himself to avoid the destin’d Fate.” And
again; “ † God himself is a Servant of Necess-
“ sity.

Which Passages do not mean as if there was
thought to be any *Fate* or *Necessity* distinct from
and really superior to the supreme God; but on-
ly that the Laws of divine Providence, as being
the Result of *infinite* and *perfect Wisdom*, were
the immutable Rule by which God was deter-
mined to order the Events of Things, and to act
in the Government of the World. To proceed
therefore;

Fate (κατ’ ἐνέργειαν) in the abstract Sense, as
implying *Energy*, *Power*, or *Operation*, “ * is
“ the Laws (of Providence) with which the
“ Soul of the World is invested for the good
“ Government of the Universe.” Hence we see
the Reason why the *Soul of the World* is call’d
Fate, viz. as containing in it those Laws of
Providence, which are that which is call’d
Fate.

* Τὴν πεπεωμένην μοῖραν ἀδύνατά ἐστι λυφύγειν καὶ τῷ θεῷ.
Cudw. Intel. Syst. p. 5.

† Δεῦλον θεὸς ἀνάγκης. Cudw. ibid.

* *Leges* (scilicet *Providentiæ*) dictæ sunt *fatum*; idque di-
vina *Lex* est mundi animæ insinuatæ, salubre rerum omnium
regimen, *Chalcid. in Plat. Tim. p. 239.*

Again; “† It is a Decree, existent Order, and
 “an all-comprehending Law, which derives its
 “precedent Causes *from our Deserts*, as the
 “Grounds (of the Events) of it: and the Events,
 “which proceed *necessarily* from it are the *con-*
 “*sequential* Effects of our *precedent* Merits, and
 “of the *Necessity* (or immutable Sanction) of
 “that Law.

Chalcidius goes on; “* The Foundation there-
 “fore of the divine Law, that is, of *Fate*, is *Pro-*
 “*vidence*: But it is call’d *Fate*, because it contains,
 “as in a *Decree*, the Duty of our Obedience, and
 “the Contumacy of our Disobedience to it. And
 “Punishments and Rewards proceed from it
 “according to our precedent Deserts. But our
 “precedent Deserts, whether good or bad, are
 “the Motion of our own Minds; and the Judg-
 “ment, Consent, Desire, and Aversion of them,
 “which are *in our own Power*; because the
Choice

† Sanctio, ordinatio existens, & lex omnia complexa, cau-
 sas præcedentes ex meritis nostris habet ut initia quædam, quæ
 porro necessitatibus constricta proveniunt, juxta præcessionem,
 necessitatemque ejus (*scilicet* legis) consequenter eveniunt.
Ibid. p. 240.

* Ergo initium divinæ legis, id est, Fati, Providentia. Fa-
 tum vero quod & parendi sibi obsequium, & non parendi con-
 tumaciam velut edicto complectitur. Animadversiones porro vel
 præmia oriuntur secundum collati meriti præcessionem. Collati
 autem in alterutram partem meriti præcessio animarum nostra-
 rum motus est; judiciumque & consensus earum, & appetitus
 vel

“ Choice of these and their contraries is in our
 “ own Power. — Therefore the Soul of the
 “ World is *Fate*, as it signifies a *substantial* Be-
 “ ing; and that *Law* also, with which it is in-
 “ structed for the well governing of all Things,
 “ is that *Fate* which consists in *Operation* and
 “ *Act*, and the Order and Consequence of it is;
 “ if we do *this*, *that* will follow: Therefore the
 “ precedent Action is in our Power; the Event
 “ that follows it, is the Decree of Fate; which
 “ is otherwise call'd Fatal, and differs very much
 “ from *Fate*. So that there are three Things,
 “ viz. that which is in our own Power; and
 “ *Fate* (or the Law of Providence) and the
 “ Recompence of our Deserts according to the
 “ Law of Fate.

Chalcidius concludes the *Platonic* Notion of
 Fate from many foregoing Arguments in these
 Words, viz.

vel declinatio, quæ sunt in nobis posita, quoniam tam horum, quam
 eorum quæ his contraria sunt, optio penes nos est. — Est igitur
 universæ rei anima Fatum in *substantia* positum: est item data
 huic informatio rem omnem recte gerendi lex, quæ in *mu-
 nere* atque *actu* posita fatum vocatur, & habet textum & con-
 sequentiam talem. Si hoc erit, sequetur illud: ergo quod ex
 his præcedit, in nobis est; quod sequitur, secundum fatum.
 Quos alio nomine *fatale* dicitur, a *Fato* plurimum differens
 ut sint tria; quod in nobis positum est (*scilicet* ut apud Græ-
 cos est, τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν) & ipsum Fatum, (*scilicet* ποῖσιν, fati lex) &
 quod secundum Fati legem pro meritis imminet (*scilicet* τὸ μὲν
 τιμωρ, fatalis poena vel præmium) *Ibid.* 242, 243.

“ * That

“ * That some Things are effected by *Fate* is
 “ true; and that some Things are *in our own*
 “ *Power*, has been prov’d to be true also.
 “ Wherefore they who ascribe all *Things* to
 “ *Fate*, are justly found fault with by those, who
 “ prove that some Things are *in our own Power*.
 “ Again; they who place every Thing *in our*
 “ *Power*, and attribute *nothing* to *Fate*, are
 “ plainly mistaken. For who knows not that
 “ something is effected by *Fate*, and is not *in*
 “ *in our Power*? Therefore that Reasoning alone
 “ is true, and that Opinion firm and solid which
 “ teacheth, that some Things happen by *Fate*,
 “ and other Things proceed from the *Choice* and
 “ *Will* of Men.

Thus, I think, it is clearly and indisputably
 prov’d, that the *Freedom of human Actions* was
 the general and prevailing, and almost unanimous
 Doctrine, not only of the *antient Christians* (amongst
 whom it was universally, and without any Contro-
 versy receiv’d and maintain’d) but also of the most
 eminent and numerous Sects of Philosophers,

* *Fato* quædam agi, verum est; & quod quædam *in nostra*
potestate sint, hoc quoque verum esse monstratum est. Quare
 qui omnia *Fato* fieri dicunt, merito reprehenduntur ab iis qui
 probant esse aliquid *in nostra potestate*. Demum, qui omnia *in*
nostra potestate constituunt, nec quicquam *Fato* relinquunt, falli
 deteguntur. Quis enim ignoret esse aliquid in *Fato*, & extra
 nostrum jus? Sola igitur vera illa ratio est, fixaque & stabili
 sententia, quæ docet quædam *Fato* fieri, alia porro ex homi-
 num arbitrio & Voluntate proficisci. p. 279, 280.

both

both *Jewish* and *Heathen*: Particularly that it was the Doctrine of the two principal Sects amongst the *Jews*, the *Sadducees*, and *Pharisees*, and not improbably of the little Fraternity of the *Essenes* also; and that it was taught by the five great Sects amongst the *Heathens*, which comprehended all the Philosophy of *Greece* and *Rome*, namely, the *Epicureans*, *Stoics*, *Platonics*, *Aristotelians* and *Academics*; and that the Opposers of this Doctrine were chiefly *Leucippus*, *Empedocles*, and *Democritus*, the first Founders of the *Epicurean* Sect, but oppos'd herein by *Epicurus* and his Followers; *Heraclitus*, *Diodorus*, and some *Astrologers* and *Fortune-tellers* amongst the *Stoics*, which were greatly despised and condemned by the most learned of that Sect also. And I have also shewn distinctly, and at large, that the antient *Platonic* and *Stoical* Notion of *Fate* and *Necessity* agreed with each other, and was declar'd to be consistent with the *Liberty* of Men's Actions; and was not understood to be a *necessary efficient Cause* of human Actions at all, but only to be the determinate *Will* and *Decrees* of God, or the *Laws* of his *Providence*, by which the Universe was govern'd, and good and Evil was dispensed unto Men according to the *free* and *voluntary* Actions and Conduct of their Life.

And from the preceding Proofs of the *Freedom* of human Actions, as being the Sense and Opinion of the most *wise* and *learned*, as well as *greatest* Part of Mankind in all Ages, I beg
leave

leave to make one Observation, namely, that upon the Supposition of the *Necessity* of Men's Actions, it must appear very extraordinary and directly absurd, that the Light of natural Reason should necessarily lead Mankind at all times to conclude their Actions to be *in their own Power* and *Choice*, and to be *voluntary* and *free*, if they are indeed *necessary*: that *Necessity* should form Men's Minds and Notions so opposite to its own Operations, and make them *necessarily* think their Actions are not *necessary* but *voluntary*. To which Purpose the learned *Ammonius Hermias* argues;

" * Does this Reason which (as they teach) *ne-*
cessarily effects all Things, make it necessary
 " for Men to affirm, either that all Things are
 " *necessary*, or that some Things are *in our Power*?
 " If the latter is true, then all Things are not
 " *necessary*; but if the former, how come many
 " to think the contrary, *viz.* that many Things
 " are *in our Power*? for it is altogether absurd to
 " suppose that Nature, which (they say) *necessa-*
 " *rily* effects all Things, should move us against
 " Nature, to contradict the Truth of its own

* Όλος ὁ πάντα ἀναγκάζων λόγος, πότερον καὶ αὐτὸ τῆτο
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις φησὶ, τὸ λέγειν ὅτι πάντα ἠνά-
 κασαι, ἢ ἐφ' ἡμῶν κινῶν τὰς περὶ τῆ τροπῆς τῆς γένεως τῶν πραγ-
 ματῶν δόξαι; εἰ μὲν ὅτ' τὸ δεύτερον ἀληθές, οὐκ ἄρα πάντα ἐξ ἀνά-
 κης, εἰ δὲ τὸ πρότερον, πῶς δοξάζουσιν τινες τὸ ἀντικείμενον, ὅτι παλλὰ
 εἶσι ἐφ' ἡμῶν; τὸ ὅτ' ὑπὸ τῆ φύσεως τῆς πάντα ἀναγκάζουσιν (ὡς ὁ
 ἐκείνων λόγος) κινῶν ὡς φύσιν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ καταψηφίζεσθαι τῶν
 ὑπὸ αὐτῆς γινομένων, παντελῶς ἄλογον. Com. in Aristot. p. 215.

" Ope-

"Operations." In like manner *Eusebius* before him hath remarked:

" * What sort of *Fate* is it that teacheth all
 " Men that God is the Creator of the Universe;
 " and *force* them to declare that there is no
 " such thing as (this pretended) *Fate*? And
 " how comes *Fate* to compel Men both to think
 " and say that she does not exist?

* Ποίε δ' εἰμαρμένη θεὸν δημιουργὸν πάντων πᾶσι, ἀνθρώποις
 κατήγγειλεν, εἰμαρμένην δὲ μὴ εἶναι φάναι ἐξηνάγκασε; καὶ πῶς ἡ
 εἰμαρμένη μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν βιάσατο; Περ.
 Evang. lib. 6. p. 253.



(186)



LETTER III.



IN this Paper * our *Cato* pursues very warmly the Defense of his Notion of the *Necessity of human Actions*. He introduceth it with some slight Censures on the Notions of *two very learned Men*, concerning the *Eternity*, and *Omnipresence* or *Immensity* of God; whereby he shews how little he had thought about these Matters, which, he pretends those eminent Men *knew nothing of*. I shall therefore briefly, by the way, take notice of his Observations.

First; He says, that *Duration is our Conception of the Continuance of Things ——— has certain Boundaries in our Imaginations, and we can multi-*

* *Cato's Letters*, Vol. IV. p. 185, &c.

ply this Conception backwards and forwards, without ever being able to come to the End of it, and so may be sure it is without End. (p. 186, 187.)

Duration is not a mere *abstract Idea* of the Mind, as our Author seems here to suppose; and is in itself a distinct Thing from our *Conception of the Continuance* of Things: if every Thing which is the Object of our *Senses* or *Imagination* ceas'd to exist, *Duration* wou'd still exist, and be what it is, independent of our Ideas, and of every finite and created Thing whatsoever. And if *Cato* had thought closely upon the Matter, he would have found, that he could not *set Bounds to Duration* in his *Imagination* or *Understanding*, (*Duration* is not an Idea of the *Imagination*, but of the *Intellect* or *Understanding* only) he cou'd not suppose it to have any *Beginning* or that it can have any *End*; or to be dependent upon the Existence of any finite or sensible Beings. The Idea (if we continue to think of it) will force its *necessary Existence*, and its *past* and *future Infinity* upon us, whether we will or not. We may indeed think of a particular Portion of *Duration*, if we please, and no more; but this is not *setting Bounds* to it; for we cannot conceive this *Portion* to exist and no more, tho' we may actually think of no more; and, as we cannot conceive *Duration* not to exist, or not to have *always* existed, or not to continue to exist *always*, or to be *more* or *less* than it is, as we can other Things, it thence follows that it is something which is in itself *necessarily-existent*; and

which not only we can multiply, but which we *must* (if we think of it) multiply *backwards* and *forwards* to Infinity, and which cannot possibly have an *End*.

We borrow indeed the *Conception* from considering the *Succession* of our own *Ideas*, or the *Continuance* of *Things*, but still it evidently is not a mere *abstract Idea*; for if it was, we could conceive it to be *more* or *less*, or even *cease* to be, as we can those *Things* from which we borrowed the *Idea*; but it has a necessary *Relation* to something *without us*, which is *eternal* and *infinite*; and not being itself a *Substance*, must be a *Property* of a *self-existent Being*.

Secondly, This Author says, that *Extension* or *Space* is the *Conception* of the *Existence* and *Immensity* of *Bodies*. (p. 187.) But this is by no means true; and the *Idea* of *Space* or *Extension*, tho' it may be taken from *Body*, (which yet is accidental) is very different from the *Idea* of *Body*. We can suppose *Body* or *Matter* not to exist; but yet *Space* will continue to exist, and we cannot, without a *Contradiction*, suppose it not to exist. We can suppose *Body* to be *more* or *less*, *finite* or *infinite*; as we can create it, so we can annihilate it in our *Imagination*; but we cannot conceive *Space* or *Extension* to be *more* or *less* than it really is *ad extra*; we cannot take away one Inch from it, or add one Inch to it in our *Thoughts*; but the *Infinity* of it necessarily

fairly forceth itself upon us; which shews that *Space* or *Extension* has a *real* and *necessary* Existence distinct from *Body*; and not being a *Substance*, must be a * *Property* of a *self-existent*, and *omnipresent* or *immense* Being.

Thirdly;

* A very learned and excellent Author, in a late Book, entitled, *The Religion of Nature delineated*, says, that " *Space* taken separately from the Things which possess and fill it, is but an empty Scene or *Vacuum*: and to say that infinite *Space* is God, or that God is infinite *Space*, is to say that he is an infinite *Vacuum*, than which nothing can be more *absurd* or *blasphemous*. How can *Space*, which is but a vast *Void*, rather the *Negation* of all Things than positively any *Thing*, a kind of *diffus'd Nothing*; how can this, I say, be the first Cause, &c. or indeed any Cause? What *Attributes*, beside *Penetrability* and *Extension*, what *Excellencies*, what *Perfections* is it capable of? p. 74, 75. (the same Notion he has of *Duration*.) *ibid*.

To which I reply, that *Space* (and the same is true of *Duration*) taken separately from the Things which fill it, is not a mere *abstract Idea*, as this learned Author seems to think, is already prov'd from the Arguments alledg'd against *Cato's* Notion of it. And they who make it to be something *real*, distinct from the *Extension* of *material*, *sensible* and *finite* Things, do not yet suppose it to be the *Substance* of God, but to be an *Attribute* of his Substance, *viz.* the *Property* of the divine *Immensity*. And if by calling *Space*, taken separately from the Things in it, an *empty Vacuum*, this learned Writer had meant only that it was an *Immensity* void of *Matter*, or an infinite immaterial Diffusion, it would neither have been *absurd* or *blasphemous* to say that it was a *Property* of God, or the divine *Omnipresence*, comprehending and containing all Things. But to suppose *Space*, abstracted from the Things in it, to have no *real* Existence, to be a mere *Nega-*

tion

Thirdly; *Cato's* saying, that in *Infinity* there is no whole nor consequential Parts, (p. *ibid.*) is absurd; for infinite Space and Duration is as much real Space and Duration as finite is; and is as much a *Whole* consisting of Parts or Constituents: The Difference only is, the Parts of finite Matter are partable; but if it was necessarily infinite as Space is, they cou'd not be partable, but still wou'd be Parts, and the existent infinite Body would be a real Being or whole Being.

He proceeds to the Existence of God, and allows that he must exist necessarily, and be the Cause of all other Things; but, adds he, by what Energy or Power he effects this (i. e. the Existence of Things) we are wholly ignorant. (p. 189.)

tion or diffus'd Nothing, as he is pleas'd to stile it, is what I could not have expected from such a learned and rational Writer: as if any Things cou'd possess or fill a mere Negation, that which hath no Existence; as if a mere Negation, or mere nothing cou'd be diffus'd; as if a Negation, a mere Nothing, that which hath no real Existence, could have (as he owns Space has) the positive and real Properties of Penetrability and Extension, to which he might have added Eternity and Self-existence, which last is the highest Excellence and Perfection. But if Penetrability is any Thing; if Extension, Eternity and Self-existence are any Thing; if Things possess or fill any Thing; then surely that which is penetrable, extended, eternal, and self-existent, that which contains and comprehends all Things, is not a mere Negation, a mere Nothing; but is something and hath a real Existence separate from the Things which exist in it.

If

If so, why does our Author presume to assert and insist that *Necessity*, the *Necessity* of the divine Nature is the *Power* from which all Things result and are produc'd as *necessary* Effects?

To which he subjoins presently; *I do not see how a greater Absurdity can be put together in Words, than that one Being shall make another, create the Matter of which it was made, give it all the Faculties it has, all its Capacities of Reasoning, Powers of Action, Means of Thinking, and present it with all its Objects for Thinking, and yet leave it at Liberty to act against them; which I conceive is a downright Impossibility.* (p. 190.)

This is only a round about Way to tell us, that the Notion of *Liberty* is an *Absurdity* and *Impossibility*: for supposing *Liberty* possible, then all that is here put together, as implying *Impossibility*, is true by necessary Consequence: It necessarily follows from *Liberty*, that Man must be endued with a Power of *acting* or *not acting* in every Case, of *consenting* to or *rejecting* every Motive of Action. So that this Harangue is nothing but a mere begging of the Question. Besides, supposing Man a *necessary* or in reality *no Agent*, yet still the Evidence of Sense and Experience shews, that he *does act against* every Motive; and therefore if the *Absurdity* or *Impossibility* lies in his *acting against the Objects of his Thoughts*, it equally follows from his being suppos'd to be a *necessary*, as from his being a *Free-agent*; with the Addition of this Absurdity to

the former Supposition, the Consequence of which is, that a *reasonable* Being necessarily acts perpetually against *Reason*; an *intelligent* Being necessarily acts perpetually against *Sense* and *Understanding*: which, I think, is not only an *Absurdity* in itself, but a severe Reflection also upon the Author of our Being: Not to take notice, that upon the Supposition of the *Necessity* of the Existence of Things, and of *human Actions*, every Part of *Cato's Reasoning* in the foregoing Passage is direct *Nonsense*. For, upon this Hypothesis, nothing is created by God; the *Matter* and *Faculties* of every thing are as necessarily-existent as God is; neither can Man have any *Powers of Action*, or *Capacity of * Reasoning*, both which necessarily imply *Will*, and *Choice*, and *Free-agency*.

He

* Λογικῆς ᾧ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἔστι, ἢ Δὲ τὸ βελυτικῆς οἰκία ἢ Προαιεσίῃ πρὸς τὸ εὖ, ἢ κακῶς βελέμεναι προαγορεύειν.
 " Our Nature is rational and therefore capable of Deliberation,
 " and of being led unto good or evil Counsels by its own Choice.
 Hiero. in Pyth. Carm. p. 162.

And Origen. 'Οι τοίνυν θέλοντες μηδὲν εἶναι ἐφ' ἡμῶν, ἀναγκάως ἡλιθιώτατον ἡ παραδέχονται. πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι εὖ καὶ ἰσχυρῶς ζῶα, δυνάμενοι ὅτι ἐστὶ λογικά. ἀλλ' οἷον ὑπὸ ἔξωθεν κινεῖν αὐτοὶ ἐδαμνῶς κινῆμενοι, ποιεῖν ὑπὸ ἐκείνου λογοῖμεθα, ἢ ποιεῖν νομιζόμεθα. ἄλλως τε ἢ ταῖς ἰδίαις πάθουσιν ἐπαύσας (lege ἐπιστάτας) τὸς ὁράτω, εἰ μὴ ἀναγκῶς ἐστὶν, μὴ αὐτὸς θέλει, &c. " They therefore who
 " wou'd have it that nothing is in our Power, by necessary
 " Consequence admit the greatest Absurdity. For, first, it
 " hence follows that we are not *Animals*, and, secondly, that
 " we are not *rational Animals*; but being impelled, as it were,

" by

He goes on; *A Pair of Scales, perfectly pois'd, cannot ponderate on either side, and a Man, who has no Motives to act, will not act at all.* (p. *ibid.*)

'Tis very true, that if the *Mind* was merely *passive*, like a *Pair of Scales*, and perfectly pois'd by equal *Motives* or *Weights*, it cou'd not ponderate or *Act*. But this is begging the *Question*, and supposing (when the Thing is to be prov'd not *suppos'd*) that the *Mind* has not *Will* and a *free Power of Action within itself*, and consequently can act by its *Will* merely, without any other *Motive*: And when a *Man* does not do any particular *Action*, because he has *no Motive* to act, his *not acting* is still *Matter of Choice*; and it was in his *Power* to have acted. I can

" by an external Force, without any Motion from ourselves, &c
 " thereby said to do those Things, which we seem to do.
 " Further, let any one who knows his own Affections consider,
 " whether it is not Impudence to affirm that he has not a
 " *Will*. *De Orat.* §. 20. See also *De Princip. lib. 3. c. 1.*
p. 712, 713.

And *Alex. Aphodisius*. Τὸ ὅτι αὐτῷ ἔστιν αὐτῷ τῶν γινομένων
 ἐν αὐτῷ, ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου· τῆτο γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι λογικῷ, τὸ
 ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ λόγον τῶν προσηπτούσων φαντασιῶν καὶ ὅλων τῶν
 πρακτικῶν τε καὶ μὴ, κερσῆν τε καὶ εὐρεῖν. " It is the peculiar
 " Property of Man to have those Things which are done by
 " him in his own Power: for it is essential to him, as being a ra-
 " tional Agent, to have in him Reason to be the finder out
 " and Judge of sensitive Objects, and of all those Things
 " which are to be done or not done. *De Fat. p. 75.*

open and shut my Eyes and Mouth merely by the Motive of my *Will* to do so; and do ten *thousand Actions, without any *external* Motive whatsoever.

I dare say *Cato* had done many Things in his Life-time by *Choice* merely, and when it was perfectly *indifferent* to him whether he did them or not, or without having, or being sensible of, any Reason or Motive for the doing of them. And suppose any one was to offer to me *two Guineas* so exactly alike as one could not be distinguished from the other, and to place them at

* Οἷον τὸ κινῆσαι ἢ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μερῶν, καὶ τὴν τοχῆσαι τοῦ τραχή-
λε περιστροφῇ, καὶ τὴν τοῦ δακτύλου ἕλτασιν, καὶ τὸ ἐπάραι τὰ βλέ-
φαρα, καὶ τὸ καθιζόμενον εἶσθαι, καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἡρεμῆσαι, καὶ τὸ
λαλῶντα σιγῆσαι, καὶ ἐπὶ μυελίων εὐροι ὡς ἂν δυνάμει ἴσα ἐνυπάρ-
χουσαι τῶν ἐναντίων δικτικῶν, ἃ εὖτε ἂν γένοιτο ἐξ εἰμαρμένης τὰ ὅσα
ἐξ αὐτῆς ἔδχεται τοῦ εὖ ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ ἐναντίον. “ Namely to move
“ any of ones Limbs, to turn one’s Neck this way or that,
“ to put forth the Finger, to lift up the Eyebrows, to stand
“ when one has been sitting, to give over walking, to hold
“ ones peace from talking; and in a thousand other Instances one
“ may observe a Power of acting *contrariwise*, which cannot
“ proceed from Fate (or Necessity); for what Things proceed
“ from that do not admit of *Contrariety*. Euseb. Prep. Evang.
lib. 6. p. 271. & Alex. Aphrodis. de Fato, p. 43, 44.

Plutarch in like manner observes; Τὸ δὲ περιπατεῖν καὶ μὴ, καὶ
εἶσα ταῦτα, ἃν ἐκείνων ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνθρώπινῃ ὁρμῇ ὑποτέτακται, ὃ δὲ
ἐφ’ ἡμῶν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν λέγεται. De Fat. p. 571. “ To
“ walk or not, either of which is wholly in Man’s Power, is
“ that which is call’d *Choice* and the Power of Action that is
“ in us.

equal

equal Distances from me, and then tell me I might take one of them if I pleas'd; does he think I should not have a *Power* of taking either of them?

He may try the Experiment if he has any Doubt of it: and yet 'tis evident there is no Motive to determine me to take *one* rather than the *other*, and so my taking one must be determined merely by my *Will*, without any other Motive whatsoever; and is a direct Proof of a *free* internal Power of Action. The only Shift which is left in such a Case is his saying, *that minute Causes may determine the Actions of Men, which neither others nor they themselves are sensible of.* (p. *ibid.*) But to suppose a Man to act by *Motives* and *Causes*, of which he is not conscious or sensible, is the same as to suppose him to act without any Reason or *Motive* at all; to act without *Understanding* and without *Intelligence*, which is something, if possible, more grossly absurd than any thing our Author had fallen into before; and if such Reasoning is to be allowed, I might with equal Reason argue against *Necessity*, that my *Heart* and *Pulse* beat by some imperceptible Direction of my *Will*, *which neither others nor my self are sensible of.*

It is plain that Men are in great Straits, when, in arguing that all Men's Actions are *necessary* Effects of impulsive Causes, they are forc'd to allow, that those impulsive Causes, which are so strong as to force the Mind into

Action, even against apparent Motives to the contrary (as in taking suppose *one* Guinea rather than *two*, when each are offered, which, no doubt is in every ones Power to do) and are able to put the Body into Motion, yet are so *minute* and imperceptible, that neither *others*, nor they who are by them impelled into Action, are sensible or conscious of any such impulsive Causes, but on the contrary cannot help thinking, that the Action wholly proceeds from *Will* and *Choice*.

If our *Senses* are deceived in our *Actions*, they may as well be deceived in every thing beside; and I think 'tis not clearer to the *Senses* or *Understanding* (nor indeed so clear and certain to the latter) that Matter or any external Object of the Senses exists at all, than that our *Actions* are the Result of an inward *self-moving* and *free* Power of the Mind: and I desire to be inform'd where the *Blunder* (as *Cato* calls it) is of supposing such a *self-moving Principle*.

Any one will find it as difficult to conceive and give an Account *how* one Thing is mov'd by another, as *how* the Mind moves itself or the Body; and yet it is evident that there is *Motion* in the World, and, I think, as evident that there is *Self-motion*.

The only Argument of *Cato* that remains to be consider'd, is; that he says, 'Tis ridiculous to say, that tho' the Mind has a Principle of *Self-motion*, yet other Causes cooperate to produce the Action,
for

for if any other Cause makes it to do what it wou'd not otherwise do, that is the Cause or Co-cause of the Action produc'd to all the Purposes of this Argument. (p. 193.)

This is only arguing, that because the Mind, endued with *Reason*, does not chuse to *act*, but upon precedent *Reason* to do so, or upon the Inducements of what appears to it to be reasonable Motives of Action, rather than upon mere Humour and Willfulness, therefore it does not *act at all*, or, what is all one, does not *act freely*. Because the Mind will not do many Things which it can do and has a Power to do, without some Cause to do them, or because it does not and will not always exercise its Power of Action, as Children do, in trifling and indifferent Things, and to no Purpose; because it acts generally upon precedent Motives, that is, acts *reasonably* rather than otherwise; therefore, according to this Author, it *acts necessarily*. Thus that very *Reason* of our Natures, which the most learned and thinking Men have thought to be an Argument and Proof of our *Liberty of Action*, is by this Gentleman made use of to infer on the direct contrary, that our Actions are *necessary*; and the Sum of his Reasoning is, that a *rational* Nature cannot *act voluntarily*; which, whether it be more *ridiculous* in *Cato* to assert, or in others to deny, I leave every intelligent Reader to consider.

In

In Conclusion; Our *Cato* replies to an Argument, which Dr. *Clarke* had made use of to shew, that the *Reasons* and *Motives* upon which a Man acts, are not the immediate and efficient Cause of the *Action*; because, if so, then either abstract *Notions* (as all *Reasons* and *Motives* are) are in themselves *Substances*, or else that which has no real *Subsistence* can put a *Body* into *Motion*.

Cato's Reply is; We see and feel, that *Desires* and *Fears*, that abstract *Notions* or *Images* of the *Brain*, alter the *Disposition* of the whole *Fabric*, and often destroy the whole *Contexture* of it. (p. 195.)

This is true, but nothing to the Purpose to shew, that abstract *Notions* are the immediate and efficient Cause of *Action* or active *Motion*, which is Dr. *Clarke's* Argument.

I grant that abstract *Notions*, such as sudden *Surprises*, violent *Passions*, or *Madness* will, by a forcible and irresistible *Impulse*, compel the *Mind* to move the *Body*; in such Cases, tho' the abstract *Notions* do not immediately themselves move the *Body*, yet, which is all one, they force the *Mind* to move it whether it will or no; but then this *Motion* (tho' call'd *Action*) is no more really or properly *Action*, than the *Motion* of a *Man*, who is driven by a *Storm* or *Whirlwind*, is an *Action*; or than the *Impression*, made upon the *Fætus* by the *Longings* of *Women* (which is *Cato's* Instance) is the *Action* of the
Women.

Women. If it shall be insisted on that every *Event* or *Effect*, howsoever produc'd, is an *Action*; then the *Motions* of *Ships* and *Clocks* are *Actions*, and all *Motion* is *Action*, and there will be no such Thing as *Passion* in Nature: and yet nevertheless there will appear to be as much Difference betwixt these *natural Motions* and *human Actions*, as between the Ideas of *Necessity* and *Freedom*. The Argument of *Cato* therefore proves no more, than that as the Mind may in some Instances be depriv'd of its *Memory* and *reasoning* Faculties, so it may also be depriv'd of its *Will*: but this is no more an Argument that the Mind rightly dispos'd has not a *Will*, than that it has not the Faculty of *Memory* or *Understanding*; and he might as well have argued that the Mind has no *Memory* or *Understanding*, because it *forgets* and does not *understand* many Things, as that it has no *Will*, because it cannot make use of it in some Cases. Therefore the Effects of *excessive Desires and Fears* are not *Actions* but *Passions*; but wherever the Mind has Power to **reason*, *reflect*,

* *Alex. Aphrodisius* makes a Distinction betwixt mere *Spontaneity* (which he ascribes to Beasts) and *voluntary Agency*; and supposeth no *Exertion* of the human Mind to be an *Action* and the Effect of *Choice*, but where the *Exertion* is preceded by *Reason* and a *deliberate Judgment* in the Agent. His Words are; *Ὅτι μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ τὴν ἐκείνων καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἑμῶν. ἐκείνων γὰρ ὁ δὲ τὸ ἐφ' ἑμῶν γινώσκον ἐν νουθεσίᾳ, ἐφ' ἑμῶν δὲ τὸ γινώσκον μὴ ἐν*

reflect and deliberate, the Effect following is properly an *Action*, and is *voluntary* and *free*; and the *immediate and efficient Cause of the Action*, is not the *abstract Motives*, upon which the Mind acts, but the *voluntary Exertion of Power* in the Mind itself.

There is another Letter of *Cato* on the same Subject, which, containing no Argument that has not been already considered, needs not to be particularly reply'd to.

Thus I have examined every Argument which *Cato* hath offered against the *Freedom* of the *Actions* of both *God* and *Men*, and in *Defense* of the *Necessity* of them; and have, I think, fully shown the *Insufficiency* and *Weakness* of every one of

αὐτὰ λόγον τε καὶ κέλευσιν συγκατατίθεται. "Spontaneity and the
 "Agency that is in us, is not one and the same; for that is
 "spontaneous which is done merely with an unforc'd Assent;
 "but Agency is when a Thing is done with Assent accompa-
 "nied with Reason and a Power of judging in the Agent.

De Fat. p. 72.

Again; Τὰ δὲ μόνα τῶν κατ' ὁρμὴν γινωμένων τὸ εἶναι ἡμῶν ἔχει
 εἶναι κατὰ λόγον καὶ ὁρμὴν ἐπιδραμεῖται. λογισμὸς δὲ εἶναι ὁρμὴν ἐν τοῖς βυ-
 λαιτικοῖς καὶ προαισθητικοῖς γινωμένοις, τυτέστιν ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅταν
 ἐπὶ τοῖς γένει. "Those Exertions of the Mind only are
 "properly Agency, which are the Exertions of a rational
 "Being; but the Exertion of a rational Being is that which
 "proceeds upon Deliberation and Choice, that is, such an Exer-
 "tion as is proper to Men. *Ibid.* p. 152.

them:

them; and at the same time have prov'd on the one Hand that God is a *Free-agent*, and hath endued Man with a *free* and *self-moving* Power of Action; and on the other Hand, that the Scheme of *Necessity* is clearly inconsistent with the *Nature*, *Existence* and *Reason* of Things; and is not only the most *filly* but the most *wicked* Hypothesis that ever enter'd into the Thoughts of Men. Therefore as a Conclusion of the whole, I will briefly set before the Reader's View the different Nature and *Consequences* of the two Notions of *Liberty* and of *Necessity*.

I. The Notion of God's being a *Free-agent* represents him as having (besides the *natural* Perfections of *necessary Existence*, *Eternity*, *Immensify*, *Omnipotency* and *Omniscieny*) the *moral* Perfections of *Wisdom*, *Holinefs*, *Goodness* and *Justice*: That he is not only in himself most *perfect* and *independent*, but is properly the *first Cause*, and the *original Agent* and Author of all other Things; that the Existence of all other Beings depends upon his *Will*, by which *Will*, as the *immediate efficient* Cause of all his Actions, his *Power* and *Knowledge* are exercis'd in the Production of a wonderful Variety of *unintelligent* and *intelligent* Beings, endued by him with various *Properties*, *Faculties* and *Modes* of Existence, all most *wisely* contriv'd and adapted to the several *Ends* intended by them.

D d

That

That the *unintelligent* Creation is wholly directed and governed without any *Agency of its own*, by those natural *Powers* and *Laws* of Motion which God originally impress'd upon it; by which it is supported and hinder'd from falling into Disorder and Confusion, and is continually subject to God's Power and Dominion; but that the *intelligent* and *rational* Part of the Creation is endued with *Liberty* and a Power of *Self-motion*, and of directing its own Actions; and is therefore governed by God, as being not a mere *efficient* but a *moral* Agent by the *eternal* and *immutable* Laws of *Reason*, which are propos'd to its *Choice*; and Obedience or Disobedience to which are attended with suitable *Rewards* and *Punishments*. Upon this Principle of *Free-agency* is founded the Nature and Original of *Good* and *Evil*; of all *Religion* and *Piety* towards *God*, and of all *Vertue* and *Righteousness* towards *Men*. God hereby renders himself an Object of *Worship*, and a *Rewarder* or *Punisher* of Men's Behaviour.

It is thro' the *free* Exercise of God's *providential* Power that he has made many *Events* to depend upon our *free Actions*, and thereon is founded the *Reason* and *Obligation* of our *Prayers* and *Praises* to him, and the Ground and Expectation of receiving *Mercies* and *Blessings* from him.

Upon this Principle also is founded the Notion of *natural Right* and *Property* among Men, of *Society* and *Government*, and the *Reason* of Laws for the Protection and Encouragement of those who *do well*, and for the Discouragement and Punishment of those who *do Evil*.

In short; the *Perfections* of God, all the Works of his *Nature* and *Providence*, all the Effects of his Power, and all the Proceedings and Actions of Men, and their Condition both here and hereafter, plainly presuppose *Liberty of Action*, and can be accounted for on no other Principle.

II. From the Notion of *Necessity* it demonstratively follows, that God has no *moral* Attributes or Perfections, is neither *wise*, *holy*, *just* or *good*; all which depend upon his being so, not by *Necessity* but by *Choice*; besides that the same is demonstrated from the Works of Creation and Providence, which, upon the Supposition of *Necessity*, cannot be reconcil'd to the Notion of a *wise*, *just*, or *good* Being.

It follows hence also, that God is not an *Agent* or *real Cause* at all of the *Existence* of any thing; that all the Effects of his Knowledge and Power in the Creation are no more properly *his Acts*, than the Existence of his own *Nature* and *Attributes* are his Acts; that either God is a *passive*

Being, and does not *act*, but is *acted* upon by a *coercive* Cause in the Works of Creation, or else that nothing is *created*, but *Matter* is *self-existent*, *eternal*, *immutable* and *infinite* as God himself is, and *independent* of him, both which are equally and infinitely absurd.

It follows also from the Notion of *Necessity*, that nothing could be *varied*, or exist in any other *Manner*, *Form*, *Time* and *Place* than it is, or be *different* in any *Mode* or *Circumstance* from what it is.

It follows again hence, that as God is not the proper and *efficient Cause*, and consequently not the *natural* Governor or Creator of the Universe; so hereby his *moral* Government is entirely excluded; for not being a *Free-agent* himself, he could not make Man to be so; the Consequence of which is, that as there are no *moral* Attributes in God, so there can be no *Morality* in Men: Upon this Principle therefore God cannot be an Object of Worship at all, or a Rewarder or Punisher of *Virtue* and *Vice*, *Good* and *Evil*; because the Essence of these Things depends upon their being Matters of *Choice*, and in our Power to do or not: So that all *Religion* and *Piety* towards God is fundamentally subverted by the Scheme of *Necessity*. And not only so, but the Disposition and Events of Things, if proceeding from *Necessity*, shew that the Nature whence they are derived is not
only

only not *good* or *just*, but that it is *unjust* and *evil*.

By this Notion also the Difference of *Right* and *Wrong*, and of all *social* and *personal* Merit and Demerit amongst Men, and consequently the *Principles* and *Laws* of all Society and Government are wholly destroy'd; the Essence of these being founded on the Supposition of Men's having a Power over their own Actions, and *freely* doing Good and abstaining from doing Evil. In short, the Scheme of *Necessity* destroys the *Perfections*, and consequently the Being and Existence of God; it contradicts all our Knowledge of the Works of Nature and Providence; and all the Sense of our own Conduct and Behaviour here, and takes away the Ground of all our Hopes and Expectations hereafter.

And since this Doctrine so manifestly tends to corrupt Men's Natures, and their Notions of *God*, and of the Difference of *Good* and *Evil*; and can serve no End but to let Men loose to *indulge their Lusts and Passions, without using

* Εἰς ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν, καὶ ἄλλα μύρια κακὰ παρορμᾶ, καὶ προτρέπει τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ δόγμα ἀνατροπὴν τῶ κατὰ βίαν ἀνθρώπου κατεργαζόμενον.

" This Opinion (of Necessity) is an Incentive and Encouragement to *Licentiousness*, *Injustice*, and a thousand other
" Evils


using their Endeavours to restrain them; and so to throw all Societies into Disorder and Confusion, and render the Communion of Men with each other more pernicious and mischievous than that of wild Beasts; leaving no Restraint to their worst Actions and greatest Enormities but the Terror of human Laws, taking away at the same time the *Reason* and Obligation of them; and supporting Men in the Practice of such Vices and Impieties as will make them miserable both here and hereafter.

Since all this, I think, is demonstratively the Consequence of the Notion of the *Necessity of human Actions*, it may well become the Defenders of this Opinion, who, I hope, are *serious Men*, to revise what they have written on this Subject, and to be well persuaded that there is no corrupt and immoral Prejudice in their Breasts which has engag'd them in Defense of so unhappy a Cause, so destructive of all *Piety, Virtue* and *Honour*: and in which therefore, I think, they ought (with all Men) to wish at least that they may be found to be mistaken; and to be both willing and ready upon their own Conviction to use their Endeavours to undeceive those of unthinking or corrupt Dispositions, who may

“ Evils, and directly tends to the Subversion of every Condition of Life. *Euseb. Prep. Evang. lib. 6. c. 6. p. 243.*

have been misled by their fallacious but artful Methods of Reasoning, pleasing to Men's Lusts and Passions, into an Opinion so contrary to their *Reason and Understanding as Men*, to their true Interest and Property as Members of a *Community*; and above all to their future Happiness and Salvation, as Believers and Worshippers of the *true God*, and still more so, as Professors of the *Christian Religion*.

F I N I S.



Corrigenda.

PAge 57. line 26. read *cadere*. p. 73. l. 26. r. γινώσκων.
 p. 88. l. 22. r. ἔχουσι. p. 116. l. pen. r. ἔχων. p. 154.
 l. ult. r. ἔχουσι. p. 165. l. 25. r. διοικῶσι. p. 172. l. 10. r.
Plutarch. p. 184. l. penult. r. ἐκείνων.



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